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ABSTRACT 
 
CONFLICTING VOICES AND STRATEGIC CHOICES: 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE HETEROGENEITY AND STRATEGIC 
ACTIONS 
 
SEPTEMBER 2015 
 
CHETAN CHAWLA, B.A., DELHI UNIVERSITY 
 
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Anurag Sharma 
 
 
The mix of debt and equity in a firm’s capital structure has been associated with 
varied strategic actions, such as diversification and innovation. Different forms of 
debt and equity have been associated with particular types of strategic actions. 
Although there are clear differences between debt and equity, I argue there are 
also similarities across the two forms of capital. I develop a theoretical framework 
to categorize both debt and equity along the dimensions of time horizon and risk 
tolerance, so as to categorize the providers of capital as Transient Equity, 
Dedicated Equity, Transactional Debt, and Relational Debt. I then empirically 
investigate the association between the presence of these four forms in the capital 
structure of firms and their strategic actions.  
 
My theory development is anchored in transaction cost economics, which 
conceptualizes debt and equity as not merely financing choices but also 
governance structures (Williamson, 1988).  Debt (rules) resembles markets while 
equity (discretion) has features of hierarchies. My integrated categorization of 
 
vii 
heterogeneous debt holders and equity holders along the dimensions of time 
horizon and risk tolerance augments this transaction cost reasoning to within debt 
and equity. I test my hypotheses on multiple panels of publicly held U.S. firms 
between 1996 and 2010 in the contexts of diversification, research & development 
(R & D), and mergers & acquisitions (M & A). After controlling for endogeneity 
– using Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) regressions for dynamic panels 
with robust inference – I find strong support for the hypothesized relationships in 
the case of mergers and acquisitions; and partial support for association between 
forms of capital and diversification, and research and development. In essence, 
my theory development and empirical analysis suggests a more nuanced role in 
strategy formation of capital providers than envisioned in extant theory.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“ Equity is soft, debt hard. Equity is forgiving, debt insistent. Equity is a 
pillow, debt a sword. Equity and debt are the Yin and Yang of corporate 
finance…Equity lulls management to sleep, forgiving their sins more 
readily than a death-bed priest...Debt’s edge jabs management awake, 
demanding attention.” 
 
Stewart & Glassman (1988: 81) 
 
 
The colorful characterization above (Stewart & Glassman, 1988) 
underlines the persistent view of debt and equity as being bestowed with distinct 
attributes, and consequently distinctively associated with firm level strategic 
actions. A call to investigate these associations between capital structure and firm 
strategy was made thirty years ago (Bettis, 1983) along with an insistence to avoid 
simplifying assumptions in such investigations (Barton & Gordon, 1987). 
Management scholars have heeded such calls by investigating strategic 
implications of equity (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010b; Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Tihanyi, Johnson, 
Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003) and debt heterogeneity (David, O'Brien, & Yoshikawa, 
2008). Unfortunately, this research has bifurcated into two independent streams, 
one investigating debt and the other equity heterogeneity, each assuming the other 
homogeneous. In this dissertation, I combine these distinct literatures to 
investigate the joint implications of debt and equity heterogeneity on strategic 
actions. 
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Williamson (1988) argued that debt and equity have governance attributes 
of markets (rules) and hierarchies (discretion) respectively. However, 
conceptualizing and examining debt and equity separately weakens the ability to 
understand the governance aspects of capital structure (Williamson, 1988) by 
suppressing attributes that the two forms of capital hold in common. This is 
especially relevant now as strategy scholars have moved beyond homogenous 
conceptions of debt and equity to recognition of heterogeneity within debt (David 
et al., 2008; O'Brien, David, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2014) and equity (Hoskisson 
et al., 2002). That is, not all equity is the same nor is all debt the same; 
considerable within-group differences remain as different types of equity holders 
bring different motivations to their role as residual owners and, similarly, 
different debt holders differ from each other as well. Researchers have noted that 
neither all equity holders (Hoskisson et al., 2002) nor all debt holders (David et 
al., 2008) speak with the same voice. In fact, some equity holders may be aligned 
less with other equity holders and more with certain debt holders, and vice versa.  
The usual distinctions between debt and equity may, in other words, undermine 
the ability to credibly understand the relationship between capital structure and 
strategic choices made by firms (cf. Hoskisson et al., 2002).   
 
Given the tendency to conceptualize debt and equity as fundamentally 
different from each other, the many conflicting voices in the capital structure are 
heard in isolation—thereby fragmenting research by shackling debt and equity 
heterogeneity into separate silos. Extant literature has investigated the association 
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between different groups of equity holders or different groups of debt holders, 
separately, with firm strategic actions such as diversification (Kochhar & Hitt, 
1998; Ngah-Kiing Lim, Das, & Das, 2009; Tihanyi et al., 2003) and innovation 
(David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001; David et al., 2008). This separation is perhaps 
driven by a persistent view amongst management scholars of equity and debt as 
merely financing choices. Viewed from this constricted lens, debt and equity are 
simply modes of raising capital and thus their associations with firm outcomes are 
investigated in isolation. 
 
Viewed from a wider lens, the combination of debt and equity 
heterogeneity is critical since their division has had far reaching repercussions on 
our understanding of capital structure’s influence on strategic actions. First, this 
division has led to the assumption of homogeneity of either debt or equity holders 
(David et al., 2008). This has prevented theoretical development to understand the 
underlying dimensions and interactions of these diverse groups of debt and equity 
holders embedded in capital structure.  
 
Second, if the choice of debt and equity has governance implications – as 
suggested by transaction cost reasoning – then these differing implications must 
extend within debt and equity also. The current literature assumes these 
governance implications are limited to between debt and equity. Consequently, 
lack of theoretical integration connecting these diverse capital structure groups 
has diluted the original vision of a “combined treatment of corporate finance and 
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corporate governance” (Williamson, 1988: 567). The impact of this assumption 
on the transaction cost perspective has been a predominant focus on transaction 
(e.g. uncertainty) and resource (e.g. asset specificity) attributes at the expense of 
governance structures (Williamson, 1991). 
 
Third, the selective picking of some elements of capital structure over 
others weakens the link between management theory and practice (Foss & 
Hallberg, 2013). This may explain the lack of support for ownership-performance 
studies (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003), all of which assume debt 
homogeneity. The assumption of debt homogeneity in research is surprising since 
studies indicate that in practice a high proportion of large U.S. public firms, the 
most common sample used in management research (Short, Ketchen, & Palmer, 
2002), combine different forms of debt (Colla, Ippolito, & Li, 2013; Rauh & Sufi, 
2010). In fact, in their sample of large public firms, Rauh and Sufi found that 53% 
of firm-year observations employ bank debt while 55% employ bonds, in other 
words: “A substantial fraction utilize both” (2010: 4251). Thus, there are perhaps 
substitutive or complementary governance implications of debt heterogeneity that 
have been disregarded in management literature. The governance implications of 
a holistic range of capital structure may thus inform corporate governance 
research.  
 
 Extant research on capital structure suggests that varied equity holders 
differ in their support for strategic actions based on differences in their time 
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horizons. For example, the long-term orientation of pension fund managers 
predisposes them to favor internal innovation in the form of R & D investments 
by firms (Hoskisson et al., 2002). This is because the long-term payoffs of such 
internal innovation (David et al., 2001) are aligned with the investment time 
horizons of pension funds. Parallel research suggests that support for innovation 
varies amongst debt holders due to different risk tolerances. Relational debt 
holders (i.e. banks) have been found to support R & D investments by firms since 
close and repeated interactions between these relational debt holders and firms 
reduces information asymmetries and increases the risk tolerance and adaptability 
of lenders (David et al., 2008).  
 
In this dissertation, therefore, I offer a new conceptualization whereby 
debt and equity are reframed along two important dimensions of time horizon and 
risk tolerance of capital—and thereby reassess the influence that different types of 
capital (combinations of equity and debt) have on the strategic choices of firms. 
Specifically, research suggests that long-term dedicated equity holders represent 
patient capital that is positively related to innovation, i.e., firm R & D spending. 
Conversely, short-term transient equity holders represent impatient capital that 
has a negative influence on innovation (Bushee, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Lee 
& O'Neill, 2003). Parallel to such equity heterogeneity research, results in the 
debt heterogeneity literature suggest that short-term transactional debt (i.e. bonds) 
negatively impacts innovation. On the other hand, long-term relational debt 
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positively impacts innovation (David et al., 2008). Thus, I argue that the 
dimensions underlying both debt and equity are the same. 
 
In summary, I offer two distinct contributions in this dissertation. One, 
when viewed from a transaction cost lens (Williamson, 1988), both debt and 
equity have governance implications that are adapted to particular types of 
strategic actions. Generally, debt follows a more rigid, rule-based governance 
regime (akin to markets) while equity follows a more discretionary governance 
regime (akin to hierarchy). I extend this transaction cost conceptualization by 
arguing that these governance attributes are driven by the dimensions of time 
horizon and risk tolerance and extend to different forms of debt and equity.  
 
The second contribution centers on the mediation mechanisms driving the 
association between capital structure and strategic actions. Innovation and 
diversification entail significant investments and involvement from top executives 
of the firm (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992). Also, different forms of opportunism 
and exchange hazards hamper markets and hierarchies and therefore require 
specific mitigation devices. Executive compensation, through incentives, 
mitigates opportunism in the form of holdup that is prevalent in market 
governance (i.e., impatient capital). While, the board of directors, through 
monitoring, mitigates moral hazard prevalent in hierarchical governance (i.e., 
patient capital) by facilitating proprietary information exchange.  
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To develop this thesis, I begin with an integrated literature review of the 
association between capital structure and strategic actions (chapter 2). In the 
theory development section (chapter 3), I begin by establishing the governance 
structures embedded in capital structure. Next, I develop a theoretical model that 
explains the governance attributes of diverse debt and equity holders using the 
dimensions of time horizons and risk tolerance. I further posit that the board of 
directors and compensation mediates the relationship between capital structure 
heterogeneity and strategic actions. The methods section (chapter 4) provides data 
sources and an explanation of the analysis used – Generalized Methods of 
Moments regressions – to control for endogeneity. The results (chapter 5) and 
discussion (chapter 6) sections present my findings. In essence, my theorizing is 
strongly supported in the context of Mergers and Acquisitions; while the mixed 
results for Diversification and Research and Development suggest that capital 
structure plays a more nuanced role than extant theories have conceived. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY – AN INTEGRATED REVIEW 
AND ASSESSMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Capital structure – the mix of debt and equity used to finance a firm – and, 
its influence on firms is perhaps one of the oldest themes in corporate governance 
(Berle & Means, 1932). Berle and Means focused on the dispersion of ownership 
amongst equity holders and the resulting separation of ownership and control. In 
more recent decades, capital structure scholarship has encompassed research 
incorporating owners (i.e. equity holders) as well as creditors (i.e. debt holders). 
The purpose of this literature review is to take an integrated view of capital 
structure and its linkages to firm strategic actions such as diversification and 
innovation. I incorporate 66 representative papers (see Tables 1 – 3) selected from 
the top management journals. Considering the scope of this dissertation, I focus 
my discussion on papers that investigate the association between capital structure 
variables and the strategic actions of diversification and innovation. 
 
 In the eight decades since the foundational work by Berle and Means, 
capital structure research can be classified into three distinct waves of 
investigations: The first wave was triggered in finance by a set of papers 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963) that argued for the irrelevance of capital 
structure for firm valuation. These analytical works were underpinned by 
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idealized assumptions, such as perfect markets, that subsequent research has 
relaxed (Myers, 2001) in order to empirically test the linkages between capital 
structure and firm strategic actions, performance and valuation. The bulk of this 
research in management (n = 17 in this review) has conceptualized capital 
structure as leverage, i.e., as made up of homogeneous debt holders and equity 
holders. 
 
Subsequent research has evolved from considering capital structure to be 
simply firm leverage to recognition of heterogeneity within capital structure. 
These constitute the second wave of research papers (n = 40 in this review) that 
have gone beyond simple leverage ratios to investigate associations between 
heterogeneous groups of equity holders and firm strategic actions such as 
diversification, innovation and corporate social performance. This literature 
equates ownership, i.e., equity holders, with governance (Connelly, Hoskisson, 
Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010a; Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003b) in all its myriad 
forms and contexts. A flourishing subset of this literature investigates family 
ownership. Although vast, family businesses have recently been reviewed 
(Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012; Schulze & Gedajlovic, 
2010) and are beyond the scope of this dissertation – they are therefore excluded 
from this broader review of the capital structure literature.  
 
This second wave of capital structure research has kept pace with changes 
in the governance landscape (Daily et al., 2003b), which has evolved since the 
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Berle and Means era. Instead of dispersion of ownership and its separation from 
control, firm management faces diverse blockholders and institutional investors 
(Johnson, Schnatterly, Johnson, & Chiu, 2010) who may even act as monitoring 
substitutes of the board of directors (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & Garc ́Ia-
Cestona, 2013). These changes, i.e. shift from dispersed to concentrated 
ownership, have intensified in recent years. For example, pension funds have 
become the predominant form of long-term equity capital available for firms 
(Buttonwood, 2012).  
 
Finally, the third wave of capital structure research investigates the 
association between heterogeneous groups of debt holders and firm strategic 
actions. This is a promising research area whose sparseness (n = 9) reflects a 
pervasive debt homogeneity assumption (David et al., 2008). Nonetheless, 
research suggests that different kinds of debt holders are differentially associated 
with firm financing (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994a), knowledge capabilities (Uzzi & 
Gillespie, 2002), innovation (David et al., 2008) and diversification (O'Brien et 
al., 2014). Research also indicates that the majority of large public U.S. firms 
carry multiple forms of debt (Rauh & Sufi, 2010) and that debt specialization, i.e. 
debt homogeneity, is a feature of relatively smaller firms that are unrated in credit 
markets (Colla et al., 2013).  
 
This continuing evolution of capital structure and its association with firm 
strategy calls for an updated review that incorporates all three waves of research: 
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homogeneous debt/equity, equity heterogeneity and debt heterogeneity. Extant 
reviews have focused primarily on the ownership as governance literature, i.e., 
equity heterogeneity (Connelly et al., 2010a; Daily et al., 2003b). These important 
and impactful reviews underscore the significance of the broader capital structure 
research – spanning both between and within debt holder and equity holder 
groups – which this review aims to highlight. Unfortunately, no recent review of 
this literature exits, with this review I seek to integrate these seemingly disparate 
literatures that investigate the association between capital structure heterogeneity 
and strategy.  
 
Another contribution of this review is to the broader corporate governance 
literature. Meta-analysis of the equity holder and firm performance relationship 
(Dalton et al., 2003) has yielded insignificant or equivocal results suggesting the 
presence of indirect effects. In other words, conflicting findings maybe driven by 
exclusion of strategic actions, which have for long been known to mediate the 
association between ownership and performance variables (Hill & Snell, 1988: 
585). Thus, the unsettled nature of the capital structure (across both debt and 
equity) and performance relationship may better explicated by incorporating 
strategic actions, i.e. intervening variables such as diversification and innovation, 
whose exclusion may be leading to equivocality in the ownership and governance 
literature.  
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This review spans 66 published papers that are representative of capital 
structure research in management. Of these 66 papers, 3 are theoretical and 63 are 
empirical studies, mainly from the top management journals: Academy of 
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Journal of Management and the Journal of Management Science. The 
earliest paper is a call for capital structure research (Bettis, 1983) in the Academy 
of Management Review published thirty years ago. Subsequent research was 
identified using keyword searches for capital structure, institutional investors, 
debt holders, relational debt and transactional debt. In addition, forward cites of 
the seminal papers were scanned to identify prospective papers for inclusion. 
Only papers incorporating qualitative investigations or hypotheses testing of 
capital structure variables and their relations to firm strategic actions were 
incorporated. The review that follows reflects the three waves of capital structure 
research discussed above – leverage (i.e. homogeneous debt and equity), equity 
heterogeneity and finally, debt heterogeneity. I conclude with a summary of 
future directions for capital structure research.   
Leverage 
 
The first wave of capital structure research – that assumed homogenous debt and 
equity represented capital structure, measured by leverage – in finance was 
triggered by a set of papers (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963) that argued for the 
separation of firm financing and firm investment strategy. The simplifying 
assumptions for these claims were perfect markets and firms categorized as 
homogenous classes of stock with similar income streams. Subsequent research 
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on firm capital structure has relaxed such unrealistic assumptions (Harris & 
Raviv, 1991). We now know that agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1988) defy any attempts at separating firm 
financing from firm strategy.  
 
Capital structure research came onto the radar screen of organizational 
scholars in the early 1980’s when Bettis called for greater integration between 
modern financial theory and strategic management (Bettis, 1983). The rise of 
modern financial theory centered on two developments: efficient market 
hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model. These developments suggest that 
the risk of a security could be divided into unsystematic and systematic risk. The 
former, i.e. unsystematic risk was the unique risk associated with a security that 
could be dealt with through portfolio diversification. The latter, i.e. systematic 
risk was a market-level risk that could not be diversified away.   
 
The call for synthesis between modern financial theory and strategic 
management (Bettis, 1983) centered on three conundrums created by the rise of 
modern financial theory: First, modern financial theory suggests that markets do 
not reward the mitigation of firm specific (i.e., unsystematic) risk, the raison 
d'être of strategy. Second, firms need to make information disclosures in order to 
enable investors to make forecasts with greater accuracy and thereby increase the 
value of the firm. However, these disclosures may decrease information 
asymmetries between the firm and its competitors thereby raising appropriability 
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hazards and imitation risks. Third, the modern financial theory paradigm is 
centered on efficient capital markets, the capital asset pricing model and equity 
holder wealth maximization. However, when facing international competition, 
U.S. firms may be at a disadvantage against nations that are not part of this 
paradigm. An example of such exceptions would be the low cost of capital 
enjoyed by many foreign competitors, especially state owned enterprises (1983: 
411). 
 
Bettis’ call did not go unchallenged, Peavy argued that modern financial 
theory is more aligned with strategy than previously believed (Peavy, 1984). For 
example, regarding the first conundrum raised by Bettis, Peavy argued: 
 
“In a diversified portfolio context beta is the only relevant risk measure 
because it gauges only the nondiversifiable systematic risk. However, an 
individual stock’s beta is affected by the total risk of the stock’s 
return…beta is affected by the fundamental business and financial features 
of the company…” 
Peavy (1984: 153) 
 
Therefore, modern financial theory does not expect managers to be 
negligent of unsystematic (i.e., firm specific) risks. For example, firm specific 
risks in the form of threat of entry can be diversified away by management, thus 
allying the prescriptions of both modern financial theory and corporate strategy. 
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In a similar manner, Peavy argued (1984: 155) that the second conundrum 
overstates the information asymmetries created by competitive secrecy. Investors 
simply want greater predictability of a firm’s future cash flows; this can be 
accomplished without jeopardizing these cash flows by reaching a middle ground 
of optimal information disclosure.  
 
This early Bettis – Peavy debate in The Academy of Management Review 
inspired the incorporation of capital structure research in strategic management. 
In a few years the three conundrums had transformed into acknowledgement of 
the critical association between capital structure and firm strategy. Scholars began 
arguing for a reverse flow of ideas, from strategy to finance (Barton & Gordon, 
1987). This was driven by a lack of consensus in finance over an optimal capital 
structure (Myers, 1984): “we know little about capital structure...our theories 
don’t seem to explain actual financing behavior” (1984: 575). Barton and Gordon 
argued for the unique opportunity for strategy by contributing to the 
interdisciplinary capital structure debate by bringing it to the level of the firm. 
 
Barton and Gordon claimed that conventional economic and financial 
theory seeking to explain capital structure was focused on industry or financial 
variables at the firm level. Thus, there was a relative neglect of non-financial 
considerations at the firm level. They argued that the potential contributions of 
strategy to the capital structure debate center on: firm level analysis, incorporation 
of top management team decisions and idiosyncrasies; and finally, going beyond 
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economic and financial goals to incorporate the multiple social and behavioral 
factors driving different stakeholders in the firm.  
 
Subsequent capital structure research in management has built on these 
ideas. Studies incorporating capital structure as leverage, i.e., composed of 
homogeneous debt and equity (n = 17), are summarized in Table 1. The first three 
of these papers are theoretical and have been discussed above. Key papers 
investigating the association between firm capital structure and the strategic 
actions of diversification and innovation are discussed below. 
 
Debt and Diversification  
 
Diversification is a key managerial policy lever for adapting to a 
constantly changing competitive landscape in the pursuit of superior performance 
(Schendel & Hofer, 1979). The difference between related and unrelated 
diversification are closely tied to the nature of firm resources (Kochhar & Hitt, 
1998), these in turn are closely linked to firm competitive advantage (Chatterjee 
& Wernerfelt, 1991) and its future performance (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 
2000). Fundamentally, the association between firm leverage and diversification 
rests on the redeployability of firm assets in case of default. Generally, firm 
specific assets (concomitant with related diversification) have a positive 
association with equity financing (i.e. lower leverage) since they are considered 
riskier for debt holders. Some of the seminal works in this literature are reviewed 
below.  
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Considering that the catalyst for capital structure research in strategy was 
a debate over the managerial role in mitigating firm level unsystematic risk, it is 
not surprising that researchers turned their attention to corporate debt and default 
risk (Sandberg, Lewellen, & Stanley, 1987). Combining an analytical and 
empirical study, Sandberg et al. (1987) proposed that historical standard 
deviations of firm return on assets (ROA) are sufficient in determining its 
probability of earnings shortfalls. Invoking signaling arguments (Ross, 1977), the 
authors suggest that firms should carry high leverage to communicate confidence 
to both capital markets and competitors, as well as to fend off any potential 
takeover bids. Since debt increases unsystematic firm risk, diversification became 
a common strategic outcome of interest for early strategy scholars. 
 
 However, in another initial study (Lubatkin & O'Neill, 1987) 
diversification was posited to leave unsystematic risk unaffected since managerial 
overconfidence (in case of related diversification) may add administrative risks. 
Instead, related diversification mitigates systematic risk as the firm’s market 
power increases and it is able to leverage its resources, capabilities, knowledge 
and economies over multiple related businesses. This allows firms to withstand 
exogenous shocks better than less diversified firms (1987: 670). Lubatkin and 
O’Neill found support for this in their sample of 297 U.S. mergers between 1954 
and 1973.  
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 In a follow-up empirical study (Barton & Gordon, 1988) to their earlier 
theoretical work (Barton & Gordon, 1987), Barton and Gordon found that 
managerial choice regarding diversification is associated with capital structure. In 
fact, the relationships between the financial variables and capital structure are 
contingent upon strategy (1988: 629). Generally, debt was negatively associated 
with profitability, but positively associated with sales growth. Specifically, related 
(diversification) and single business firms had the lowest debt levels. On the other 
hand, unrelated firms had the highest. These studies, while methodologically 
elementary compared to modern diversification investigations, were critical in 
establishing the association between capital structure and strategic actions and 
catalyzing the interest of strategy scholars. A subsequent replication of Barton and 
Gordon (1988) using Australian data (Lowe, Naughton, & Taylor, 1994; Taylor & 
Lowe, 1995) suggested that capital markets reward focused firms since they are 
easier to understand, findings in line with research on the conglomerate discount 
(Benner, 2007). 
 
 The rising influence of the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984) was evident in a study by Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991). 
They found that firm diversification strategy was predicated on the nature of its 
unutilized (or under-utilized) resources. Firms with excess knowledge and 
external financial resources (equity capital) are associated with related 
diversification. Excess internal financial resources (including debt capacity) was 
associated with unrelated diversification (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). 
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Interestingly, in both high and low performing firms, innovation was associated 
with related diversification.  
 
 Kocchar and Hitt (1998) investigated the debt and diversification linkage 
through a transaction cost lens. They found that the capital structure and strategy 
association is reciprocal as changes in asset specificity combine with capital 
market imperfections. For example, prior research (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 
1991) suggests that nature of resources affect firm diversification strategy. 
However, the nature of diversification itself is associated with capital structure 
and firm’s resource profile (Kochhar & Hitt, 1998). Generally, equity financing is 
linked with related diversification and firm specific assets. 
 
 This link between capital structure, strategy and firm resources was further 
developed in a paper linking the nature of resources with capital structure 
(Vicente-Lorente, 2001). Vicente-Lorente argued that opaque and firm specific 
resources reduce a firm’s borrowing capacity. This creates a fundamental 
contradiction between the goal of following a resource based strategy (Barney, 
1991) and seeking the lowest cost financing. This problem echoes the second 
conundrum raised by Bettis (1983) that highlighted an inconsistency between the 
transparency sought by capital providers and the strategic opacity required for 
competitive advantage. Thus, capital market imperfections may create 
insurmountable challenges for smaller or younger firms trying to grow by 
pursuing a resource driven strategy. This swing in the pendulum (Hoskisson, Hitt, 
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Wan, & Yiu, 1999) is ironic since it was firm level resource heterogeneity that 
was used to invoke the importance of strategy to the capital structure literature 
(Barton & Gordon, 1987). However, that very resource heterogeneity (especially 
if concomitant with resource opacity) may make financing expensive and the 
capital structure choice difficult. 
 
The issue of strategic opacity becomes more nuanced in the presence of 
environmental dynamism. For example, the leverage and diversification 
association is moderated by environmental dynamism (Ngah-Kiing Lim et al., 
2009). Their sample of 245 Singaporean listed firms from 1995 to 2000 reveals 
counterintuitive findings. Under stable conditions, unrelated diversification is 
associated with low debt while under dynamic conditions, such firms take on 
more debt. The authors argue that this unexpected result maybe driven by country 
effects (Singaporean firms being smaller on average than U.S. firms) due to which 
Singaporean firms maybe using the complexity and information asymmetries 
created by environmental dynamism to raise their debt levels. Such findings 
suggest that firm strategies pertaining to diversification are inexorably linked to 
firm financing since changes in firm resources modify its risk profile in the eyes 
of capital providers. 
 
Debt and Innovation 
 
 Strategy research over the last few decades has shifted its focus from 
industry levels of analysis to investigations of firm-level heterogeneity 
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(Hoskisson et al., 1999) , exemplified by the resource based view (Barney, 1991; 
Penrose, 1959). One of the key drivers of this firm-level heterogeneity is 
innovation. Similar to a related diversification strategy, the pursuit of innovation 
centers on the use of under- or un-used firm productive services (including 
managerial resources) for the introduction of new combinations of resources, i.e. 
innovation (Penrose, 1959: 85). However, such an emphasis on innovation is 
likely to create firm specific assets that increase the riskiness of debt. This is 
because firm R & D not only serves as a “stock of strategic resources such as 
innovative capabilities” (Vincente-Lorente, 2001: 162), but also proxies for the 
relative importance the firm gives to innovation (O'Brien, 2003). Some seminal 
papers linking firm leverage with innovation are reviewed below. 
  
Balakrishna and Fox (1993) proclaimed the primacy of firm-level 
heterogeneity in explaining capital structure. Using transaction cost arguments, 
they posited that firm specific effects contribute the most to leverage suggesting 
strong links between strategy and capital structure. These firm specific attributes 
are far more important than industry level factors in determining firm capital 
structure. For example, asset specificity (measured by R & D) is negatively 
related to debt in their sample of 295 U.S. firms. However, reputational assets 
(measured by advertising intensity) were positively related to debt. A 
contemporaneous study (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993) found a similar negative 
association between debt and innovation. However, in their context of 72 
leveraged buyouts between 1981 and 1987, the authors argued that this decline 
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(LBOs led to 40% decline in R & D intensity) was attributable to the agency role 
of debt in disciplining managers by reducing discretionary spending in pet 
projects, including R & D.  
 
 A more recent paper (O'Brien, 2003) argued that slack plays a key role for 
firms following a strategy of innovation. This is both because innovation 
capabilities are cumulative (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) and require regular 
expenditures as well as because such innovative firms may acquire outside 
capabilities to complement their own stock of resources (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992). Both these factors along with prior research on intangible 
assets suggest that firms pursuing a strategy of innovation (R & D intensity at 90 
percentile of industry) will prioritize slack and therefore have lower leverage. 
Furthermore, in his sample of 16,358 U.S. firms between 1980 and 1999 O’Brien 
found that innovative firms with low or median leverage saw positive 
performance effects.  
 
 The studies discussed above treated capital structure as simply leverage, 
i.e., the implicit assumption being that debt and equity are homogeneous. These 
studies have found that debt and diversification are linked primarily due to 
diversification’ role in shuffling of firm resources. These resources in turn change 
the riskiness of the firm for its capital providers. In the context of innovation, 
there is an increase in the stock of firm specific assets, which have lower 
redeployability in case of default. Thus, generally, slack and equity are preferable, 
compared to debt, when it comes to financing innovation. Theoretically, 
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environmental dynamism is expected to raise riskiness of firm strategies, as has 
been shown in U.S. samples (Simerly & Li, 2000). However, such findings may 
not hold in international institutional settings (Ngah-Kiing Lim et al., 2009; Ofori-
Dankwa & Julian, 2013). The evolution of this literature discussed above and its 
insightful findings suggest that a more realistic incorporation of capital structure – 
i.e., recognition of heterogeneity between and within different debt holder and 
equity holder groups – offers to increase our understanding of the capital structure 
and strategy relationship. The next set of papers reviewed take on part of this 
challenge by being cognizant of heterogeneity amongst equity holders. 
 
Equity Heterogeneity 
 
 
Scholars investigating the changing corporate governance landscape of the 
1980’s also realized the theoretical gains to be made by integrating capital 
structure and strategy research. Unlike the Berle and Means (1932) era, corporate 
America was witnessing a surge in institutional ownership of firms that belies the 
myth of dispersion of ownership (Holderness, 2009). From a mere 16% in the 
1960’s, institutional investors came to own 57% of U.S. corporate equity by 2000 
(Ryan & Schneider, 2002). This upward trend grows unabated, by 2010 
institutional investors owned 67% of U.S. equities by market capitalization 
(Aguilar, 2013; Blume & Keim, 2012). Instead of dispersion of stockholdings and 
separation of ownership and control, the corporate landscape witnessed the rise of 
institutions whose influence was felt by firms either through direct actions or 
through stock sell-offs (Porter, 1992).  
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These changes swept the governance landscape as the reversal of 
dispersed ownership combined with equity holders need to curb managerial 
tendency to entrench themselves (Davis & Thompson, 1994). In order to 
understand these developments and their associations with firm strategy, scholars 
began incorporating differences between equity holder groups as a key 
explanatory variable. Extant literature categorizes this research under the rubric of 
ownership as governance (Connelly et al., 2010a; Daily et al., 2003b). This 
literature forms the lion’s share of capital structure research in strategy, and is 
reviewed below. See Table 2 for an overview of these articles. Seminal articles 
investigating the links between firm equity holders and innovation, diversification 
and firm performance are discussed below. 
 
 
Equity holders and Innovation 
 
 
 The 1980’s were a decade of soul searching for American business. 
Globalization, especially the rise of Japan, was making both academic and 
corporate strategists realize the impact of corporate governance and ownership on 
competitiveness. A belief took hold that “the U.S. system of allocating investment 
capital both within and across companies appears to be failing” (Porter, 1992: 4). 
This institutional myopia logic was the key impetus for studies into the impact of 
equity holder concentration, and later equity holder types, on firm innovation. 
Investigations into the cause of this broader phenomena led scholars to identify 
different groups and types of equity holders as a key antecedent to firm 
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innovation, these investigations continue to this day and form the biggest subset 
of the equity holder heterogeneity literature.  
 
 An early study (Graves, 1988) was motivated by the anecdotal nature of 
the investor myopia accusation – i.e., institutional investors being negatively 
associated with firm investments in R & D and other long-term projects. In his 
sample of computer manufacturers between 1976 and 1985, Graves found that, 
ceteris paribus, institutional ownership was negatively associated with R & D. He 
concluded that this innovation suppression effect might be hampering U.S. 
international competitiveness. Contradicting these findings, another study (Hill & 
Snell, 1988) of research intensive industries established that stock concentration 
was positively associated with innovation. However, contrary to agency 
expectations, proportion of outside directors on board was negatively associated 
with innovation. 
 
 Baysinger and colleagues found results confirming the positive effects of 
insiders on boards on innovation in their sample of 176 Fortune 500 firms from 
1980 (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991). These results were contrary to the long-
held belief that innovation creates an employment risk for managers that cannot 
be diversified away, like financial risk (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). However, the 
association between stock concentration and innovation was mixed. Stock 
concentration amongst institutions was positively associated with innovation and 
concentration amongst individuals was negatively associated with innovation. 
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Thus, they argued, the positive impact of stock concentration on R & D is largely 
attributable to institutional investors.  
 
 More evidence against investor myopia kept accumulating (Hansen & 
Hill, 1991). In a 10-year longitudinal study of 129 firms, Hansen and Hill found 
that institutional investors are positively (but weakly) associated with innovation. 
Cash and debt were also positively associated with innovation, while insider 
holdings gave mixed results. Contrasting myopic investors with efficient market 
hypothesis, Hansen and Hill argued that the sole empirical result in favor of 
myopic investors (Graves, 1988) was an artifact of sample and methodological 
choices. They further posited two potential explanations for the positive 
association between institutional investors and innovation. First, using a weak 
form of efficient market hypothesis, the short-termism of equity holders maybe 
attributed to individual equity holders who lack the capabilities required for 
thorough firm analysis. This is in stark contrast to the highly capable research 
capabilities of institutions, i.e., institutions are superior investors. This is a 
persistent belief since percentage of outstanding shares held by a firm’ largest 
institutional investors has been associated with a perception of information 
advantage (Schnatterly, Shaw, & Jennings, 2008). The second possibility is that 
the large holdings of institutions make exits expensive, thereby leading to a “lock-
in”.  
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 The mounting evidence against the myopic investor hypothesis raised 
another question: is their any heterogeneity in the effect of different institutions 
and their impact on innovation? To answer this question, Kocchar and David 
(1996) utilized a categorization developed in financial economics (Brickley, 
Lease, & Smith, 1988) that classified institutional investors based on their 
susceptibility to management pressure. Institutions that may in some way be 
dependent on firms for business, such as banks and insurance companies, are 
classified as pressure-sensitive. Those that have no business with firms, such as 
public pension funds and mutual funds, are classified as pressure-resistant. Those 
institutions that fall into neither category, such as corporate pension funds, are 
classified as pressure-indeterminate.  
 
 In a sample of 135 U.S. manufacturing firms, Kochhar and David (1996) 
find that pressure-resistant institutional investors are positively associated with 
innovation (measured as new product announcements). Kochhar and David 
interpret this as support for their “active investor” hypothesis and rejection of both 
the myopic investor and superior investor hypotheses, since only pressure-
resistant investors were associated with innovation. The lack of support for the 
superior investor hypothesis was a significant finding and foreshadowed 
subsequent works in accounting that measured actual investor behavior and 
confirmed the prevalence of stock indexing amongst institutions (Bushee, 1998; 
Bushee, 2001). 
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 Once the association between active investors and innovation was 
established, the question of the nature of this activism arose. David et al. (2001) 
found that institutional investor activism has positive and both short and long-
term association with R & D inputs (i.e. expenditures). Specifically, one instance 
of activism (proxy-based) raises R & D inputs by 0.05% in the subsequent year 
and 0.025% over the long-term. These are not insignificant as they represent 9% 
and 44% respectively of within-firm standard deviation of R & D expenditures 
(2001: 149). Interestingly, activism has an indirect effect on R & D outputs (new 
product announcements) via R & D inputs (David et al., 2001). These findings 
corroborated the cumulative research till date, namely that equity holder 
heterogeneity was a critical factor in explaining firm-level variance in innovation.  
 
 Institutional ownership and board governance factors were combined in 
another investigation of the antecedents of innovation (Hoskisson et al., 2002). In 
their sample of 234 U.S. firms between 1985 and 1991, these scholars found that 
pension funds were positively associated with internal innovation (R & D 
expenditures) while investment funds were associated with external innovation 
(acquisitions). The authors argue that this is driven by the long-time horizons of 
pension funds that match the longer payoff periods of internal R & D projects. 
Similarly, investment manager short-term incentives match the faster market entry 
that acquisitions enable. Upholding previous findings (Baysinger et al., 1991; Hill 
& Snell, 1988), insider board members were associated with greater internal 
innovation. Interestingly, outsider board members were associated with external 
 
29 
innovation. These findings on innovation mirror those on corporate venturing, 
which is negatively associated with outsiders on the board and positively 
associated with executive stock options and long-term institutional investors 
(Zahra, 1996). 
 
 The equity holder and innovation association received nuanced support 
from a multi-country study (Lee & O'Neill, 2003) that contrasted the U.S. with 
Japan. Lee and O’Neill found similar positive associations between concentrated 
ownership in the U.S. but no effect in Japan. Furthermore, Japanese firms on 
average spend more on R & D suggesting that unlike the agency issues 
dominating the U.S. environment, Japanese managers are driven by stewardship 
concerns that align their incentives with equity holders – even if these equity 
holders are dispersed.  
 
 The Lee and O’Neill (2003) study brought out sharp distinctions between 
the markets for corporate control and the prevalent corporate governance 
paradigms (agency vs. stewardship) operating in the U.S. as opposed to countries 
like Japan. These differences imply that managerial incentives are likely to be 
important in the context of U.S. where agency problems seem to be more severe. 
A study of 250 U.S. firms (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003) revealed that one way in 
which managers balance the interests of short-term equity holders with the long-
term interests of firms is through stock buybacks. The presence of information 
asymmetries (measured by R & D) between the firm and its equity holders 
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increases the prevalence of stock repurchases as a mollifying mechanism. 
Furthermore, such “strategic satisficing” (2003: 166, 171) is more likely under 
conditions of unmet performance expectations and high CEO stock options.  
 
 Kim and colleagues (2008) explored the principal-principal conflict and its 
impact on the association between slack and innovation. A key tenet of the 
behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) is that organizational slack 
encourages risk-taking and experimentation exemplified by innovation. However 
this relationship is inverted-U shaped as it reverses at high levels of slack (Nohria 
& Gulati, 1996). In a sample of 253 Korean firms between 1998-2003, Kim and 
colleagues found that equity holders are differentially associated with this 
relationship (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008). Increasing ownership by foreigners and 
domestic institutions weakens the positive relationship between slack and 
innovation. Such owners further increase the negative relationship between slack 
and innovation (at higher levels of slack).   
 
 A recent paper (O'Brien & David, 2014) argues that the differences 
between the U.S. and Japan are driven primarily by the differing regimes both 
corporate cultures operate under. American firms follow a contractarian regime, 
while Japanese firms follow a communitarian regime in which reciprocity and 
embeddedness reign. In their sample of 2,123 Japanese firms (18,283 firm-year 
observations) between 1992 and 2004, the authors find that the pattern of 
problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963) is similar to those found in other 
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contexts, but R & D intensity will increase more for communitarian firms (those 
with domestic equity holders). Furthermore, communitarian Japanese firms raise 
their R & D search more than other contractarian firms (i.e. transactional or 
foreign owners) when performance exceeds expectations, since such 
communitarian firms tend to invest in growth opportunities. In contrast, firms 
with high transactional ownership cut R & D as performance rises above 
aspirations.  
 
 In summary, the last thirty years (1983-2013) have seen the capital 
structure and innovation debate come full circle. From early concerns of U.S. 
firms being at a disadvantage due to differing financial paradigms operating in 
countries with low cost of capital (Bettis, 1983), to concerns over investor myopia 
(Graves, 1988; Porter, 1992), research has found that equity holder heterogeneity 
has material impact on firm innovation strategies and that these vary with country 
contexts. Strategy research has also elaborated the nature of the mechanisms 
linking equity holder heterogeneity with innovation, ranging from transaction and 
agency costs to behavioral considerations. I next turn my attention to the literature 
linking equity holders with firm restructuring and diversification. 
  
Equity holders, Restructuring and Diversification 
 
Along with concerns about U.S. competitiveness and lack of investment in 
innovation, a parallel and prominent conversation in the 1980’s was 
diversification. The core arguments in the early investigations centered on the 
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disciplining influence of concentrated equity holders. Such concentrated equity 
holders have both the incentive and the clout to ensure that the link between firm 
diversification and performance remains positive. 
 
These concerns are evident in the study by Hill and Snell (1988) that 
investigated links between firm equity holder concentration and the strategic 
actions of innovation and diversification. Their findings on innovation have been 
discussed in the previous section.  In their sample of 94 research-intensive U.S. 
firms, contrary to expectations, proportion of outsiders on the board was 
positively associated with diversification. Such unrelated diversification was 
negatively associated with profitability, a finding confirmed by recent meta-
analysis (Palich et al., 2000). However, stockholder concentration was associated 
with more focused firms (Hill & Snell, 1988), a finding that corroborates prior 
work in economics (Amihud & Lev, 1981).  
 
A pair of papers (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Gibbs, 1993) featured in a 
special issue of the Strategic Management Journal (Vol. 14, 1993) on corporate 
restructuring further investigated the governance and capital structure antecedents 
of restructuring (changes in firm’s business portfolios and/or financial structure). 
In their sample of 93 firms, Bethel and Liebeskind found that a combination of 
agency and environmental factors were behind the restructuring wave. Firms 
“restructured in the 1980’s when opportunities arose, but only when pressured by 
blockholders” (1993: 16). Specifically, they find that firms with blockholders at 
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the outset of the restructuring wave (1981) were more likely to restructure. On the 
other hand, emergence of blockholders in firms with previously diffused 
ownership was negatively associated with firm growth and diversification. They 
interpret this finding in terms of the efficiency enhancing and disciplining 
influence of blockholders, leaving less room for later restructuring. The effect of 
institutional equity holders was opposite; they were positively associated with 
firm growth.  
 
 Financial restructuring (firms taking on debt and carrying out stock 
repurchases) is a key prescription of the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). 
Free cash flow is a necessary but not sufficient condition under the free cash 
model of agency costs, the other two conditions are existence of governance 
problems and the threat of takeover as a catalyst for restricting. Gibbs (1993) 
found that restructuring was motivated by such agency costs. In his sample of 70 
U.S. firms, Gibbs found that initial level of diversification was related to 
subsequent restructuring. High board power (product of proportion of outside 
directors and their tenure divided by tenure of insiders on the board) is associated 
with less restructuring. The management equity hypothesis was not supported.   
 
 The two key explanations for restructuring emerging in the literature at 
this time were inadequate governance and prior unrelated diversification. Scholars 
(Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994) suggested that there was a causal order 
linking inadequate governance, strategy, firm performance and finally, divestment 
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activity. In their sample of 203 U.S. firms between 1985 and 1990, Hoskissson 
and colleagues find that non-board member blockholders are associated with 
lower diversification. In turn, high levels of diversification are associated with 
higher debt intensity as well as an increase in divestment intensity.    
 
 At this point in the evolution of the capital structure literature, a key 
debate arose on the association between equity holder concentration and 
diversification. The crucial explanatory mechanism in strategy research linking 
capital structure and diversification rests on agency arguments (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Specifically, managerial propensities are directed 
towards reducing their employment risks. Therefore, lack of equity holder 
oversight (either direct or indirect through the board of directors) is associated 
with higher levels of unrelated diversification (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hill & 
Snell, 1988) which in turn are detrimental to firm performance (Palich et al., 
2000). This core narrative has not gone unchallenged (Lane, Cannella Jr, & 
Lubatkin, 1998).  
 
In a substantial replication and extension of the original Amihud and Lev 
(1981) study, Lane et al. (1998) invoked Bettis’ (1983) arguments on the 
paradigmatic differences between financial economics and strategy. Lane and 
colleagues argued that these differences and the growth of the management 
literature suggest that reiterating the agency theoretic links between inadequate 
governance and unrelated diversification based primarily on Amihud and Lev was 
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erroneous. In two separate datasets, one from the 1960’s replicating Amihud and 
Lev’s original data and another from the 1980’s, Lane et al. (1998) found no 
association between capital structure (stockholder concentration to signify owner 
control), board vigilance and corporate strategy (diversification). The authors 
claim that this lack of support for agency arguments for the equity holder and 
diversification link (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hill & Snell, 1988) suggest that the 
negative assumptions of managerial behavior in public corporations has been 
overblown, instead stewardship theory may be a better explanatory mechanism 
for this association. 
 
Lane et al.’s refutation of the agency links between equity holders and 
diversification received its own strong rebuttals. Lack of statistical power in the 
subgroup samples and the cumulative evidence developing in financial economics 
in favor of agency arguments linking equity holder concentration and 
diversification were one set of critiques (Amihud & Lev, 1999). These suggest, 
“corporate risk strategy and corporate acquisitions are affected by agency 
problems, proxied by ownership structure” (1999: 1068). This conclusion was 
confirmed by others on the basis of mounting empirical evidence in favor of a link 
between equity holder heterogeneity, corporate risk-taking (Wright, Ferris, Sarin, 
& Awasthi, 1996) as well as diversification (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999). 
However, the debate remains open due to paradigmatic differences between 
financial economics and strategy (Bettis, 1983; Lane, Cannella Jr, & Lubatkin, 
 
36 
1999), although it has been suggested that these differences rest primarily on 
measurement problems (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005). 
 
Nonetheless, further support for the equity holder heterogeneity and 
diversification link came from a study (Tihanyi et al., 2003) of 197 U.S. firms. 
Tihanyi and colleagues found that the due to alignment between interests and time 
horizons, international diversification was favored by both professional 
investment funds and pension funds. In addition, insider director incentives 
positively moderate the relationship between pension fund ownership and 
international diversification. While outsider directors moderate the relationship 
between professional investment funds and international diversification. The 
authors argue this is because insider director incentives (especially long-term) 
better align their interests with long-term pension funds. In case of investment 
funds, outsider directors amplify the monitoring capabilities of the board that 
catalyzes support for strategic actions like international diversification. 
 
 The debate outlined above had two characteristics germane to this review: 
First, it centered on the purported link or lack thereof between equity holder 
concentration (measures of concentrated stockholdings) and diversification, at a 
time when scholars had already begun to address the issue of equity holder 
heterogeneity, i.e. actual types (Brickley et al., 1988) and behaviors (Bushee, 
1998) of different equity holders. Second, all the studies that were core to the 
debate were U.S. centric and were thus open to the critique of being contextual 
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and not internationally generalizable. This has changed in recent years as scholars 
have investigated the equity holder heterogeneity and diversification link in 
international samples (Colpan, Yoshikawa, Hikino, & Del Brio, 2011; David, 
O'Brien, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2010; Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002).   
 
 In one of the early strategy studies in an international context, 
Ramaswamy et al. (2002) posited that country contexts matter since these 
influence both ownership types and the monitoring disposition of the principals. 
In their sample of 88 Indian manufacturing companies, they found that pressure-
sensitive investors (Brickley et al., 1988) such as banks are associated with 
unrelated diversification while pressure-resistant investors like mutual funds are 
negatively associated with unrelated diversification. Raising concerns that 
simplistic stockholder concentration ratios (e.g. Lane et al. 1998) may mask 
agency effects, the authors (Ramaswamy et al., 2002) however concede that lack 
of significant findings linking pressure-indeterminate investors (government 
agencies) and foreign investors with diversification may represent a boundary 
condition for agency theorizing as alluded to by Lane et al. (1998). 
 
 In contrast to the small sample of Indian firms used by Ramaswamy and 
colleagues, significant relationship between equity holder heterogeneity and the 
drivers of diversification were found in a sample of 1,180 Japanese firms (David 
et al., 2010). Using the relational vs. transactional lens, David et al. (2010) argue 
that Japanese domestic ownership is relational in nature and reflects priorities 
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other than pure profit maximization. On the other hand, foreign owners are 
primarily focused on rent appropriation through profit, reflecting their 
transactional orientation. Relational owners seek sales and employment growth 
via international diversification as opposed to transactional owners who seek 
profit growth. Thus, equity holder heterogeneity is associated with the 
performance goals of firms.  
 
Another study investigated the evolving landscape of Japanese corporate 
governance (Colpan et al., 2011) as it shifted from relational to more transactional 
or market oriented ownership in the 1990’s. The authors argue that global 
institutional investors are the primary drivers of change – from a relational to a 
transactional governance culture. Domestic corporate investors are their polar 
opposites, still adhering to a strongly relational culture that values long term 
capital commitments. Finally, between these two are domestic financial 
institutions that are trying to balance their relationships with firms with their 
responsibilities towards investors, i.e., these institutions are influenced by firm 
performance. Using a sample of 96 electronic firms, Colpan and colleagues find 
that product diversification is negatively associated with foreign institutional 
ownership and positively with domestic corporate ownership. Further, firm 
performance moderates the relationship between domestic financial institutions 
and capital investments. This suggests that for institutions straddling the 
relational-transactional divide, firm performance determines their support for 
strategic investments.  
 
39 
Equity holders and Firm Performance 
 
Being residual claimants, equity holders are particularly concerned about 
firm performance as they bear risks of any monitoring failure. These risks are 
exacerbated for outside equity holders who suffer from information asymmetries 
with respect to firm management. Outside equity holders have been incorporated 
in the literature as blockholders, institutional investors and finally, different types 
of institutional investors. Blockholders in a firm, investors with a 5% or higher 
equity stake, are motivated by concentrated ownership and private benefits 
(Connelly et al., 2010a). Non-board member blockholders have been found to be 
positively associated with both accounting and market-based performance 
measures. However, when the number of such blockholders is controlled for, the 
total equity held by non-board blockholders has a negative association with 
accounting performance (Hoskisson et al., 1994).  In case of corporations 
becoming blockholders in other corporations, improved performance is seen if the 
target firm is a supplier or customer. This suggest that partial vertical integration 
(Bogert, 1996) enhances performance by reducing transaction costs. 
 
Institutional investors have been found to be positively associated with 
return on equity (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991). Furthermore, executive equity 
holdings and institutional holdings have a supplemental effect on firm 
performance in terms of return on assets, return on equity and price-earnings 
ratios. Chaganti and Damanpour argue that this alignment between executive and 
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institutional equity holdings is in line with agency predictions. However, the 
insider ownership and performance relationship is stronger under conditions of 
environmental dynamism (Li & Simerly, 1998). This suggests that environmental 
dynamism is a major factor in the ability of owners to comprehend firm strategies, 
an area that has not received adequate attention in the literature. This is in contrast 
to the rich literature on debt and environmental dynamism (see earlier section on 
homogeneous debt and equity).  
 
 Consistent with agency predictions, concentrated ownership has been 
found to be positively associated with firm performance in Japan (Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro, 2002) as well as European samples (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Such a 
positive association between ownership concentration and firm performance is 
also observed in the context of IPO firms (Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & 
Wright, 2010). However, it has been argued that the relationship is inverse of 
agency predictions in case of business groups as controlling shareholders exploit 
insider information to increase their stakes in the most profitable and promising 
firms (Chang, 2003). Dalton et al.’s meta-analysis reports a similar equivocality 
and fails to find any substantive relationship between blockholder or institutional 
equity holders and firm performance (2003: 19).   
 
 Researchers have also considered the link between different 
categorizations of institutional investors and firm performance. In one such study, 
equity holders in the form of affiliated firms are negatively associated with firm 
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performance; but, market investors and pension funds have a positive association 
with firm performance in a Japanese sample (Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, & 
Hashimoto, 2005). However, this reveals one key weakness of equity holder 
heterogeneity research in management, namely institutional investor 
categorizations based on type. This may be one of the key factors leading to 
confused findings (Daily et al., 2003) since with few exceptions (Connelly et al., 
2010b), management research has assumed stability in principal intentions and 
incentives; thereby ignoring “the changing nature of principal interests over time” 
(2010b: 726).  
 
 In summary, the key insights developed by this flourishing subset of the 
capital structure literature can be bifurcated into two themes. On the one hand we 
have differences that are driven by variations in the intentions and incentives of 
the equity holders. On the other hand, scholars argue that these equity holder 
differences are a function of the institutional differences across countries (Ofori-
Dankwa & Julian, 2013) which belies the notion of convergence in corporate 
governance practices across the world (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). Such an 
international institutional differences hypothesis is an especially common driver 
of research contrasting U.S. and Japanese contexts (David, Yoshikawa, Chari, & 
Rasheed, 2006; O'Brien & David, 2014; Yoshikawa, Phan, & David, 2005). 
 The first, and more germane to this dissertation, of these differences 
centers on the categorization of institutional equity holders. In finance, the most 
common categorization centers on susceptibility of institutions to managerial 
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pressures (Brickley et al., 1988). Although the Brickley et al. categorization has 
on occasion been adopted in management research (Kochhar & David, 1996; 
Ramaswamy et al., 2002), an even more common categorization is simply 
institutions by type. In such cases, intentions and incentives are attributed to 
institutional fund mangers based on the type of institution; for example, long-term 
orientation to pension fund managers (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Neubaum & Zahra, 
2006). These categorizations are in contrast to the ones developed in accounting 
that incorporate actual investor behavior (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001) and have 
been fruitfully applied in management research (Connelly et al., 2010b). In spite 
of these shortcomings, the equity holder heterogeneity literature has underscored 
the varied associations of equity holder groups with firm strategic actions. These 
linkages also suggest that the ambiguous findings plaguing equity holder and firm 
performance research maybe a result of ignoring the intervening strategic actions. 
Thus, this review suggests new directions for capital structure research by further 
integrating strategic actions into corporate governance research along equity 
holders with a more realistic categorization of equity holders.  
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Debt Heterogeneity 
 
 
The most common conceptions of capital structure in the management 
literature are leverage (i.e. ratios incorporating debt and equity, assumed 
homogeneous) and equity holder heterogeneity. Debt is assumed to be 
homogeneous in these literatures. This assumption is contradicted by both the 
financial intermediation literature (Boot, 2000) as well as studies in management 
which indicate lender influence via the board of directors (Stearns & Mizruchi, 
1993). Furthermore, different types of debt holders influence firm financing 
(Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994b), knowledge capabilities (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002) 
and innovation (David et al., 2008).  
 
Corporate governance research has over the decades produced a 
voluminous body of work investigating the impact of board composition on 
various firm level outcomes (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003a; Deutsch, 2005). 
In spite of this substantial research, confusion and inconsistencies remain in the 
literature regarding the empirical linkages between board composition and firm 
level outcomes (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). It has been suggested that owing to the 
multilevel context of board composition studies, these null results “may be a 
function of the inadequacy of the analyses relied on…” (2011: 405). However, a 
more parsimonious explanation may be that governance research in management 
has largely ignored a key constituent of influence, namely lenders. Specifically, 
there is a neglect of debt heterogeneity in much of management research (David 
et al., 2008). 
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Lender influence on the management of corporations has principally been 
considered episodic and infrequent, triggered by events such as firm distress and 
bankruptcy (Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001). However, an increasing tide of empirical 
evidence refutes this assumption and demonstrates that lender influence on 
governance of the firm is regular and frequent (Tung, 2009). In fact, these 
findings show the wide span of “private lenders’ influence on corporations’ 
financing and investment decisions and operational matters” (2009: 117). In light 
of these findings, it is likely that incorporating lender influence will help mitigate 
the theoretical confusion and empirical insignificance that plagues the research 
linking corporate governance with firm level outcomes. This lender influence is 
evident both through relational debt (i.e. bank loans, which may involve board 
representation) and transactional debt (i.e. bonds). Below, I briefly review the 
literature exploring lender influence on firm management. An overview of key 
debt heterogeneity papers in management can be seen in Table 3.  
 
Bankers on Board 
 
Banker representation on boards is usually found on large firms with 
collateralizable assets and low dependence on short-term financing (Kroszner & 
Strahan, 2001). This phenomenon of bankers on board is inherently a side effect, 
as well as aggravating factor, of equity- and debt holder conflicts of interest. 
Since the shareholders usually elect board members, bankers representing debt 
holder interests create inescapable conflicts in the highest echelons of the 
corporation as equity and debt have different risk bearing preferences and payoff 
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structures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, the fact that one-third of U.S. 
public firms have a banker on board suggests that the benefits of monitoring 
outweigh the costs associated with these conflicts (Kroszner & Strahan, 2001). 
 
Research has indicated that use of debt financing by corporations is 
influenced by having lender representatives on the board (Stearns & Mizruchi, 
1993). However, there are indications that this influence is on the decline over 
time, due to professionalization and internalization of the finance function as well 
as greater environmental uncertainty (Mizruchi, Stearns, & Marquis, 2006). This 
phenomena is evident from data which shows that while the average proportion of 
outside directors in U.S. firms has steadily increased (53.2% in 1973 to 72.2% in 
1994), there has been a proportional decline (27.6% of outside directors in 1973 
vs. 12.7% in 1994) in banker representation on boards (data from Mizruchi et al 
2006: 316).  
 
Nevertheless, when considering overall representation on the board of 
large firms (e.g. the S & P 500 in 2002) bankers were present on 27% of the 
boards (Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012). Research has shown that creditor representation on 
the board: “1) increases the amount of debt in a company’s capital structure via an 
increase in private debt, 2) decreases the sensitivity of debt financing to the 
amount of tangible assets that a company holds, 3) decreases the cost of 
borrowing, and 4) reduces the pledge of collateral and financial covenants in debt 
contracts” (2012: 665). In light of this, the proportional decline of bankers 
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amongst outside directors found in the Mizruchi et al (2006) data may reflect 
substitution of agency mitigating mechanisms between direct (relational) 
monitoring through board positions and indirect (transactional) monitoring 
through covenants and contracts. 
 
Further complexity is added to banker representation on boards by the 
finding that banker board member behavior depends on whether their bank is a 
lender or non-lending board member (Byrd & Mizruchi, 2005), i.e., whether there 
is a conflict between the bankers fiduciary responsibilities and self-interest. The 
authors found that presence of a lending banker on the board is reflected 
negatively on the firm’s debt ratio; while, the presence of a non-lending banker on 
the board has influence depending on the firm’s level of distress risks. In case of 
firms with high distress risk, non-lending bankers provide legitimacy/certification 
along with expertise. For low distress risk firms, non-lending bankers carry out 
the role of monitors.  
 
Consequently, we can see that debt holder representation on the board is 
variegated and contextual. Contrary to the popular assumption in much of 
management research, corporate governance is not merely the domain of 
shareholders and their representatives on the board, but is significantly and 
frequently influenced by lenders (Tung, 2009). Banker presence on the board 
gives them informational and relational advantages (Boot, 2000; David et al., 
2008) that are hard to contract ex ante.  
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Such findings highlight the mechanism linking ownership heterogeneity 
and how it’s mirrored by heterogeneity in the board of directors. This 
heterogeneity invariably gives rise to equity holder and debt holder conflicts that 
potentially influence strategic actions. For example there is empirical evidence 
(Hilscher & Sisli-Ciamarra, 2011) that firms with creditor-directors indulge in 
acquisitions (more diversifying) that destroy shareholder wealth. Thus, the 
phenomena of bankers on board highlights a fundamental heterogeneity in debt 
that has been overlooked by most of management research (David et al., 2008) – 
namely, the difference between transactional and relational debt (Boot, 2000).  
Transactional vs. Relational Debt 
 
In the case of strategic actions like innovation, transaction cost perspective 
(David et al., 2008; Wang & Thornhill, 2010) suggests that the strategic fit 
between the governance structure and the firm’s strategic action affects firm 
performance. In a rare study incorporating debt heterogeneity, David et al. (2008) 
posited that the choice of governance structure is molded by the need to mitigate 
three types of transaction hazards: one, asset specificity, which limits asset 
redeployment; two, uncertainty about both the transaction and the counterparty; 
and third, appropriability risk. Thus, transactions exposing firms and their capital 
providers to such hazards will seek governance structures that enable dispute 
resolution, adaptation (i.e. forbearance) and monitoring. 
 
David et al. (2008) found that relational debt, with hierarchical governance 
features, is positively associated with innovation. Furthermore, the alignment 
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between a strategy of innovation and relational debt led to higher performance. 
Wang and Thornhill (2010) extended these arguments and found that the 
association between relational debt and innovation is an inverted U-shape. This is 
because although relational debt facilitates monitoring and adaptation, it requires 
collateral that firms with very high R & D expenses may not have. Another 
intriguing finding was that convertible debt has a U-shaped relationship with 
innovation. Two opposing forces drive this relationship. Holders of convertible 
debt cannot intervene in firm management but have the option of swapping their 
securities for common stock. Firms focused on innovation are likely to have 
higher valued convertible securities that have lower cost than conventional debt 
(Wang & Thornhill, 2010).  
 
 Such a distinction is also evident in the context of diversification. In a 
sample of Japanese firms (O'Brien et al., 2014), transactional debt (bonds) was 
found to negatively affect performance more than relational debt. The authors 
argue that the negative and inflexible connotations of debt largely pertain to 
transactional debt. This is in contrast to relational debt (bank loans) that are 
characterized by social embeddedness (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002; Uzzi & Lancaster, 
2003) between lenders and firms that confer advantages of reciprocity, knowledge 
exchange and network transitivity. Thus, the original transaction cost bifurcation 
of debt and equity as separate governance mechanisms (Williamson, 1988) can be 
extended to different forms of debt as well as equity. These ideas are further 
developed below.  
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Capital Structure and Transaction Costs 
 
 
Most of transaction cost theory’s application to the capital structure and 
strategic action association implicitly invokes the differing governance attributes 
of equity and debt (Williamson, 1988) and explicitly focuses on transaction 
attributes such as uncertainty and asset specificity. However, the bifurcation of 
the literature into separate streams of equity and debt heterogeneity reveals an 
implicit assumption – namely, that equity and debt are simply financing choices. 
Their governance attributes are only incidentally invoked in theoretical 
explanations without any integrated analysis of commonalities and interactions 
between different forms of debt holders and equity holders and the governance 
structures they generate.  
 
The governance attributes of patient (akin to hierarchy) and impatient 
capital (akin to market) are critical since in the absence of optimum contracting 
they determine the strategic fit between capital structure heterogeneity and firm 
strategic actions (see Table 4). Assuming bounded rationality and agent 
opportunism, these governance attributes determine if the strategic actions 
followed by the risk takers (i.e. managers) are those preferred by the risk bearers 
(i.e. capital providers). 
 
Within strategy, transaction costs are one of the dominant explanatory 
mechanism linking capital structure and strategic actions. Research has often 
juxtaposed transaction cost and agency elements to develop (Kochhar, 1996) and 
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test (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; O'Brien et al., 2014; Simerly & Li, 2000) 
competing hypothesis. Kochhar (1996) pointed out that agency and transaction 
cost theories differ fundamentally in their approach to capital structure. 
Transaction cost theory (unlike agency) posits that markets can fail, debt and 
equity both possess governance attributes with equity being the more powerful 
and that the key asset under governance is not free cash flow but firm resources. 
He argued that LBOs (leveraged buyouts), which increase firm debt load, are 
more likely to occur in firms with low asset specificity. 
 
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) found that asset attributes of specificity and 
intangibility are negatively associated with leverage because although such 
investments may improve a firm’s competitive position, they are harder to 
evaluate and monitor by lenders; this is especially true under conditions of 
environmental dynamism (Simerly & Li, 2000). For the same reasons, related 
diversification has also been found to be negatively associated with leverage 
(Kochhar & Hitt, 1998). More recently, O’Brien et al. (2013) found that 
management protected from the harsh market governance of transactional debt 
(i.e. bonds) performs better by leveraging existing firm resources. Thus, following 
transaction cost logic – the hierarchical governance of equity is preferable when 
firms invest in strategic actions that develop highly specific and intangible 
resources.  
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In summary, the composition of capital structure itself has governance 
features that are often ignored in strategy research (Barton & Gordon, 1987). 
When considering strategic actions such as diversification and innovation that 
entail managerial risk taking, capital structure heterogeneity across debt holders 
and equity holders has been assumed away. Research till now has focused either 
on equity holder or debt holder heterogeneity. We still do not know how the full 
range of capital structure heterogeneity –between different equity and debt-
holders – influences strategic actions. Moreover, this bifurcation of the capital 
structure literature – into separate equity and debt heterogeneity silos – leaves 
important questions unanswered: What are the common underlying factors 
driving the association between capital structure heterogeneity and strategic 
actions? What are the interactions between these varied governance structures?  
 
Unlike extant research, this dissertation incorporates capital structure 
heterogeneity –across both debt holders and equity holders – as governance 
structures (Ebers & Oerlemans, 2014; Weingast, 1993; Williamson, 1988) with 
varied attributes and associations with strategic actions. In the next section 
(chapter 3) I develop an integrated theoretical model of capital structure 
heterogeneity and strategic actions that addresses these unanswered questions in 
the literature. In addition to the de facto governance role of the capital structure, I 
incorporate the de jure role of the board of directors and the association of 
compensation as mediators of the association between capital structure 
heterogeneity and strategic actions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Strategy research has investigated the associations between capital 
structure heterogeneity and strategic actions such as diversification and 
innovation. However, these investigations bifurcate capital structure research into 
two separate streams: one investigating equity holder heterogeneity, i.e. 
ownership as governance (Daily et al., 2003b); and, another investigating debt 
holder heterogeneity (David et al., 2008). Therefore, we still do not know the 
associations between the full range of capital structure heterogeneity – across both 
debt and equity – and strategic actions. Even when extant research explicitly 
invoke transaction cost arguments, their separation of equity and debt 
heterogeneity reveals an implicit assumption, entrenched in the conventional 
view, of equity and debt as merely financing choices.  
 
 Although capital structure has been investigated within strategic 
management for three decades, it suffers from a simplifying assumption in which 
researchers of equity holder heterogeneity assume away debt holder heterogeneity 
and vice versa. In this dissertation I argue that this implicit assumption limits our 
understanding of the association between capital structure heterogeneity and 
strategic actions. Such hidden assumptions limit theoretical advancement (Davis, 
1971) and the explanatory power of management research by undermining its 
closeness to reality (Foss & Hallberg, 2013). Strategic actions like diversification 
and innovation are likely associated with the whole range of capital structure 
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heterogeneity – across both debt and equity holders, which existing research 
overlooks. 
 
 The division of extant research into isolated streams investigating equity 
holder and debt holder heterogeneity and its associations with firm level outcomes 
reflects the conventional view of equity and debt as simply financing choices. 
Such a perspective allows for research that focuses on either equity or debt holder 
heterogeneity while assuming the other homogenous. However, viewed from a 
transaction cost lens, these heterogeneous groups of equity and debt holders 
represent governance structures that are not bound by such simplifying 
assumptions. Williamson (1988) argued that debt and equity have governance 
attributes of markets (rules) and hierarchies (discretion) respectively. I extend this 
transaction cost approach to different types of equity and debt holders. This 
necessitates a simultaneous investigation of equity and debt holder heterogeneity.   
 
 Although distinct, equity holder and debt holder heterogeneity research 
suggests that differences among providers of capital center on their varied 
tolerance for risk and their investment time horizons. Therefore, I argue that the 
dimensions underlying both debt holder and equity holder heterogeneity, i.e., 
dimensions driving their governance attributes, are the same. Such a framing 
makes explicit what has till now been implicit in these disjointed literatures. Both 
equity and debt holders can be categorized along these two dimensions that drive 
their associations with strategic actions such as diversification and innovation. 
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Therefore, I extend transaction cost economics conceptualization of capital 
structure as governance structures (Williamson, 1988) to groups within debt and 
equity. When viewed in this manner as governance structures, a question arises: 
what drives the association between debt and equity holder heterogeneity with 
strategic actions? I posit that the mechanisms linking capital structure 
heterogeneity and strategic actions are executive compensation and the board of 
directors.  
 
 In the following sections, I first draw on extant literature to integrate and 
develop a categorization of heterogeneous debt holders and equity holders. Next, I 
establish time horizons and risk tolerance as the two fundamental dimensions 
driving the governance attributes of these diverse equity and debt holders. 
Following that, I develop hypotheses that link these debt and equity holders to the 
strategic actions of diversification and innovation. Finally, I argue that the board 
of directors and executive compensation mediate these associations.  
 
Capital Structure As Governance Structures: A Transaction Cost 
Perspective 
 
 
Capital structure refers to the mix of debt and equity used to finance a 
firm. Different types of debt holders and equity holder groups constitute capital 
structure heterogeneity. Unlike the extensive equity heterogeneity literature, debt 
heterogeneity has seen limited theoretical and empirical research. In this section I 
 
55 
first discuss different categorizations of these groups commonly used in the 
literature. I go on to develop a new theoretical model that argues for 
commonalities between debt and equity holders along the dimensions of risk 
tolerance and time horizons. Development of these underlying dimensions gives 
me the opportunity to treat a wide range of capital structure heterogeneity – across 
debt and equity – as governance structures associated with firm strategic actions 
like diversification and innovation.  
 
 Viewed from a transaction cost lens, debt and equity are de facto 
governance structures (Williamson, 1988), akin to the de jure organizational 
governance structures (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991) that have been the 
subject of significant research1. Misalignment between these governance 
structures and strategic actions creates maladaptation costs that can be avoided by 
“judicious use of governance structure…rather than merely realigning incentives” 
(Williamson, 1988: 572). Such a transaction cost framework differs from the ex 
ante incentive alignment emphasis of agency theory. 
 
In addition to maladaptation costs, the transaction cost perspective 
emphasizes other ex post costs such as haggling costs (to correct misalignment), 
setup costs and bonding costs (securing commitments). I argue, in line with 
Williamson (1988), that the governance structures embedded in capital structure 
have been neglected in research as opposed to their organizational counterparts. 
                                                
1 For a recent review of governance structures and theoretical extension of hybrid forms of 
governance, see Ebers, M. & Oerlemans, L. 2014. The Variety of Governance Structures Beyond 
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Furthermore, by bifurcating capital structure research into separate streams, extant 
research ignores the additive and interactive associations between these 
governance structures and strategic actions. Below, I briefly clarify how some of 
the fundamental premises of transaction cost economics have been overlooked in 
the research of capital structure.   
 
 Transaction cost economics rests on two fundamental behavioral 
assumptions: bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1997) builds on the impact of uncertainty (Knight, 1964) to 
study “human nature as we know it” (1964: 270). A combination of uncertainty 
and cognitive limitations lead to human behavior that “is intendedly rational, but 
only boundedly so” (Simon, 1997: 88). This boundedly rational behavior is 
exacerbated by the need to protect actors in transactions against “each other’s 
predatory propensities” (Knight, 1964: 254). These predatory propensities 
manifest themselves as opportunism, a serious exchange hazard (Arrow, 1971; 
Williamson, 1985). The nature of transactions (i.e., asset specificity, frequency 
etc.) must “match” the attributes of the governance structures if costs arising from 
such exchange hazards are to be economized.  
 
Perhaps the first to indicate alternative governance structures as “choices” 
for economic coordination was Coase. Within the governance structure of 
markets, this coordination is carried out using the price mechanism (Coase, 1937). 
Hierarchies coordinate economic activity using fiat (Williamson, 1991), with the 
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business judgment rule creating a governance regime in which “hierarchy is its 
own court of ultimate appeal” (1991: 274). In fact, “the distinguishing feature of 
the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937: 389).  
 
 Beyond markets and hierarchies, there exist a range of hybrid governance 
structures such as subcontracting, quasi-integration and joint ventures (Ebers & 
Oerlemans, 2014). These governance structures differentially deal with the 
transaction costs arising from economic coordination. Some have argued that the 
existence of hybrid governance structures suggests that a mix of attributes is 
needed for economizing of transactions and mitigation of hazards (Hennart, 
1993).  
One key distinction separates governance structures that are organizational 
and those that are embedded in the capital structure. Organizational governance 
structures can take many forms. This plurality is itself a function of the 
complexity facing economic organization. Hennart (1993) has argued that the 
price system and hierarchy are the organizing methods that manifest as ideal types 
in markets and firms respectively. The core reason for the plethora of hybrid 
forms is that in reality, economic coordination requires a mix of attributes – i.e., a 
combination of price system and hierarchy. These organizational governance 
structures have been the focus of much research and debate (Ebers & Oerlemans, 
2014). 
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However, in this work, the focal governance structures are those 
embedded in the capital structure (Williamson, 1987; Williamson, 1988). Unlike 
organizational governance structures that arise from managerial choice about 
economic coordination, the governance structures of equity and debt are vestiges 
of firm financing choices. These financing choices lead to differential firm capital 
structure and consequent associations with strategic actions (Bettis, 1983).  In this 
dissertation I focus on the strategic actions of innovation and diversification, two 
of the most critical strategic actions carried out by firms (Hill & Snell, 1988) and 
of continued interest to scholars of capital structure (O'Brien & David, 2014; 
O'Brien et al., 2014).  
 
I argue that since capital structure is a de facto governance structure, it is 
necessary to have a simultaneous treatment of both equity and debt holder 
heterogeneity to truly understand how the mix of these yin & yang of governance 
structures are associated with strategic actions. This is in line with transaction cost 
economics, in which a “fundamental tenet …is that the supply of a good or 
service and its governance need be examined simultaneously” (Williamson, 1988: 
567). Thus, selective focus on some providers of capital while assuming others 
homogenous gives us only partial insight into the associations between capital 
structure heterogeneity and strategic actions. 
 
Unfortunately, extant capital structure research – even that which invokes 
transaction cost arguments – circumvents the concurrent treatment of debt and 
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equity heterogeneity. By keeping these two research streams separate, extant 
research has left key questions unanswered: What is the association between 
different kinds of governance structures embedded in equity and debt with 
different forms of strategic actions? How do these varied governance structures 
interact and relate to innovation and diversification? This dissertation research is 
centered on answering these two questions. Below I briefly review some of the 
popular categorizations of capital structure heterogeneity and demonstrate how 
extant literature has left the above two critical questions unanswered.  
 
Types of Debt holders 
 
 
 Most of the capital structure literature focuses on equity heterogeneity, i.e. 
the ownership as governance literature (Daily et al., 2003b). However, debt 
constitutes over 90 percent of all new external financing (Mayer, 1988). In 
addition, a substantial proportion of large U.S. public firms utilize both relational 
and transactional debt (Rauh & Sufi, 2010). Considering the governance attributes 
of debt suggested by both agency theory and transaction cost economics – 
governance of free cash flow in the former (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
governance of resources in the latter (Williamson, 1987; Williamson, 1988) – the 
debt homogeneity assumption (David et al., 2008) underlying almost all of 
governance research is puzzling.  
 
Extant literature categorizes different debt holders as either relational or 
transactional (Boot, 2000). Relational debt refers to bank or commercial lending 
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in which the lenders develop relationships with borrowers over repeated 
interactions. Such relational lending is known to “facilitate monitoring and 
screening and can overcome problems of asymmetric information” (2000: 7). In 
other words, relational debt is fundamental to the mitigation of exchange hazards 
such as uncertainty, opportunism and appropriation. 
 
The mechanisms underlying such mitigation through relational debt may 
be close coordination between the lender and borrower through board 
representation (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). Another factor is network transitivity 
(Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002) in which a focal firm gains resources and capabilities 
from a particular network tie, this in turn increasing the value added it brings to a 
relationship with a third independent network actor. In fact Uzzi and Gillespie 
argue “bank – firm tie is the dominant explanatory factor for network transitivity 
effects” (2002: 597).  
 
An example of such transitivity is relational lenders introducing firms to 
new suppliers. As such, relational debt characterized by embedded social relations 
becomes an inimitable resource for firms and enhances their adaptability and 
learning (Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003) in the face of incomplete contracting through 
increased intertemporal information reusability (Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007). 
Socially embedded relational debt is ideally suited for transfer of proprietary 
knowledge since norms and expectations of trust and reciprocity, built over the 
duration of a long-term relationship, provide assurances that such knowledge will 
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be used for the mutual benefit of both parties in the transaction. A situation 
ideally suited for strategic actions involving risks of uncertainty, opportunism and 
appropriability.  
 
 In contrast to the hierarchical governance features of relational debt 
outlined above, transactional debt (bonds) mirrors the rigid and unforgiving 
governance structure of markets (Williamson, 1988). Doctrines enshrined in these 
restrictive covenants both enforce and limit the scope of these governance 
structures.  This arms-length financing is focused on a single transaction with a 
customer or multiple identical transactions with various customers. The rigidity of 
such transactional debt is severe and even a single covenant violation can trigger 
creditor intervention in management (Chava & Roberts, 2008). Thus, 
transactional debt takes the form of an exceptionally constrictive governance 
structure that limits managerial latitude with respect to strategic actions that may 
require future adaptation.  
 
Types of Equity holders 
 
 
Unlike the scarce debt heterogeneity literature discussed above, there is a 
rich literature on equity holder heterogeneity. One of the most common 
categorizations is along the dimension of susceptibility to management pressure 
(Brickley et al., 1988). Blockholders have a stronger incentive to vote than most 
shareholders. Amongst these blockholders, Brickley et al. (1988) found, those less 
beholden to management (pressure-resistant investors) such as pension and 
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mutual funds are more likely to oppose management proposals. In contrast, 
blockholders that derive benefits from managerial discretion (pressure-susceptible 
investors) such as banks and insurance companies tend to vote in line with 
management over critical corporate issues. Such institutions “have a virtually 
unblemished history of passitivity” (Davis & Thompson, 1994: 162).  
 
Susceptibility to management pressure has also been used to explain firm 
innovation (Kochhar & David, 1996). Since these blockholders hold large 
investments in firms, exiting their positions can be problematic. Kochhar and 
David argue that such market illiquidity makes institutional investors more active 
in making their voice heard by management, especially with regards to 
investments in innovation that may confer long-term competitive advantage. Such 
pressure-resistant investors are found to be positively associated with innovation 
as measured by new product introductions.  
 
However, Kocchar and David found no association between institutional 
ownership in general and innovation. This may be a relic of their innovation 
measure or the fact that the Brickley classification fails to take into account actual 
institutional investment time horizons and instead depends on classification by 
type of institution (Bushee, 1998). As pointed out by Bushee, classifying equity 
holders on actual investment portfolio behavior (time horizons etc.) creates a 
richer and more parsimonious categorization. This also ensures that investment 
behavior is not assumed simply because of type of institution since equity holders 
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“exhibit significant heterogeneity across these other possible classification 
schemes” (1998: 310).  
 
 In spite of these shortcomings, the Brickley et al. (1988) categorization 
remains popular and has also been used to investigate the association between 
heterogeneity amongst equity holder groups and diversification (Ramaswamy et 
al., 2002). In a modified2 application to the Indian context, Ramaswamy et al. 
(2002) classified all for-profit institutional investors as pressure-resistant, while 
banks and insurance companies were pressure-susceptible. They found that 
pressure-resistant owners were negatively associated with unrelated 
diversification  
  
 Using the same classification, a recent meta-analysis investigated the 
ownership and firm performance linkage (Dalton et al., 2003). The authors 
categorized outside equity-holders as: pressure-resistant (public pension funds, 
mutual funds, foundations and endowments), pressure-sensitive (insurance 
companies, banks and nonbank trusts) and pressure indeterminate (corporate 
pension funds). Dalton et al. (2003) hypothesized that pressure-resistant investors 
will be positively associated with firm financial performance. However, in their 
meta-analysis, the results are non-supportive.  
 
                                                
2 The Indian context precludes use of private pension funds as a separate category as most 
pensions are managed by a federally operated scheme. See footnote 2 (Ramaswamy et al., 2002: 
350).  
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I classify equity holders based on their past investment behavior (Bushee, 
1998), into transient, quasi-indexer and dedicated. I extend transaction cost theory 
and argue that transient equity holders provide governance structures akin to 
markets while dedicated equity holders are more akin to hierarchies. This mirrors 
the earlier classification of debt holders into transactional and dedicated (see 
Table 5). My classification is in contrast to most of the capital structure research 
focused on equity holder heterogeneity has used classification schemes based on 
institutions by type; this is problematic (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001; Connelly et 
al., 2010b). Classification by type assumes stability in equity holder behavior and 
preferences that is belied by empirical research (Bushee, 1999, 2001).  
 
 Transient equity holders are focused on short-term trading profits and are 
characterized by high portfolio turnover and diversification (Bushee, 2001). If 
disappointed by the financial performance of their holdings, these transient 
investors do not hesitate to sell off the firm’s stock (Porter, 1992). The short-term 
nature of these investors also suggests that they will forgo the rewards of longer-
term and risker strategic actions that may entail poor short term performance3. 
 
 Dedicated and quasi-indexer equity holders provide more stable and long-
term ownership to firms. However, due to their complete passitivity, I exclude 
quasi-indexer from inclusion in my theoretical development. Dedicated investors 
are akin to relational debt in that they have both long term and less diversified 
                                                
3 Time horizon and risk have often been conflated in the literature. Both dimensions are developed 
in the next section.  
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portfolios (Bushee, 2001). Such owners have greater incentives to monitor 
executives as well as gather proprietary firm-specific knowledge about long-term 
and riskier strategic actions. Quasi-indexer equity holders on the other hand are 
passive long-term investors with more diversified portfolios and as such have low 
inclinations towards monitoring management. Porter (1992) has posited that the 
prevalence of these quasi-indexers threatens long-term investments due to their 
abdication of monitoring “duties”. In the next section, I extend the notion of 
capital structure as governance structures and develop the dimensions of time 
horizons and risk tolerance that underlie different groups of debt and equity 
holders.  
Dimensions Of Time Horizon And Risk Tolerance 
 
Capital structure manifests the financing choices of a firm but represents 
latent governance structures (Williamson, 1988). Extant research has taken for 
granted the governance structures embedded in capital structure by separating 
them into two research streams – debt and equity heterogeneity. This reveals an 
implicit bias towards treating capital structure as merely financing choices, even 
amongst researchers invoking transaction cost arguments. In this section I argue 
that we may gain significant theoretical insights by combining these two distinct 
research streams. Incorporation of both debt and equity heterogeneity as 
governance structures allows this dissertation to be a first step in developing 
commonalities between them and studying their interactions.  
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 The separation of the debt and equity heterogeneity literatures underplays 
the transaction cost conception of capital structure as governance structures. 
Transaction cost economics was a significant departure from neoclassical 
economics because it treated the firm as a governance structure (Williamson, 
1985), not a production function. The governance of transactions becomes the 
focal objective, not the organizing of labor, capital and materials as a production 
function. Once viewed from this perspective, capital itself is a governance 
structure (Williamson, 1988) and not merely an input in the production function.  
 
Williamson argued that debt mirrors the rule (Kydland & Prescott, 1977) 
based governance of markets, while equity mirrors the discretion based 
governance of hierarchies (see Table 5 above). I argue that these distinctions 
extend to heterogeneity within debt and equity holder groups. Furthermore, I 
propose that the fundamental dimensions underlying these groups are time 
horizon and risk tolerance. These two dimensions allow me to treat different debt 
and equity holders on an equal footing and hypothesize their associations with 
strategic actions. Thus, I aim to gain fuller theoretical insights from a transaction 
cost approach through a simultaneous investigation of governance structures, 
irrespective of their manifest forms.    
 
 Strategic actions such as diversification and innovation involve significant 
investments, firm resources and management attention. Furthermore, these 
initiatives influence future firm performance. As such it is not surprising that 
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capital structure research has provided us insights into the associations between 
capital structure heterogeneity and diversification (Ngah-Kiing Lim et al., 2009; 
Ramaswamy et al., 2002; Tihanyi et al., 2003) as well as innovation (David et al., 
2008; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Lee & O'Neill, 2003). However, this literature treats 
capital as a production input by assuming either debt holder or equity holder 
groups homogenous. Surprisingly this assumption is implicit even in research 
invoking transaction cost arguments. In such cases, the focus is on attributes of 
transactions (uncertainty and asset specificity) to the neglect of governance 
structures embedded in firm capital structure. Since transaction costs arise due to 
both transaction attributes and governance structure attributes, focus on just one 
of these understates transaction costs reasoning (Williamson, 1985).  
Opportunism and Governance Structures  
 
The fundamental theoretical incompleteness created by the implicit 
assumption discussed above is evident in the root metaphor at the beginning of 
this work “…equity is a pillow, debt a sword…” Recognition of heterogeneity 
within debt and equity holder groups was the first step in overcoming this 
incompleteness; the insights generated by extant research reflect these positive 
developments. As a next step, I elaborate on the governance structures latent in 
these diverse debt holder and equity holder groups and posit that the underlying 
dimensions of time horizon and risk tolerance are common to both the “Yin and 
Yang” of firm capital structure. These governance structures map onto particular 
forms of opportunism that are often conflated in the literature. This extends 
transaction cost reasoning and contributes to overcoming one of its key 
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weaknesses – especially in the context of capital structure investigations – 
namely, that it has “given disproportionate attention to the abstract description of 
transactions as compared with the abstract description of governance” 
(Williamson, 1991: 270).  
 
Within the framework of transaction cost economics, “the object is not 
merely to resolve conflict in progress but also to recognize potential conflict in 
advance and devise governance structures that forestall or attenuate it” 
(Williamson, 1985: 29). These conflicts are an inevitable outcome of behavioral 
factors like bounded rationality and opportunism leading to incomplete 
contracting and contractual hazards. These problems are exacerbated when they 
merge with characteristics of transactions such as asset specificity. But the capital 
structure literature has primarily focused on transaction attributes such as asset 
specificity. Thus, the critical importance of the governance structures embedded 
in firm capital structure remains underappreciated. We still do not have a 
comprehensive view of exactly how attributes of governance structures differ 
amongst dissimilar capital structure groups and their interactions. Further, what 
are the common underlying dimensions across these diverse governance 
structures and how are they related to mitigating opportunism (Williamson, 
1993)? 
Opportunism is “self-seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985: 47) or 
simply, the opposite of trust (Barney & Hansen, 1994). The behavioral 
assumption of opportunism has received trenchant criticism (Ghoshal & Moran, 
 
69 
1996) and has been labeled “neo-Hobbesian” (Granovetter, 1985) for taking a 
needlessly dark view of human nature. Unfortunately reality doesn’t correspond 
to the utopia envisioned by such critics. Reality suggests that “but for 
opportunism, most forms of complex contracting and hierarchy vanish” 
(Williamson, 1993: 97). If opportunism were wished away, market governance 
would predominate since the key factor for market failure disappears. It therefore 
becomes important to understand how different forms of opportunism are related 
to diverse governance structures.  
 
Opportunism comes in many varieties (Alchian & Woodward, 1988; 
Williamson, 1993). Unfortunately, much of transaction cost theorizing and 
empirical testing ignores these differences (Alchian & Woodward, 1988; Tsang, 
2006). Perhaps this assumption of opportunism homogeneity is also an artifact of 
the relative neglect of governance structures in the capital structure literature 
invoking transaction cost arguments. These distinctions are important although 
underdeveloped. This in spite that fact that “differential contractual hazards that 
are associated with alternative forms of governance” (Williamson, 1993: 104). 
 
Some types of opportunism are adverse selection, moral hazard, holdup 
and appropriability hazard. The first of these, adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) is 
an ex ante form of opportunism, while the latter three are ex post and more 
germane to this study. Moral hazard (Hölmstrom, 1979) refers to an incomplete 
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contracting problem that arises from information asymmetries between principals 
and agents. Monitoring is the preferred containment device for moral hazard.  
 
Holdup (Klein, 1996; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978) refers to the 
threat of appropriable specialized quasi rents arising from asset specificity. 
Holdup hazards are most often dealt with by shifting transactions within a 
hierarchy and remain one of the most common justifications for the existence of 
hierarchical governance structures. In fact, asset specificity (i.e., cause of holdup 
hazard) is the most common construct incorporated in transaction cost 
investigations (David & Han, 2004). This focus on asset specificity is reminiscent 
of arguments made earlier about the relative focus on transaction attributes to the 
detriment of explicating governance structures. 
 
Appropriability hazards (Oxley, 1997) are provoked by weak property 
rights, usually in the context of technology and knowledge transfer. 
Appropriability remains a key driver of innovation centric transactions being 
subsumed in hierarchical governance structures. Fundamentally, I argue that 
holdup and appropriability hazard plague market governance; while, moral hazard 
hampers hierarchical governance (see Table 6 below). This distinction remains 
underappreciated in the capital structure literature. However, it is germane to this 
research since governance structures differentially deal with opportunism hazards.  
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 The fundamental attributes of all governance structures are ownership 
autonomy, incentive intensity, administrative controls and adaptation (Ebers & 
Oerlemans, 2014; Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991). Nonetheless, these four 
attributes can be further unpacked into other features of governance structures that 
constrain or enable strategic actions (see Table 6). These additional features of 
governance structures are especially relevant in the context of capital structures 
because they indicate the economic institution (i.e., markets or hierarchies) that 
these disparate groups of debt and equity holders resemble. I argue that 
transactional debt and transient equity (i.e., impatient capital) are akin to market 
governance, while relational debt and dedicated equity (i.e., patient capital) are 
akin to hierarchical governance. Extant literature, by bifurcating debt and equity 
heterogeneity research has overlooked the governance similarities across debt and 
equity holder groups.  
 
 
In addition, I argue that the dimensions of time horizon and risk tolerance 
are fundamental to debt and equity holder groups and determine their sorting into 
governance structures akin to markets or hierarchies. What lies beneath these 
disparate groups are their differences in preferences that can be bifurcated along 
time and risk. These dimensions are either restrained or enabled by the attributes 
of governance structures.  
 
For example, relational debt is long-term in nature and may, in some 
cases, even involve the presence of bankers on board (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). 
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These relationships not only affect the type of financing but also the nature of 
governance. Firms with embedded social ties to bankers often get favorable loan 
conditions (Uzzi, 1999) and avoid late-payment penalties (Uzzi & Gillespie, 
2002). Such discretionary regimes (Boot, Greenbaum, & Thakor, 1993) are 
supported by exchange of proprietary information (David et al., 2008) over long 
periods of time (Boot, 2000), thus potentially supporting riskier strategic actions.  
Therefore, relational debt, ceteris paribus, has features of hierarchical governance.  
 
Long-term institutional investors, i.e. dedicated equity, help counter an 
excessive focus on short-term earnings at the expense of longer term strategic 
actions (Bushee, 1998). Such dedicated investors (attributed by Porter 1992 to 
countries like Germany and Japan) are more invested in monitoring management 
through devices like outside board members (Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). Thus, 
due to their propensity to provide hierarchical governance, dedicated equity 
holders are more associated with long-term strategic actions, which may also 
entail risk. This assertion is supported by the literatures categorizing equity 
holders by type (Hoskisson et al., 2002) as well as by actual behavior (Bushee, 
2001). 
 
Transactional debt is fundamentally arms length and covenant driven. The 
dispersed nature of bonds and lack of proprietary information about the firm make 
them susceptible to the exchange hazards of uncertainty and asset specificity in 
the context of both innovation (David et al., 2008; Wang & Thornhill, 2010) and 
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diversification (O'Brien et al., 2014). In fact, most of the capital structure 
literature, by assuming debt homogeneity, has focused on such market governance 
provided by transactional debt. This situation underscores the theoretical 
incompleteness in the literature addressing debt heterogeneity. This assumption of 
homogeneity drives researchers to focus on the specific elements of transactions 
(usually uncertainty and asset specificity) and neglect governance structures 
rooted in capital structure. 
 
Short-term equity holders have long been criticized as the enablers of 
managerial myopia (Porter, 1992) by focusing excessively on short-term earnings 
(Bushee, 2001). Such transient equity neglect their monitoring function to such an 
extent that their presence in the capital structure has been associated with 
financial misreporting by firms (Burns, Kedia, & Lipson, 2010). Such findings 
contradict the assumption of equity homogeneity in the debt heterogeneity 
literature that ascribes hierarchical governance to all equity. I therefore argue that, 
similar to transactional debt, transient equity is generally akin to market 
governance (cf. O’Brien et al. 2014). 
 
Thus, extending the transaction cost logic to within debt and equity holder 
groups, I posit that the original claim (Williamson, 1988) of debt offering market 
and equity offering hierarchical governance is an oversimplification. On 
investigating the empirical and theoretical developments in the last couple of 
decades, it is clear that reality is more nuanced. Relational debt exhibits elements 
 
74 
of hierarchical governance such as close monitoring (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994b; 
Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993), forbearance in the event of debt covenant violation 
(Chava & Roberts, 2008), exchange of non-public proprietary information 
between the lender and borrower (Demiroglu & James, 2010; Uzzi & Lancaster, 
2003) etc. 
 
Concurrently, transient equity generally exhibits features of market 
governance (see Table 6 above) that have been overlooked in the literature. The 
focus of transient equity investors on short-term firm earnings (Bushee, 2001) is 
largely driven by their own incentives being tied to quarterly fund performance 
(Hoskisson et al., 2002). There is high level of competition between these fast 
moving equity investors to gain funds under management by demonstrating short-
term portfolio gains (Graves & Waddock, 1990; Porter, 1992). When viewed as 
governance structures, such transient equity exhibits features of stark market 
governance in which firms are penalized (through sell-offs, portfolio turnover 
being a key feature of transient equity) for underperforming. 
 
 Applying a comprehensive transaction cost perspective – i.e. incorporating 
both governance structure arguments and transaction/exchange hazards – I argue 
that the underlying dimensions of time horizon and risk tolerance transcend the 
conventional bifurcation of debt and equity holders and necessitate their 
simultaneous treatment. The full categorization is depicted in Table 7. Quadrant 1 
in Table 7 represents impatient capital with low risk tolerance and short-time 
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horizons, such impatient capital constituted transactional debt and transient 
equity. Quadrant 3 in Table 7 represents patient capital with high-risk tolerance 
and long-time horizons; such patient capital is constituted by relational debt and 
dedicated equity.  
 
Quadrant 2 contains debt and equity holders who combine high-risk 
tolerance with short-time horizons. Such debt or equity holders can best be 
characterized as activist, they often seek corporate control to bring about 
management and/or strategic change (Harner, 2011). Quadrant 4 in Table 7 
represents owner-managed or family firms that tend to have long-time horizons 
and general focus on preserving socioeconomic wealth (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, 
Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). The scope of this 
dissertation precludes discussion of these latter two categories of capital structure 
constituents. The next section develops specific hypotheses on patient and 
impatient capital.  
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Capital Structure Heterogeneity And Diversification 
 
 
The diversification strategy of a firm invariably shuffles its resource 
bundle, either making it more (related diversification) or less (unrelated 
diversification) firm specific. Firms with a well developed stock of intangible 
resources often try to leverage them over multiple related businesses (Chatterjee 
& Wernerfelt, 1991). However, the very intangibility, firm specificity and 
internalization of these resources reduces firms debt (transactional) capacity 
(Vicente-Lorente, 2001). The reduced debt capacity is not surprising since 
transaction cost arguments suggest that increased asset specificity would 
negatively influence the ability of debt holders to redeploy assets in the case of 
financial distress.  Thus, from the perspective of debt-holders, related 
diversification is a high-risk endeavor that increases asset specificity and reduces 
liquidation values. Unrelated diversification is the opposite.  
 
 Concomitantly, short-term equity investors have a greater focus on short-
term firm performance. Prior research suggests that “pressure-resistant” investors 
are negatively associated with unrelated diversification (Ramaswamy et al., 
2002). However, as mentioned earlier, such research conflates multiple 
institutional owners (pension, mutual and investment funds) into one category in 
addition to ignoring their actual investment styles (Bushee, 2001). I posit that 
these different owners will have a differential association with firm diversification 
strategy due to their varied risk and time horizons. 
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 From a firm strategy perspective, related diversification allows firms to 
leverage existing assets to generate competitive advantage which often confers 
immediate stock price gains (Tihanyi et al., 2003) that are attractive to investors 
seeking high returns over short time horizons.  However, fuller application of the 
transaction cost lens suggests that the governance structures provided by equity 
holder groups are also germane. The predominance of market governance 
provided by transient equity holders should ideally put a pause to strategies 
dependent on unrelated diversification due to their generally higher risk and 
payoff time horizons (Palich et al., 2000) from the firm perspective.  
 
Unfortunately, research also indicates that short-term institutional 
investors, characterized by diversified portfolios and high turnover, are likely to 
neglect their monitoring duties (Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes, & Khan, 2008; 
Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). I posit that transient equity holders due to these 
factors are likely to allow unrelated diversification to go on unchecked. Thus, the 
impact of impatient capital (transactional debt and transient equity) on 
diversification is the same. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Transactional debt is positively associated with unrelated 
diversification. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Transient equity is positively associated with unrelated 
diversification. 
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 An unintended consequence of the market-like, rules driven regime of 
impatient capital is lack of investments in capabilities and long-term competitive 
advantage (Porter, 1992) that accrue from related diversification. This suggests: 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Transient equity is negatively associated with related 
diversification. 
 
The long-term nature of relational debt necessitates private knowledge 
accumulation about the borrower by the lender, in effect “specialization leads to 
more efficient credit analysis and the development of better monitoring 
techniques because of cross-sectional and intertemporal information reusability” 
(Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007: 531). The long-term performance of both the 
borrower and lender are closely tied together, a connection that is further 
enhanced by cross selling of other financial products by the relational lender.  
 
 Fundamentally, relational lending confers four distinct benefits (Boot, 
2000): One, it manifests as hierarchical governance by adopting a discretionary 
regime. Two, due to the long-term nature of the relationship, relational debt 
allows lenders to permit strategies that pay off over the long term. Three, the loan 
covenants themselves can be extensive as they are informed by intimate 
knowledge of firm strategy and capabilities. Four, relationship lending may 
involve collateral that requires close monitoring (2000:13). The first two of these 
push the firm to obtain higher levels of diversification. However, the latter two 
put a break on unsustainable unrelated diversification.  
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Dedicated equity is in an especially precarious position, being residual 
claimants with a low diversified portfolio. I posit that their attention to 
diversification is triggered when it is excessively high and runs the risk of 
impairing firm performance (Palich et al., 2000) and increasing their portfolio 
risk. This is a concern since leveraging of firm resources to garner high 
performance is enabled by related diversification and hampered by unrelated 
diversification (Palich et al., 2000). Thus, patient capital is likely to support 
related diversification even though it develops firm specific assets and 
capabilities; and dedicated equity (being residual claimants) is likely to 
discourage unrelated diversification. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Relational debt has a positive association with related 
diversification.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Dedicated equity has a positive association with related 
diversification.  
 
Hypothesis 2c: Dedicated equity has a negative association with unrelated 
diversification.  
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Capital Structure Heterogeneity And Innovation 
 
 
Innovation is one of the lynchpins of competitive advantage as it generates 
firm specific assets, learning and capabilities (Zott, 2003). But, according to 
extant literature these very attributes of innovation expose firms to information 
asymmetries and exchange hazards (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; David et al., 
2008; O'Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001). Although valid, this perspective 
only gives us partial insight into the ability of transaction cost arguments to 
explain the linkages between capital structure heterogeneity and innovation. 
Another element of the transaction cost argument are the governance structures 
embedded in capital structure.  
 
The classical agency function of debt is represented by transactional debt 
which curtails discretionary managerial spending by tying up free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The restrictive covenants and interest 
payments of this market regime siphon away capital from internal investments in 
R & D. This directly implicates transactional debt as a restraint on innovation 
through firm R & D spending (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). This phenomena is 
distinct from the positive impact of relational debt on R & D spending due to 
reduced exchange hazards (David et al., 2008). 
 
Combining governance structure arguments with transaction attributes 
gives us a richer picture of the association between capital structure heterogeneity 
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and strategic actions like innovation. Innovation has long been considered to 
entail uncertain and long-term payoffs (Hill & Snell, 1988). By focusing primarily 
on transaction attributes, i.e. uncertainty and asset specificity, extant transaction 
cost explanations have underplayed the latter, i.e. governance structure attributes. 
Market-like governance structures (i.e., transactional debt and transient equity) 
are impatient and therefore mismatched for the long-term time horizons that 
innovation requires. Concurrently, hierarchical governance structures enable long-
term capability development through investments in intangibles such as R & D.  
 
However, impatient capital is driven by short-term market performance of 
firms. On occasion, innovation may spur such short-term performance. Such a 
situation emerges in the case of acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions are high 
risk endeavors (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004) with highly variable 
performance implications. However, in the context of externally acquired 
innovations, they confer unique advantages (Ahuja & Katila, 2001) such as 
enhanced absorptive capacity to internalize and exploit external knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Todorova & Durisin, 2007), faster market entry 
(Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, & White, 2004), new opportunities for 
recombinations (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992) etc.. Such 
advantages via externally acquired innovation are likely to speed firm 
performance by helping them overcome time compression diseconomies 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989) – making it attractive to transient equity holders. 
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Another significant factor that makes such external innovation attractive to 
impatient capital is the reduced information asymmetry. Research suggests that 
more forthcoming disclosures by acquiring companies are associated with higher 
firm performance (Shalev, 2009). When viewed as market-like governance 
structures, transient equity holders are at a disadvantage compared to hierarchical 
governance structures such as dedicated equity and relational debt. There is a lack 
of proprietary information exchange between firms and their transient equity 
holders and transactional debt holders. External innovation, due to disclosure 
requirements, offers such market-like governance structures an opportunity to 
mitigate the risk that innovation carries. I posit that due to these factors, impatient 
capital has a very different view of externally acquired innovation as compared to 
internal innovation via R & D spending. Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Transactional debt is positively associated with external 
innovation.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: Transient equity is positively associated with external 
innovation.  
 
Research also suggests that transient equity holders are intrinsically 
against innovation due to the required immediate expensing of R & D (i.e. 
internal innovation) costs (Bushee, 1998) that dampens short-term firm 
performance. Poor performing portfolios negatively impact the incentives of these 
fund managers who are judged primarily on short-term performance. This leads 
them to discount the long term gains that accrue from investing in intangibles like 
research and development (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Thus, I hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 4c: Transient equity is negatively associated with internal 
innovation.  
 
 Relational debt is fundamentally a hierarchical governance structure. 
Relational lenders combine close monitoring, occasionally through board 
representation (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993),  with a discretionary approach to 
covenant enforcement (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002). These long-term lenders are 
often trusted with proprietary firm-level information that mitigates information 
asymmetries between lender and borrower. Such factors suggest a positive 
association between relational debt and firm innovation through R & D 
investments. 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Relational debt has a positive association with internal 
innovation. 
 
Dedicated equity holders are interested in the long-term performance of 
the firm and are willing provide latitude to managers by “forgiving their sins” in 
the pursuit of innovation based strategies that are critical for competitive 
advantage (Porter, 1992). An example of such patient capital are the domestic 
owners of Japanese firms who take a long-term, communitarian view (O'Brien & 
David, 2014) and support innovation (Lee & O'Neill, 2003). 
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Hypothesis 5b: Dedicated equity has a positive association with 
innovation. 
 
Such dedicated equity holders are also likely to be concerned by the 
uncertainty of merger and acquisition success, since research suggests 
“anticipated acquisition synergies are not realized by acquiring firms” (King et 
al., 2004: 194). Externally acquired innovation is further complicated by the 
importance of factors like technological overlap (Sears & Hoetker, 2013) and 
relatedness of knowledge base, which has a curvilinear impact on subsequent 
innovation output (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). This suggests that external innovation 
that at face value appears impressive to impatient capital may not be easy to 
integrate post-acquisition (Zollo & Singh, 2004). Therefore, I posit that dedicated 
equity holders will have a more circumspect attitude to externally acquired 
innovations. 
 
Hypothesis 5c: Dedicated equity has a negative association with external 
innovation. 
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The Mediating Role Of Executive Compensation: Mitigating Risk Aversion 
Or Aggravating Loss Aversion? 
 
 
“Parties engaged in a trade that is supported by nontrivial investments in 
transaction-specific assets are effectively operating in a bilateral trading 
relation with one another. Harmonizing the contractual interface that joins 
the parties, thereby to effect adaptability and promote continuity, becomes 
the source of real economic value.” 
- Williamson (1985: 30) 
 
Agency theory has been the predominant means of investigating ex ante 
incentive alignment between principals and agents. This is not surprising since 
fundamentally, all contracting contains elements of agency (Ross, 1973). This 
tradition has a long history and intellectual roots in mathematical “mechanism 
design” research (Myerson, 1983) and positivist agency (Jensen, 1983), the two 
key subsets of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Transaction cost economics acknowledges the importance of incentive 
mechanisms but differs from these ex ante incentive design traditions due to its 
focus on the governance of ex post contractual relations (Williamson, 1985). 
Transaction cost economics is therefore complementary to positivist agency 
theory with its focus on “governance mechanisms that limit the agent’s self-
serving behavior” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59), i.e. opportunism. In the context of this 
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current study, I therefore propose that the associations between the governance 
structures within debt and equity and strategic actions are mediated by executive 
compensation. Theory suggests that holdup due to asset specificity plagues 
markets and incentives may relieve these problems.  
 
Also, positive agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) assumes that managers 
are risk averse while owners are risk neutral or seeking. This fundamental 
asymmetry can be overcome using optimal contracting that better aligns managers 
with firm owners. Compensation becomes a key alignment device within the 
agency framework. For example, stock options have been found to encourage 
managerial risk taking through increased investment outlays (Sanders & 
Hambrick, 2007) and corporate risk taking (Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 2006). 
This suggests that the combination of reduced monitoring by impatient capital and 
increased incentives will fuel unrelated diversification and external acquisitions. 
Therefore, based on agency arguments that executive compensation mitigates risk 
aversion, I hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 7a: CEO stock options will positively (and partially) mediate 
the association between transactional debt and unrelated diversification. 
 
Hypothesis 7b: CEO stock options will positively (and partially) mediate 
the association between transient equity and unrelated diversification. 
 
 Hypothesis 7c: CEO stock options will positively (and partially) mediate 
the association between transactional debt and external innovation. 
 
Hypothesis 7d: CEO stock options will positively (and partially) mediate 
the association between transient equity and external innovation. 
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However, in direct contrast to agency theory, behavioral-agency 
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) proposes that agents are primarily loss averse 
and not risk averse. Thus, “stock option schemes may increase risk bearing of the 
executive (and, thus, increase risk aversion) rather than decrease risk aversion” 
(1998: 141). This suggests opposing hypotheses to the ones above since CEO 
stock options may have unintended consequences by aggravation of loss aversion.  
 
Hypothesis 8a: CEO stock options will negatively (and partially) mediate 
the association between transactional debt and unrelated diversification. 
 
Hypothesis 8b: CEO stock options will negatively (and partially) mediate 
the association between transient equity and unrelated diversification. 
 
 Hypothesis 8c: CEO stock options will negatively (and partially) mediate 
the association between transactional debt and external innovation. 
 
Hypothesis 8d: CEO stock options will negatively (and partially) mediate 
the association between transient equity and external innovation. 
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The Mediating Role Of The Board Of Directors: Mitigating Moral Hazard 
 
 
“It has long been recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise 
when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their 
privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome.” 
       - Holmstrom (1979: 74) 
 
Hierarchies are an efficient way to deal with holdup problems, triggered 
by asset specificity, that are endemic in markets. However, the discretionary 
regime within hierarchies engenders moral hazards due to information 
asymmetries. This trade-off is a choice between Scylla and Charybdis. Viewed 
from a transaction cost lens (Williamson, 1985), providers of long term capital are 
at a unique disadvantage. Unlike consumers, labor and suppliers, the firm’s equity 
holders invest for the life of the firms and are residual claimants. These equity 
holders are the only voluntary stakeholders in the firm whose contracts are not 
renewed/ renegotiated regularly. Even debt holders occasionally have 
opportunities to renegotiate terms.  
 
Another issue further exacerbating this contractual impasse for equity 
holders is the fact that “their investments are not associated with particular 
assets…the diffuse nature of their investments puts shareholders at an enormous 
disadvantage in crafting…bilateral safeguards” (Williamson, 1985: 305). It is to 
safeguard against this risk of opportunism that the fiduciary role of the board of 
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directors arose (Alchian & Woodward, 1988; Williamson, 1985). Although it has 
been argued that concentrated equity holders may offer a substitute to board 
governance (Desender et al., 2013). Research also suggests that relational 
governance and contractual/ fiduciary arrangements are complementary (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002).  
 
At this juncture, it is important to point out an important distinction. 
Unlike the focus on equity holder representation in much of the board of 
directors’ literature, the transaction cost perspective (Williamson, 1985) explicitly 
notes the possibility that other constituencies of the firm may have impact on its 
management via the board of directors. Similar to long-term equity holders (i.e., 
dedicated equity), long term lenders “usually carefully align incentives and 
protect themselves with safeguards” (1985: 307) that may involve board 
representation (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). 
 
I argue that these providers of patient capital (dedicated equity and 
relational debt), due to their unique position are especially exposed to a particular 
type of opportunism: moral hazard. Moral hazard is fundamentally driven by 
information asymmetries between two parties in a transaction. It “arises in 
agreements in which at least one party relies on the behavior of another and 
information about that behavior is costly” (Alchian & Woodward, 1988: 68). This 
is distinct from the holdup problem (due to asset specificity) that has been the 
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primary focus of most capital structure research invoking transaction cost 
arguments.  
 
Such information asymmetries are endemic in the context of strategic 
actions that have long-term payoffs. Information asymmetries suggest that the 
alignment between hierarchical governance structures in the capital structure and 
strategic actions takes place partially through intermediaries who specialize in 
mitigating moral hazard. I argue that these intermediaries are the board of 
directors.  
 
The role and contribution of outside members in the board of directors to 
corporate governance has been controversial and research has questioned their 
utility (Bhagat & Black, 2001). Five possibilities arise when we question the 
value and contribution of these independent directors: One, perhaps director 
independence is a mirage that is propped up by titles but belied by social ties 
(Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2012; Hwang & Kim, 2009). Second, resource 
dependence suggests that directors are valuable to the extent they can channel 
resources to a firm (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000), thus independence and 
monitoring may be overshadowed by their resource provision role. Third, perhaps 
the conduit for monitoring by outside directors is committee membership 
(especially audit and compensation). Thus, operationalization of outside directors 
that ignores committee membership is insufficient. Fourth, contingencies like past 
performance and CEO power may influence the monitoring attention of the board 
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(Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010). Fifth, independent directors need to 
be better incentivized to align their interests with those of the equity holders. 
 
It is the last of these, director incentives, which I focus on since research 
indicates that in the context of strategic actions entailing risk, director 
compensation is a key factor. In the case of acquisitions, the relationship between 
outside director compensation and acquisition rate is curvilinear (inverted-U) 
(Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2007) suggesting that the ability of incentives to 
reduce risk aversion tapers off. Deutsch et al. (2007) label this effect “dual-
agency” since it implies that compensation of both executives and board members 
matters.   
 
The fundamental agency problem between managers and providers of long 
term capital is rooted in their differential risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers, due to employment risk, tend to be risk-
averse while equity-holders might be risk-neutral or risk-seeking. The monitoring 
function of the board is meant to mitigate this agency problem. In the context of 
strategic actions such as innovation or diversification, focus has traditionally been 
on “outsider” or “independence” leading to equivocal findings (Deutsch, 2005). 
Stock options ostensibly provide directors with the pecuniary incentives to carry 
out this monitoring and low absolute levels of director incentives have been found 
to be negatively associated with R & D (Deutsch, 2005). This suggests that 
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director incentives influence their monitoring performance in the context of 
strategic actions. Thus, I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 9a: Director incentives positively mediate the association 
between relational debt and related diversification.  
 
Hypothesis 9b: Director incentives positively mediate the association 
between dedicated equity and related diversification.  
 
Hypothesis 9c: Director incentives positively mediate the association 
between relational debt and innovation.  
 
Hypothesis 9d: Director incentives positively mediate the association 
between dedicated equity and innovation.  
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the full model of hypothesized relationships in the context of 
diversification. 
 Figure 2 depicts the full model of hypothesized relationships in the context of 
innovation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
 
Sample 
 
My base sample includes all firms with data available on equity 
heterogeneity (Bushee classification), and company financials (Compustat 
Annual). Considering that my study incorporates multiple dependent variables – 
using a single sample would create selection bias. In order to sidestep this I 
created three separate samples. One dataset each to investigate firm 
diversification, M & A (Mergers and Acquisitions) and R & D (Research and 
Development). The first dataset combines the base sample described above with 
firm diversification data from Compustat Business Segments and includes of 
5,025 firm-year observations. The second dataset is a combination of the base 
sample and M & A data from SDC Platinum and comprises of 2,790 firm-year 
observations. The third and final dataset combines the base sample with R & D 
data from Compustat and has 12,161 firm-year observations.  
 
 All three datasets are of public U.S. firms from 1996 – 2010 in the form of 
unbalanced panels. To each of these three datasets I added CEO and Director 
options data from ExecuComp as well as debt data from Osiris. Lack of pre-1996 
data in ExecuComp and limited bank loan data available from Osiris (data item 
21070) were the main constraints on the sample. The unbalanced nature of the 
panel combined with the use of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM, 
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described in Analysis section below) regression reduced the usable sample to 
firms with multi-year data available. Below I describe the construction of this 
sample. 
 
 The use of multiple datasets in a study of this nature means that the final 
usable samples are obtained after significant data loss. The initial sample of 
equityholder classification and Compustat annual data (Bushee data combined 
with Thompson Reuters 13f and Compustat annual data) comprised 35,705 firm-
year observations. This initial dataset encompassed the S & P 1500 universe of 
firm that is the focus of the publicly available Bushee classification. (Bushee, 
2013). In order to prevent data loss at the merging stage, full merging option was 
carried out in R (data replication code is provided in Appendix).  
 
 Reduction in usable samples in studies incorporating multiple datasets is 
common, especially in studies incorporating executive option data. For example, 
another study (Lim & McCann, 2013), published in the Strategic Management 
Journal, incorporating director options had a final usable sample of 2,004 firms. 
The inclusion of debt heterogeneity in a sample of U.S. firms is a significant 
challenge since such data “is not readily available for U.S. firms” (O’Brien et.al. 
2014: 1021). To overcome this, I utilized Osiris bank loan data. Osiris is a 
credible data source, that is increasingly being used in studies published in top 
journals like the Academy of Management Journal (Rogan, 2014; Surroca, Tribó, 
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& Zahra, 2013). Since this is the first study of its kind – incorporating both equity 
and debt heterogeneity – the datasets required to conduct it are also unique.  
 
The importance of the equity classification (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001; 
Connelly et al., 2010b) used in this study cannot be overstated. The literature has 
for long suggested (Graves, 1988; O'Brien et al., 2014; Porter, 1992) that capital 
providers are differentially associated with strategic actions due to their varying 
time horizons. However, scholars have assumed these investment time horizons to 
be linked with institution type. For example, pension fund providers have long 
term horizons, while mutual funds exhibit short-term horizons (Hoskisson et al., 
2002). However, classifications based on actual equityholder behavior – rather 
than assumed behavior – are likely to provide richer opportunities to disentangle 
the complex relationships between risk bearers (capital structure) and risk takers 
(management).  
 
Therefore, I utilize the Bushee classification that divides equityholders as 
transient, dedicated or quasi-indexer based on their past investment patterns in the 
areas of portfolio turnover and portfolio diversification (Bushee, 1998). 
Specifically, Bushee used factor and cluster analysis of nine variables that 
describe institutional investor behavior: level of portfolio concentration (average 
percentage of an institutions ownership position in portfolio firms), average 
percentage holding, percentage of institutions equity that is invested in firms 
where institution has greater than 5 percent ownership, a Herfindahl measure of 
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concentration (squared percentage ownership in each portfolio firm), portfolio 
turnover, stability of holdings (percentage of holdings held for over two years). In 
addition to these six variables, Bushee includes three measures of institutions 
sensitivity to firm earnings (1998: 324).  
 
The superiority of this classification is evident from the fact that Bushee 
found significant heterogeneity by type across these equityholder categories, i.e. 
simple type-based classifications do not capture the real time horizon (and risk 
preferences, as argued in chapter 3) heterogeneity observed amongst 
equityholders (1998: 310). This data is at the institution (ID mgrno, i.e. Manager 
Number) level with multiple institutions holding equity positions (obtained from 
Thompson-Reuters 13f data) in any given sample firm. Following standard 
practice in the literature (Connelly et al., 2010b), I create a separate dataset which 
incorporated the last known holdings for each manager and firm combination for 
each year. This dataset was used to calculate the final aggregate shareholdings of 
Transient and Dedicated equityholders for each sample firm-year.  This firm-year 
data combined with the Compustat annual fiscal year forms the base sample from 
which the three datasets in this study were created.  
 
The descriptive statistics for the three samples are provided in Tables 8a 
(Diversification), 8b (M & A) and 8c (R & D). 
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Variables 
 
Independent variables. Equity heterogeneity studies have usually been 
carried out using type based classification schemes for investors that 
overestimates their stability and ignores actual investor behavior (Bushee, 1998; 
Bushee, 2001). Use of the Bushee classification scheme allows me to bypass this 
common weakness of extant studies, i.e. assumption of stable time horizons 
amongst institutional investors. This classification scheme extends between 1981 
and 2010 for institutional investors in (largely) the S & P 1500 companies. The 
classification trifurcates investors into transient, dedicated and quasi-investors 
based on investment horizons and portfolio turnover. As described above, I 
merged Bushee’s publicly available classification scheme with Thompson-
Reuters 13f data to identify actual ownership stakes of these different types of 
equity holders in the sample firms.  
 
 Following established methodology (Connelly et al., 2010b) , I calculated 
aggregate equityholdings (as percentage of shares outstanding) for each type of 
investor at the firm level. For the purposes of this study, I incorporate only the 
transient and dedicated equity holders since by definition quasi-indexers are 
passive investors. This gives me a dataset that captures actual equity holder 
behavior that mirrors market or hierarchical governance rather than classification 
by type of institution. The variable for both transient and dedicated equity holders 
is their percentage shareholding of total firm outstanding shares.  
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Debt heterogeneity data comprises of transactional and relational debt 
obtained through Compustat annual dataset (Wang & Thornhill, 2010) and Osiris. 
Relational debt is the bank loan (Data item 21070) information available through 
the Osiris dataset. Transactional debt is primarily corporate bonds and includes 
notes, debentures and subordinates. Fundamentally, transactional debt is the debt 
remaining that is not classified as relational (Boot, 2000; Wang & Thornhill, 
2010). This leads to high correlation between relational and transactional debt, but 
that is not a concern for this study since none of the hypothesized models 
incorporate both together.  The debtholder variables were calculated using 
standard practice in the literature (Vicente-Lorente, 2001; Wang & Thornhill, 
2010) and are their ratios to the sum of book value of equity (Compustat variables 
book value per share BKLVPS multiplied by shares outstanding CSHO) and long-
term debt (Compustat variable DLTT). 
 
Dependent variables. The strategic action of innovation is bifurcated into 
internal and external to reflect their differing risks and time horizons. Internal 
innovation is measured using firm R & D intensity (Hoskisson et al., 2002). 
Following prior capital structure research (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; Wang & 
Thornhill, 2010), I calculated R & D intensity as the ratio of R & D expenditures 
to net sales. 
 
External innovation refers to focal firms acquiring innovations developed 
outside through mergers and acquisitions. I follow the same methodology as 
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developed in prior research on external innovation (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 
2006; Sears & Hoetker, 2013) which identifies acquisitions using the SDC 
Platinum M & A database. Following established practice, first I calculated the 
aggregate value of completed M & A by each firm in the sample. The ratio of this 
aggregate completed M & A value to assets is the dependent variable.  
 
The theory developed in this dissertation predicts that heterogeneous 
groups of equity and debt-holders have different time horizons and risk tolerance. 
Prior research has either assumed homogeneity of innovation strategies (i.e., 
focused solely on internal innovation – R & D expenses) or focused on either debt 
or equity heterogeneity. In this dissertation, I extend the literature by combing 
both internal and external innovation and investigating their association with 
capital structure heterogeneity that encompasses both equity and debt-holders. 
 
For diversification, I calculated the well-established entropy measure 
(Davis & Duhaime, 1989; Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985) using the 
Compustat Business Segments database for the sample firms. This measure takes 
into account two elements: first, the number of SIC segments in which a firm 
operates and second, the relative importance of each SIC segments to total firm 
sales. In addition it also takes into account the relatedness of segments. Following 
established methodology (Palepu, 1985: 252 and Davis & Duhaime, 1989: 11) I 
first calculated firm sales in each industry group (SIC two digit level) and 
industry segment (SIC four digit level). Unrelated diversification is the weighted 
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average of all firm industry group shares that arises out of operating in several 
industry groups. If Pj  is the share of jth group sales in total sales of the firm, then 
unrelated diversification is: 
 
 Related diversification is the weighted average of firm segment-to-group 
shares across segments within all firm groups. If Pji is defined as the share of the 
segment i of group j in the total sales of the group and DRj is defined as the 
related diversification arising out of operating in several segments within an 
industry group j, then: 
 
Since a firm may operate in multiple industry groups, its total related 
diversification is:  
 
The entropy measure provides me with separate indices of unrelated and 
related diversification to highlight their differing risk and time characteristics 
(Boyd et al., 2005). The sum of this related and unrelated index is the firm’s total 
diversification. This measure factors in diversity of the firm’s activities both by 
number and relative size of the segments.  The separation of related and unrelated 
diversification into separate indices adds more nuance to this study and the use of 
the entropy measure is standard practice in the literature exploring the capital 
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structure and diversification relationship (Ngah-Kiing Lim et al., 2009; O'Brien et 
al., 2014). 
 
Mediator variables. A contribution of this dissertation is the mediation 
mechanism that intervenes in the association between capital structure 
heterogeneity and strategic actions. Two separate sets of governance variables are 
posited as mediators – CEO stock options and the outside Director stock options.  
 
Executive option data is available through ExecuComp (available from 
1996 onwards). Following prior research (Devers, Wiseman, & Holmes, 2007; 
Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Welbourne, 2007; Martin, Gomez-
Mejia, & Wiseman, 2013) I utilize the measure of CEO stock options available in 
ExecuComp. The Black-Scholes option value of fiscal year awards are used for 
CEO options variable. This variable is available directly via ExecuComp. 
 
Also following extant research (Lim & McCann, 2013), I utilize the 
outside director stock options data is also available from ExecuComp. This 
measure is the average value of director stock options awarded to outside (i.e. 
non-employee) directors and therefore the perfect proxy for Board incentives for 
monitoring.  
 
Controls. The set of controls used in this study are standard in 
investigations of capital structure. I control for firm size using Assets. Since the 
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purpose of this study is to investigate the similarities and dissimilarities between 
various capital providers – across both debt and equity – alternative sources of 
capital, especially firm cash or near cash holdings were also controlled for. 
Unlike Transaction Cost Theory’ focus on capital structure as governance 
structures, Agency theory argues that the key battles amongst capital providers is 
over control of the firm’s free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, varying levels 
of free cash flow (Operating cash flow – capital expenses) could be a rival 
explanation for the results, hence were controlled for. Finally, to account for 
growth options and market-based performance, firm market-to-book (using 
Compustat variables PRCC_F and CSHO, i.e. fiscal year closing stock price and 
shares outstanding) ratio was also included as a control.  
 
Details on the various components of this dataset are in Table 9. The 
correlations for these variables in the three datasets are depicted in Tables 10a, 
10b and 10c. 
 
Following standard practice in the literature (Martin et. al. 2013), prior to 
analysis, all variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to limit the 
influence of outliers and then standardized to have mean zero and standard 
deviation one.  
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Analysis  
 
One of the biggest challenges facing organizational scholars is that 
statistical results generated by commonly used OLS or fixed/random panel 
regressions may be driven by endogeneity. Endogeneity – which refers to 
correlation between the independent variable(s) and error terms – arises from four 
sources: measurement error, simultaneous causality, autoregression and omitted 
variables (Bascle, 2008; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Semadeni, Withers, & 
Certo, 2013). Some or all of these sources may add endogeneity to studies of firm 
strategy since:   
“The field of strategic management is fundamentally predicated on the 
idea that management decisions are endogenous to their expected 
performance outcomes – if not, managerial decision making is not 
strategic, it is superfluous.”   
       - Hamilton & Nickerson 
(2003: 51) 
This study is not immune to the possibility of endogeneity, especially 
since the association between capital providers (both equity and debt) and firm 
strategic actions may suffer from simultaneous causality, i.e. the causal direction 
may be two-way. Therefore, conventional OLS, or panel fixed/random effects 
regressions are unsuitable for estimation of parameters in this study.  
 
In order to account for endogeneity, the estimation method I utilize are 
two-step Blundell and Bond (Blundell & Bond, 1998) generalized methods of 
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moments (GMM) for dynamic panels with robust inference and firm fixed effects 
(through differencing of data). The R package plm (Croissant & Millo, 2008) was 
used for estimating the models. The last model (# 4) in each table is for CEO or 
Director stock options to test the mediation hypotheses. The different dependent 
variables are shown together in each model in order to test for the mediation 
hypotheses (Shaver, 2005). One limitation of using GMM methodology was that 
the use of lag structure of variables as instruments led to loss of usable data, this 
is visible from the observations used numbers for each regression model. 
 
Nonetheless, the Blundell and Bond dynamic panel approach – which 
utilizes generalized method of moment’s estimator – offers numerous advantages 
for this study: First, it accounts for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity since 
individual fixed effects are accounted for by differencing the data. Second, it 
accounts for the dynamic nature of panel data and the dependent variables whose 
values depend on their lagged values. Third, GMM allows me to account for 
endogeneity between capital providers and different strategic actions. Fourth, the 
robust GMM estimator with Windmeijer corrected standard errors (Blundell, 
Bond, & Windmeijer, 2000; Windmeijer, 2005) utilized in this study accounts for 
the potential presence of both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Fifth, the 
GMM estimator uses the fact that in panel data, the number of instruments 
increases with time t, this overcomes a key weakness of conventional 2SLS (Two-
stage least squares) – namely, the difficulty of finding adequate number of 
suitable instruments for firm-level studies. Sixth, use of GMM to test all models 
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also allows me to bypass the common oversight found in tests of mediation in 
management journals  – namely, that testing system of equations (independent 
variables regressed on the mediator as well as regressed on dependent variable 
with the mediator present to test for combined effect) using OLS (MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002) will lead to biased estimates since 
error terms in these equations will be correlated. Use of instrumental variable 
regression is recommended to ensure correct estimation, especially in the 
presence of feedback effects (Shaver, 2005), a concern in this study. Finally, the 
system-GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998) produces smaller bias and more 
precise estimates compared to the difference-GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991) 
approach, especially in unbalanced panels with many firms having only a few 
years of data available, a common feature of firm level panel data.  
 
All these advantages have led to greater use of GMM in recent 
management research (Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Patel & Cooper, 2014). The 
instruments utilized in the Blundell and Bond GMM are lagged values of the 
independent variables (at t-1 and further lags), as well as lagged values of the 
dependent variables (at t-2 and further lags). These ensure that the results 
presented are free from endogeneity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
Table 8a, 8b and 8c present the key descriptive statistics for each of the 
datasets in this study. Table 10a, 10b and 10c provide the correlations with 
associated significance levels. The results of the GMM regressions are presented 
in Tables 11 – 14: for the dependent variables of Unrelated Diversification, 
Related Diversification, Mergers & Acquisition and R & D Intensity respectively. 
The last model (#4) in each table tests the effect of the independent variables on 
the hypothesized mediators (either CEO or outside Director options). Combined 
analysis of model #3s (full range of predictors, mediators and controls on strategic 
actions) and #4s (full range of predictors and controls on mediator) is used to test 
for mediation. 
 
Prior to a discussion of the results, it is important to note that two key 
statistics indicate the validity of these two-step system GMM regression models. 
First, the Hansen-Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in which the null 
hypothesis is that the specified lagged variables are valid instruments. Non-
significance of the Hansen-Sargan chi-square statistics for models confirms 
instrument validity.   
 
The second key test for GMM models is the Arellano-Bond test of serial 
correlation (Arellano & Bond, 1991). A robust estimator was used in the 
computation of these measures. Although some first order autocorrelation tests 
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are significant. None of the second order autocorrelation tests were significant. 
Therefore the assumption of no serial correlation in these models is reasonable 
(Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Arellano & Bond, 1991). 
Capital Structure And Diversification  
 
I first consider the results of the GMM dynamic panel regressions for 
Unrelated and Related Diversification. Unrelated Diversification (see Table 11) 
has been negatively associated with firm performance (Palich et al., 2000) since 
the “marginal costs of diversification increase rapidly as diversification hits high 
levels” (2000: 159). This is perhaps the main driver of the two key shifts in 
diversification witnessed amongst U.S. firms, an increase during the 1960’s and a 
decrease in the 1980’s (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997). The main arguments against 
such “conglomerate” diversification are increased complexity of managing 
diverse businesses, internal capital market inefficiencies and diseconomies related 
to other inefficiencies.  
 
Model 3 of Table 11 suggests that Transient equityholders are negatively 
associated with Unrelated diversification. Therefore, Model 3 (full model with 
both compensation and capital structure variables) confirms – contrary to the 
hypothesized relationship – the negative association between Transient equity 
holders and Unrelated Diversification. Thus, hypothesis 1b is marginally (0.1 
level) significant but with an unexpected sign; the association between Transient 
equity and Unrelated Diversification is significant but negative. This suggests that 
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Transient equity holders provide a sort of market discipline in spite (or perhaps 
because) of their reputation for being ‘fluid capital’ (Porter, 1992: 8). Being aware 
of the performance drawbacks of unrelated diversification, they do not support it 
via an error of omission (to monitor) as Transaction Cost reasoning would 
suggest.  
The non-significance of the coefficient for Dedicated equity shows that, in 
this sample, after accounting for endogeneity, no association exists between 
Dedicated equityholders and unrelated diversification (H2c not supported). 
Similarly, none of the other hypotheses for unrelated diversification are 
supported.  
 
The results for Related Diversification are presented in Table 12. 
Transient equity remains negatively associated with related diversification too 
(Model 3) thus supporting hypothesis 1c. Taken together with the results of 
unrelated diversification, it is clear that the negative influence of short-term equity 
holders is persistent over both types of diversification. Interestingly, relational 
debt is marginally significant and negative in Model 1 and 3, opposite the 
predicted direction in hypothesis 2a. Outside director options are significant and 
negatively associated with related diversification (hypothesis 9 a) in Model 2. 
These results are further discussed in the Discussion section. I now turn my 
attention to the results for innovation.  
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Capital Structure And Innovation 
 
The GMM regression models for external innovation/ M & A are 
presented in Table 13. In Model 1, coefficients for both Transactional Debt and 
Transient Equity are significant and positive. These results are in line with 
hypotheses 4a and 4b, which postulates a positive relationship between impatient 
capital and external innovation in the form of Mergers and Acquisitions.  
 
 In Model 1, Dedicated equity also shows a significant and negative 
relationship with M & A, thus supporting hypothesis 5c. This relationship has 
reduced significance (p < 0.1) in model 3 (full model with controls, capital 
structure and compensation), while the positive influence of Transient 
Equityholders on M & A remains positive and highly significant (p < 0.01). The 
relationship between Transactional Debt and M & A loses significance in the full 
Model 3.  
 
 The influence of CEO options on M & A is negative and highly significant 
in Models 2 & 3, this is in line with research suggesting that acquirer firms suffer 
poorer performance (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 
2009). Interestingly, Models 3 and 4 show the existence of a mediating 
relationship in which Transient Equity has a positive association with M & A 
(Model 1 & 3) and a negative association with CEO options (Model 4) – thereby 
supporting hypothesis 8d. 
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 Results for Research and Development are presented in Table 14. 
Contrary to prior findings in the literature (David et al., 2008; Wang & Thornhill, 
2010), lagged values of relational debt are negatively associated with Research 
and Development (Models 1 & 3), i.e. hypothesis 5a is significant but in an 
unexpected direction. None of the other hypotheses are significant. This suggests, 
in accordance with results for unrelated diversification, that once endogeneity – 
an omission in the bulk of capital structure research – is accounted for, some prior 
results in the literature between capital structure and firm strategy may not hold.  
 
A summary of all significant results is presented in Table 15. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 
Prior research has devoted a substantial amount of effort to investigate the 
associations between firm capital structure and firm strategic actions. In this 
dissertation, I contribute to this vast literature by developing and testing theory 
that integrates both equity and debt heterogeneity. The results demonstrate that 
after controlling for endogeneity – an omission in most of the capital structure 
literature – the hypothesized dimensions of risk tolerance and time horizon 
definitively and parsimoniously describe the key factors at play in the association 
between capital providers and Mergers and Acquisitions. On the other hand, the 
mixed results for Diversification and Research and Development suggest that the 
role of capital providers is much more nuanced than extant theory explains.  
 
Capital Structure And Diversification 
 
In the case of firm diversification, a broad consensus has developed over 
the last decade or so (Palich et al., 2000) that there is an optimal level of related 
diversification that is rewarded through higher firm performance. Firms that go 
beyond this level into unrelated diversification suffer from diseconomies that 
hamper performance.  
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This firm performance driven support for related diversification stems 
largely from resource based reasoning (Markides & Williamson, 1996). 
According to this logic, “diversification will only support long-run superior 
returns when it allows a firm to exploit resources or assets that are unavailable to 
its rivals at a competitive cost” (1996: 341).   
 
In order to delve deeper into the unexpected results for diversification I 
further analyze the association between firm diversification and performance. I 
conducted additional post-hoc analysis – presented in Table 16 – in which market-
to-book and firm return-on-assets were used as dependent variables to test the 
performance implications of diversification. The results are in line with the 
consensus view in that unrelated diversification has clear and significant negative 
influence on firm performance. Model 3 of Table 16 shows significance for the 
quadratic term for total diversification (sum of related and unrelated 
diversification), suggesting an inverted-U shaped relationship between firm 
diversification and performance (market-to-book). This confirms that even after 
accounting for endogeneity, the results of the meta-analysis conducted by Palich 
and colleagues holds.  
 
However, the coefficients for related diversification are neither significant 
nor substantial, suggesting that at least for the sample under study the benefits of 
related diversification may be overstated. This in spite the fact that, as 
hypothesized, Dedicated equityholders support related diversification and 
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Transient equityholders do not.  Relational debt is, opposite to hypothesized 
direction, negatively associated with related diversification. These results 
combined with the post-hoc performance analysis suggest a more nuanced 
relationship between related diversification and capital structure. Four 
interrelated explanations exist for these results for diversification.  
 
First, Markides and Williamson argue that “diversification will only 
support long-run superior returns when it allows a firm to exploit resources or 
assets that are unavailable to its rivals at a competitive cost…any measure of 
relatedness that fails to take into account the characteristics of the resources or 
assets being shared” will lead to erroneous conclusions about competitive 
advantage (1996: 341). This is perhaps the key reason that related diversification 
as measured by conventional industry counts, Herfindahl or Entropy measures 
fails to take into account the specific nature of resources being “shared” – which 
may in turn drives the lack of meaningful performance benefits of related 
diversification.  
 
When discussing their results supporting a curvilinear (inverted-U shaped) 
relationship between diversification and firm performance, Palich et.al. (2000: 
167) point out that for related diversification, “the effect sizes are not quite as 
strong as expected…diversification may not be quite as strong a player as some 
have imagined…” When we consider the performance implications, the results for 
diversification (especially, the strong and negative association of Transient 
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equityholders) are not surprising. In the face of a real performance drawback, 
firms clearly suffer a diversification discount (Denis et al., 1997) as witnessed by 
the results in Table 16. The curvilinear relationship between firm diversification 
and performance holds even after accounting for endogeneity (see Model 3 of 
Table 16).  
 
The second probable explanation for the diversification results is that for 
firms to enjoy the fruits of synergy that related diversification promises there must 
exist enabling mechanisms within the firm, if not, then these firms either focus or 
falter (Nayyar, 1992). Implementation difficulties arising from increased 
bureaucratic/ coordination costs, internal transaction costs, intra-firm competition, 
incentive distortion and incompatible technologies are some of the factors that 
maybe driving the poor performance of even related diversifiers. Fundamentally, 
these organizational barriers hamper attempts at obtaining cooperation from 
multiple units within firms.   
 
Thirdly, firm knowledge base and technological diversity are key factors 
in its ability to leverage related diversification (Miller, 2006), this more nuanced 
version of the resource-based argument in favor of related diversification echoes 
the rational outlined in the first explanation above. However, similar to the first 
explanation, the exclusion of patent based measures of technological diversity in 
this study precludes any additional post-hoc tests that incorporate more nuanced 
measures of firm resources under consideration for diversification. This limitation 
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is indeed one of the most fruitful areas of future research possible for me since 
publicly available technology and patenting data of firms is a valuable resource 
for investors and researchers alike.  
 
Finally, the results for related diversification (Table 12) suggest that in 
spite of their greater involvement in firms, Relational debt holders and Dedicated 
equityholders have differing perspectives on related diversification. In spite of 
reduced information asymmetries engendered by long-term relationships, 
Relational debts negative association with related diversification suggests that 
they do not support the firm-specific assets and capabilities generated through 
related diversification. On the other had, as hypothesized, Dedicated 
equityholders are wholly supportive of related diversification.   
 
 The inexorable links between firm resources and diversification strategy 
have been part of management discourse at least as far back as Penrose (1959). 
The results obtained after rigorous analysis suggest that agency arguments 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) that underlie the early 
diversification literature are sound. I have argued earlier that viewed from a 
transaction cost lens, debt and equity are de facto governance structures 
(Williamson, 1988). However, the self-interest of debt and equityholders seems to 
surmount any other considerations. Only partial support is found for transaction 
cost reasoning, the clear and negative consequences of firm diversification on 
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performance are not in favor of capital providers who seem to prefer more 
focused firms.  
Capital Structure And Innovation 
 
Similar to diversification, results for Research and Development present a 
nuanced picture of capital structure, one that runs contrary to current theory. The 
only significant relationship is one between Relational Debt and R & D, and it is 
counter to the positive relationship predicted by theory. The difference between 
these and prior results may be driven by either lack of endogeneity controls in 
prior work (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001) or the nature of samples used: either 
Japanese firms (David et al., 2008) and 1980’s U.S. oil companies (Wang & 
Thornhill, 2010).  
 
A more optimistic explanation maybe that the myopic investor behavior 
institutional investors have been accused of, is a legacy of the 1980’s, and is no 
longer the case as the level of sophistication of institutional investors and 
corporate governance practices have evolved. An early indicator of this is visible 
in Bushee’ 1998 study that investigated institutional investor holdings and its 
impact on managerial tendency to cut R & D expenditures when facing an 
earnings shortfall: 
“A possible explanation for the negative relation between institutional 
ownership and the decision to cut R & D is that institutions prefer to invest 
in more innovative firms that are unlikely to cut R & D under any 
circumstances.” 
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      - Bushee (1998: 322) 
 
A more pessimistic explanation maybe that lack of significance for 
equityholder influence on R & D in this large sample suggest the possibility that 
prior results obtained by Bushee are either an artifact of endogeneity or sampling 
period (1980’s-early 1990’s). A future direction for my research will be to expand 
both the sample size and period to investigate this possibility.  
 
The negative and significant relationship of relational debt and R & D is 
contrary to prior findings amongst Japanese firms (David et al., 2008). Perhaps 
the more communitarian nature of Japanese banking (O'Brien et al., 2014) 
compared to U.S. banks explains these results. The opaque nature of R & D that 
develops firm-specific “stock of strategic resources such as innovative 
capabilities” (Vincente-Lorente, 2001: 162) may be too opaque even for relational 
debt holders. A limitation of this study, and concomitant future direction, is to 
directly account for relational debtholders by incorporating their representation on 
firm board of directors. It is likely that board representation is a mediating or 
moderating factor in their influence on firm strategic actions.  
 
The issue of strategic opacity and information asymmetries may also 
explain why the theoretical framing (see Table 7) of capital providers along the 
dimensions of risk tolerance and time horizon perfectly explains their attitudes 
towards Mergers and Acquisitions. Unlike internal, operationally focused 
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strategic actions like diversification and R & D, M & A activity tends to make 
more data publicly available due to higher business combination disclosures 
(Shalev, 2009). 
 
This explains why impatient capital (quadrant 1 in Table 7), which doesn’t 
have the firm-specific knowledge to evaluate either diversification or R & D 
strategies, can act on publicly disclosed M & A strategies and events. Contrary to 
such impatient capital, Dedicated equityholders and CEO’s have firm-specific 
investments that are long-term in nature and maybe harmed by the negative 
performance impact (Haleblian et al., 2009) acquirers face. Furthermore, these 
strong results suggest future directions for investigating capital structure and M & 
A: does hubris increase CEO propensity for mergers (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997), i.e. would the negative impact of CEO options on M & A change if CEO 
hubris was accounted for? How would the presence of diverse capital providers 
affect these relationships?  
Levers Available To Capital Providers 
 
The lack of support for most of the hypothesized mediation relationships 
(except H8 d) suggests that levers other than CEO options and Director options 
may be linking capital structure and strategic actions. These levers run the gamut 
from proxy fights and corporate resolutions available to equityholders to Board of 
Director representation, and litigation available to both equity and debtholders. In 
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addition, debt covenant violations are another source of influence available to 
debtholders.  
 
Proxy fights are perhaps the most direct way in which equityholders can 
influence management (Campbell, Campbell, Sirmon, Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012). 
A key example of such use of proxy contests is the selection of Board members. 
Post the 2007-08 financial crisis, the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) 
recognized the broad failure of corporate governance and responded by 
introducing Rule 25 in 2010 to directly address a key point of governance failure 
– the lack of truly independent members on the Board. This rule allows long-term 
shareholders (at least 3 years of equity ownership in firm) with 3% or greater 
equityholdings in firms to nominate their own choices for the Board of Directors. 
Campbell and colleagues found that the passing of Rule 25 increased firm value 
(measured by abnormal return around the event). This finding highlights that post 
2010 (the ending year for my dissertation sample), equityholder influence on 
director selection improved – thereby suggesting another future research 
direction: expanding my sample period beyond 2010 and incorporating proxy 
contests as a mediation mechanism between capital providers and firm strategic 
action. A similar role could be played by corporate resolutions. 
 
A lever of influence available to both equityholders and debtholders is 
litigation. For example, firms whose Boards are dominated by insiders are known 
to suffer from more shareholder lawsuits (Kesner & Johnson, 1990). Such 
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securities class-action lawsuits can be detrimental to management and have been 
linked with executive turnover, higher capital costs, reputational penalties, 
reduced payouts to shareholders etc. (Shi, Connelly, & Sanders, 2015). A recent 
(Shi et al., 2015) study found that higher vertical pay gaps – i.e. between CEO 
and other top executives – also lead to managerial misconduct, a common 
precursor to such equityholder litigation. Interestingly, such litigation has also 
been found to raise the cost of relational debt (Deng, Willis, & Xu, 2014).  
 
A lever specifically available to debtholders is debt covenants (e.g. 
maintaining a minimum current ratio). Violation of these covenants in debt 
contracts directly influences managerial discretion over investment (Chava & 
Roberts, 2008). For example, violation of even financial covenants (those not 
related to payment of interest or principal), termed technical defaults, shift control 
rights from management to debtholders. Such violations have been linked with a 
13% decline in capital expenditures compared to pre-violation levels (2008: 2087) 
as debtholders proceed to punish management for perceived misbehavior. These 
levers, along with Board representation discussed in Chapter 2 (see page 45) 
suggest multiple future directions to further investigate the mediating mechanisms 
between capital structure and firm strategic actions.  
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Limitations And Contributions 
 
Like all research, this study is not devoid of limitations. Some of these are: 
restricted sample size due to limited data availability for relational debt through 
Osiris, exclusion of technological diversity measures based on patents to better 
account for relational diversification, lack of Board level data to test for actual 
Board representation by capital providers. A methodological limitation due to the 
use of GMM is the bias in this study towards firms with multi-year data available, 
thereby eliminating newly public/ young firms from the sample. Nonetheless, 
none of these are insurmountable challenges, and in fact offer fruitful directions 
for future research.  
 
In this dissertation I offer four significant contributions to the capital 
structure literature. First, the key contribution of this study is the incorporation of 
diverse capital providers – across both debt and equity – to explore their 
commonalities and differences. Extant research highlights that neither all equity 
holders (Hoskisson et al., 2002) nor all debt holders (David et al., 2008) speak 
with the same voice. This suggests the possibility that some equity holders may be 
aligned less with other equity holders and more with certain debt holders, and vice 
versa.  The usual separation of the equityholder and debtholder literatures may, in 
other words, undermine our ability to credibly understand the relationship 
between capital structure and strategic choices made by firms. 
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The results clearly indicate that the nature of strategic actions matter and 
that the commonalities between debtholders and equityholders – as clearly visible 
in the results for Mergers and Acquisitions – have been ignored in the literature. 
Equity is not a pillow and Debt is not a sword, but these have highly contextual 
and variegated influences on firm management and strategy. Therefore their 
persistent separation in the literature is detrimental to both theory development 
and practical resonance. This work offers to be a first step in remedying this lapse.  
 
The second contribution I make in this dissertation is conceptualizing 
capital providers along the dimensions of risk tolerance and time horizon. By 
creating a parsimonious categorization of capital – across equity and debt – and 
testing it across multiple strategic actions, I demonstrate the commonalities and 
not just the differences between types of equity and debt. The results for M & A 
definitively show that the two proposed dimensions of risk tolerance and time 
horizon drive capital providers association with M & A. This supports the theory 
proposed in this dissertation – namely, that through applying a transaction cost 
lens, capital providers can be categorized along their underlying dimensions of 
time horizon and risk tolerance. Please see page 65 onwards for a more detailed 
discussion of these two dimensions.  
 
The third contribution of this dissertation is to specify and test executive 
options as a mediating mechanism linking capital structure and strategic actions. 
The results for M & A again demonstrate the critical role CEO options play in 
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aligning the interests of capital providers with firm management. The support 
found for hypothesis 8d (positing that CEO stock options will negatively and 
partially mediate the association between transient equity and M & A) gives 
greater credence to the behavioral-agency (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) view 
that executive stock options increase risk-bearing of executives and thereby 
reduce their risk-taking by aggravating loss-aversion. The lack of support for the 
mediation hypotheses for diversification and R & D suggest that capital providers 
may influence firm management through some other lever(s), such as those 
discussed above. Incorporation of these additional levers is a potentially 
promising future direction for my research.  
 
Fourth and finally, a key contribution I make in this dissertation is the 
methodological choice of GMM that allows me to control for endogeneity. The 
fact that after controlling for endogeneity, many of the “established” results in the 
literature disappear in this study suggests that they may be driven by 
methodological choices made in previous works. Seminal works from the 1980’s- 
early 2000’s on capital structure used analytical tools like OLS, structural 
equation modeling and more recently fixed effects regressions. None of these 
account for the endogenous nature of the capital structure and firm strategy 
relationship. Although recent capital structure research accounts for endogeneity, 
much of prior theory remains open to reassessment. This along with the other 
issues mentioned earlier indicate that the conversation on capital structures’ 
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influence on firm strategy is far from settled, thereby giving me ample scope for 
research projects beyond this dissertation.  
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TABLES & FIGURES 
TABLE 1: Homogeneous debt & equity 
Citation Capital 
Structure  
Measures  
Sample Theoretical Lens  
 
Strategic Variables & Implications 
Bettis (1983) 
 
N/A, theory 
paper 
 
 
N/A, theory 
paper 
 
Call for synthesis between 
financial theory and 
corporate strategy 
 
 
Three conundrums: 1) financial theory 
suggests equity markets don’t reward 
firm specific (unsystematic) risk – the 
core of strategy. 2) Info asymmetries 
due to competitive secrecy and 3) 
Capital availability and performance 
differences between U.S. & 
international firms 
 
Peavy (1984) N/A, theory 
paper 
 
N/A, theory 
paper 
 
 
Response to Bettis (1983) 
and reconciliation between 
financial theory and 
corporate strategy 
Response to two Bettis’ (1983) 
conundrums: 
1) Recommendation of financial theory 
to diversify unsystematic (i.e. firm-
level) risk is not contradictory to 
management of such risks through 
strategy. 2) Information increasing cash 
flow predictability, without damaging 
future cash flows, should be released 
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Barton &  
Gordon  
(1987) 
 
N/A, theory 
paper 
 
N/A, theory 
paper 
 
Critique of financial theory. 
Posits that strategy (i.e. 
managerial choice) helps 
explain capital structure 
decisions 
Firm level capital structure affected by 
context and managerial values. 
Therefore, this decision better studied 
through managerial/strategy perspective 
Sandberg et  
al. (1987) 
Firm leverage 
 
456 S & P 
industrial 
firms with 
publicly 
traded debt 
(in 1978) 
Managerial choice Debt coverage. Historical mean and 
standard deviation of ROA can be used 
to determine probability of debt default 
Lubatkin &  
O’Neill  
(1987) 
Leverage  
(book value of  
long term debt/  
book value of   
assets) 
297 U.S. 
mergers and 
large 
acquisitions 
(> $10 
million) 
between 
1954-1973 
Capability and competitive 
advantage: tangible, 
intangible and competitor 
interrelationships (1987: 
670) 
 
Diversification via mergers. Leverage 
positively associated with related 
diversification as these reduce 
systematic risk, i.e. market-level risks 
(1987: 671, 680) 
Barton &  
Gordon  
(1988) 
Owner’s 
equity/Invested 
capital (inverse 
of leverage) 
279 U.S. 
firms part of 
1974 Fortune 
500 list still 
active in 
1982  
Managerial choice Diversification (proxy for managerial 
propensity for risk-taking). Unrelated 
diversification and growth rates 
positively associated with debt levels. 
Profitability negatively associated with 
debt 
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Chatterjee &  
Wernerfelt  
(1991) 
Debt (Long 
term debt to 
market value) 
118 U.S. 
firms 
between 
1981 and 
1985 
Resource & capabilities Diversification. Physical & intangible 
assets support related diversification. 
Financial assets support unrelated 
diversification. Innovation associated 
with related diversification in both high 
and low-performing firms 
 
 
 
Balakrishna  
& Fox (1993) 
Leverage 
(book 
value of total 
debt-to-
market value 
of equity & 
book value of 
debt, this ratio 
then log 
transformed) 
295 single 
business 
U.S. firms 
between 
1978 and 
1987 
TCE (Transaction Cost 
Economics) 
Asset attributes (tangibility & 
specificity). Fundamental conflict 
between a resource driven strategy and 
debt financing. Generally, RBV 
(Resource Based View) pushes for firm-
specific assets while debt holders want 
redeployable assets. Advertising 
(intangibility of assets) builds 
reputational advantages and increases 
debt capacity 
 
Long &  
Ravenscraft  
(1993) 
Debt  72 U.S. 
LBOs 
(leveraged 
buyouts) 
between 
1981 
between 
1987 
Agency & capital market 
imperfections (information 
asymmetries & moral 
hazard) 
R & D in firms undergoing LBOs. R & 
D intensity drops by 40% in firms 
undergoing LBOs. Agency theory 
(debts disciplines managers’ propensity 
for pet projects, including R & D) 
predicts the direction of this decline. 
Capital market imperfections predict the 
extent of this decline 
 
Lowe et al.  
(1994) 
Debt to equity 
 
Replication 
of Barton & 
Firm risk and debt Diversification. Corporate strategy 
influences capital structure, especially 
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Gordon 
(1988) using 
Australian 
data (176 
firms 
between 
1984-88) 
 
in the most diversified firms 
Taylor &  
Lowe (1995) 
Debt to equity 
(inverse of 
Barton & 
Gordon, 1988 
measure) 
 
176 
Australian 
and 279 U.S. 
firms  
Capital market 
imperfections 
Diversification. Capital markets reward 
focused (i.e. low diversification) firms 
since they are easier to understand 
Kocchar &  
Hitt (1998) 
Debt & equity 
 
187 U.S. 
manufacturin
g firms 
following 
diversificatio
n strategy 
between 
1982 and 
1986  
 
TCE Diversification. Reciprocal relationship 
between capital structure and 
diversification. Equity financing 
associated with related diversification 
and debt financing associated with 
unrelated diversification 
Simerly & Li  
(2000) 
Leverage 
 
700 large 
U.S. firms 
Agency & TCE Environmental dynamism. Leverage 
positively associated with firm 
performance in stable environments, 
negatively associated with firm 
performance in dynamic environments 
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Vincente- 
Lorente   
(2001) 
Leverage: 
Market (total 
debt to market 
value of 
equity) and 
Accounting 
(total debt to 
book value 
equity plus 
book value of 
debt) 
 
52 
nonfinancial 
Spanish 
firms 
between 
1990 and 
1994 
Resource Based View 
(RBV): Factor market 
imperfections 
Resource features (opacity and 
specificity). Resource specificity and 
opacity limit borrowing capacity. A 
resource driven strategy creates 
financial constraints for firms 
 
 
 O’Brien  
(2003) 
Leverage 
(book  
value of debt 
to  
total market 
value  
of firm) 
 
16,358 U.S. 
firms listed 
on 
Compustat 
for at least 2 
years 
between 
1980 and 
1999. 91,000 
firm-year 
observations 
 
Behavioral theory of the 
firm (BTOF) 
Slack and innovation. R & D intensity 
of firm is not merely its stock of 
intangible resources, but indicates the 
strategic importance of innovation to the 
firm. Such an innovation strategy is 
negatively associated with leverage 
Ngah-Kiing  
Lim et al.  
(2009) 
Debt (long-
term debt to 
total capital, 
log 
transformed) 
245 publicly 
listed firms 
in Singapore 
between 
1995 and 
2000 
Agency and Contingency Environmental dynamism and 
Diversification. Debt association with 
unrelated diversification: positive in 
dynamic environments, and negative in 
stable. Argue that managers exploit 
dynamic environments to raise more 
debt. Bidirectional causal relation 
 
130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
between debt financing and 
diversification strategy 
 
Ofori- 
Dankwa &  
Julian (2013) 
Equity to sales 
ratio 
100 largest 
Ghanaian 
companies 
between 
1996 and 
1999 
Institutional theory subset 
of institutional difference 
hypothesis 
Environmental dynamism. Contingency 
effects of environment on capital 
structure and performance relationship 
are different in emerging market 
context. Specifically, unlike findings in 
developed countries, in Ghana, sector 
dynamism (environmental dynamism 
measured at industry sector level, see 
2013: 1429) negatively moderates 
relationship between equity and firm 
performance 
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TABLE 2: Equity heterogeneity 
Citation Capital 
Structure  
Measures  
Sample Theoretical 
Lens  
 
Strategic Variables & Implications 
Hill & 
Snell 
(1988) 
Stockholder 
concentration 
and Insider 
ownership  
94 research 
intensive 
firms listed in 
the Fortune 
500 in 1980 
Agency and 
Contingency 
theory.  
Innovation and Diversification. Stock concentration 
positively associated with innovation and negatively 
associated with diversification. Outsiders on board 
discourage innovation and support diversification 
(opposite of hypothesized relationship). 
Diversification relevant in declining industries. R & 
D relevant in industries with changing product and 
process technologies 
 
Graves 
(1988) 
Institutional 
ownership 
concentration 
 
22 computer 
manufacturing 
firms between 
1976 to 1985 
 
Investor 
myopia 
Innovation. Confounding of time trend and 
institutional ownership effects on innovation. 
Generally, negative association between institutional 
owners and innovation 
Baysinger 
et al. 
(1991) 
Institutional 
ownership 
concentration 
 
 
176 Fortune 
500 firms 
(1980) 
Corporate 
governance 
Innovation. Institutional equity holder concentration 
positively associated with firm innovation  
Chaganti 
& 
Damanpo
ur (1991) 
Outside 
institutional 
equity holders 
and insider 
ownership 
80 U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms between 
1983 and 
1985 
Power and 
resource 
dependence 
Debt-capital ratio & firm performance. Family 
ownership increases debt-capital ratio, while outside 
institutional ownership reduces it. Combined, they 
lower the debt-capital ratio. Influence of institutional 
and executive ownership are additive to performance  
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Hansen & 
Hill 
(1991) 
Institutional 
and insider 
ownership 
125 U.S. 
research 
intensive 
firms between 
1977 and 
1987 
 
Investor 
myopia vs. 
efficient 
markets 
 
Innovation. No evidence for myopic institutional 
investors. Positive (but weak) relationship observed 
between institutional ownership and innovation 
Bethel & 
Liebeskin
d (1993) 
Blockholder 
and insider 
ownership 
100 (93 final 
sample) 
randomly 
selected U.S. 
firms from 
Fortune 500 
list of 1981 
that survived 
as public 
firms till 1987 
 
Agency vs. 
Environmen
tal 
antecedents 
(e.g. 
deregulation 
and 
financial 
innovation) 
of 
restructuring 
Restructuring. Outside blockholders have the 
incentives and power to ensure efficient firm 
management. Blockholders associated with reduced 
diversification, i.e. refocusing 
 
Gibbs 
(1993) 
Blockholders 
and 
management 
equity. 
Leverage 
 
70 firms 
selected from 
Business 
Week 1982 
Corporate 
Scoreboard 
 
Agency 
 
 
 
 
Restructuring (financial & portfolio). Restructuring 
motivated by agency costs. Board power associated 
with reduced restructuring. Overall support for free 
cash flow hypothesis of restructuring (Jensen, 1986) 
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Hoskisson 
et al. 
(1994) 
Debt and 
insider equity 
 
203 U.S. 
firms 
initiating 
divestments 
between 1985 
and 1990 
Agency Restructuring (divestment). Diversification 
positively associated with relative debt intensity 
(adjusted for industry), which in turn is positively 
associated with divestment. Outside board members 
associated with debt-intensive strategies in divesting 
firms. Greater equity per blockholder detrimental to 
performance 
 
Graves & 
Waddock 
(1994) 
Number and 
equity 
concentration 
of institutional 
investors  
453 of S & P 
500 firms in 
1990 
Risk-
reduction 
and efficient 
markets 
Corporate social performance (CSP). Investments in 
CSP reduce risk (due to potential regulatory 
sanctions, legal and consumer retaliation). CSP 
found to be positively associated with number of 
institutional investors  
 
Davis & 
Thompson 
(1994)  
 
N/A N/A Social 
movements 
Shareholder activism. Three trends drove activism 
trend in 1980’s: 1) Concentration of ownership 
amongst public pension funds, 2) Elaboration of 
fiduciary duties for such funds and 3) Spread of 
antitakeover activity amongst corporations. 
Structure of corporations not only driven by capital 
markets but also by political processes drive 
opportunities for activism 
 
Wright et 
al. (1996)  
Insider, 
institutional 
ownership and 
blockholders 
 
 
358 U.S. 
firms in 1986 
and 514 in 
1992 
Incentives, 
growth 
opportunitie
s and risk-
taking 
Corporate risk-taking (standard deviation of 
analyst’s forecast of earnings per share). High levels 
of insider ownership associated with lower risk-
taking for firms with growth opportunities. 
Institutional ownership associated with greater risk-
taking for firms with growth opportunities 
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Zahra 
(1996) 
Institution (by 
type) and 
executive 
ownership. 
 
 
127 Fortune 
500 firms in 
1988 
Agency Corporate entrepreneurship. Long-term institutional 
ownership (mutual, pension & retirement funds) 
associated with both innovation and venturing. 
Short-term institutions (investment banks & private 
funds) negatively associated with both innovation 
and venturing 
 
Kocchar 
& David 
(1996) 
Brickley et al. 
(1988) equity 
holder 
classification. 
 
135 U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms in 1989 
Comparison 
of investor 
myopia, 
superior 
investor and 
active 
investor 
hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation (new product announcements). Pressure-
resistant institutions associated with innovation 
(active investor hypothesis) 
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Lane et al. 
(1998) 
Strong-owner 
controlled 
(30% or 
greater 
equity), weak-
owner control 
(30-10% 
equity) and 
management-
controlled 
(10% or less 
equity)  
Study 1: 309 
U.S. firms 
between 1957 
and 1972 
 
Study 2: 289 
mergers 
between 1980 
and 1987 
Replication 
of Amihud 
& Lev 
(1981). 
Argues 
against any 
agency 
theoretic 
link between 
equity 
holders and 
diversificati
on 
Diversification. Study 1: Blockholders have no 
impact on acquisition strategy. 40% of management-
controlled firms are constrained diversifiers, which 
offers the best combination of risk and return (1998: 
565)    
  
Study 2: No association between ownership and 
merger type. No evidence of board vigilance (sum of 
standardized outsiders on board and their equity) 
and corporate strategy 
 
Li & 
Simerly 
(1998) 
Insider (CEO) 
ownership 
and leverage 
90 U.S. firms 
between 1990 
and 1993. 51 
from 
computer and 
electronics 
industry and 
39 firms from 
good and 
beverage 
 
Contingency 
in the form 
of 
environment
al dynamism 
Firm performance. Greater positive association 
between insider ownership and performance in 
industries experiencing high environmental 
dynamism 
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Johnson & 
Greening  
(1999) 
Institution (by 
type) 
252 firms 
randomly 
selected from 
KLD (Kinder, 
Lyden- 
berg, Domini, 
and Company 
database) for 
1993 
 
Institutional 
& signaling 
theory 
 
CSP. Public pensions funds, outsider director 
representation and top management equity positively 
associated with product quality dimension of CSP 
Thomsen 
& 
Pedersen 
(2000) 
 
 
 
Institution (by 
type) 
435 European 
firms between 
1990 and 
1995 
Owner 
identity 
Firm performance. Owner identity (i.e. equity holder 
heterogeneity) associated with differential firm 
performance. Corporate, family and government 
owners negatively associated with market-to-book. 
Bank ownership positively associated with market-
to-book (as well as ROA) compared to institutional 
owners. Sales growth highest when majority owner 
is family firm or another company 
 
David et 
al. (2001) 
Public 
pension funds 
 
Panel data of 
73 firms 
between 1987 
and 1993 
Activism Innovation (R & D inputs/investments, and 
outputs/products). Institutional activism (proxy-
based) positively associated with R & D inputs. This 
association is amplified in strategic contexts where 
innovation is critical, i.e., high-tech industries. Also, 
the R & D inputs mediate the association between 
activism and R & D outputs 
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Hoskisson 
et al.  
(2002) 
Institution (by 
type) 
 
 
234 firms (> $ 
30 million 
revenues) 
between 1985 
and 1991 
Investment 
horizons 
Innovation (Internal/R & D, and External/ 
Acquisitions). Pension funds more positively 
associated with internal innovation (i.e. R & D), 
while investment managers more positively 
associated with external innovation (acquisitions) 
 
Ramaswa
my et al.  
(2002) 
Brickley et al. 
(1988) equity 
holder 
classification 
 
88 Indian 
manufacturing 
firms between 
1993 and 
1994 
Agency Diversification. In their Indian sample, authors find 
that pressure-sensitive investors (banks) support 
unrelated diversification while pressure-resistant 
investors (mutual funds and financial institutions) 
discourage it 
 
Gedajlovi
c &  
Shapiro 
(2002) 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
 
344 Japanese 
firms between 
1986-1991 
Agency and 
redistributio
n. 
Inter-corporate profit redistribution. Ownership 
concentration positively associated with corporate 
profitability. Large stakes held by financial and non-
financial partners associated by profit redistribution; 
i.e., least profitable firms (ROA levels < 2%) 
benefit, while the most profitable firms experience 
negative associations between profitability and such 
equity owners. Overall, redistribution effects 
stronger than agency effects (2002: 573) 
 
Chang 
(2003) 
Controlling 
equity holders 
in Korean 
group-
affiliated 
companies. 
 
419 Korean 
chaebol 
affiliates 
between 1986 
and 1996 
Agency Firm performance. Performance associated with 
ownership but not vice versa. Controlling equity 
holders exploit insider information to increase equity 
stakes in profitable companies 
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Lee & 
O’Neil 
(2003) 
Ownership 
concentration. 
 
1,044 U.S. 
firms and 270 
Japanese 
firms in 1995. 
Agency and 
stewardship 
Innovation. Country context matters, agency 
perspective more appropriate for U.S. while 
stewardship more appropriate for Japan. Stock 
concentration associated with innovation in U.S., but 
not in Japan. On average, Japanese firms invest 
more in innovation 
 
Sanders & 
Carpenter 
(2003) 
Insider 
ownership 
250 randomly 
selected S & 
P 500 firms 
between 1992 
and 1995 
Behavioral-
agency 
theory 
Innovation and stock repurchases. Executives use 
stock repurchases to mollify shareholders and 
mitigate information asymmetry generated by 
innovation. Such “strategic satisficing” exacerbated 
by executive stock options and firms missing 
performance expectations. 
 
Tihanyi et 
al. (2003) 
Institution (by 
type) 
 
197 firms 
from 1996 S 
& P 1500 
population 
Agency Diversification (international). Professional 
investment funds and pension funds positively 
associated with international diversification. The 
former association positively moderated by outside 
directors, and the latter by inside director incentives 
 
 
 
Citation Capital 
Structure  
Measures  
Sample Theoretical 
Lens  
 
Strategic Variables & Implications 
Keister 
(2004) 
 
 
State 
ownership 
769 Chinese 
firms between 
1980 and 
1989 
 
Resource 
dependence 
and 
Institutional 
theory 
Firms in transition economies imitate local and high 
status firm’s borrowing strategies. Retained earnings 
associated with increased borrowing from external 
sources, in order to reduce state dependence 
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Yoshikaw
a et al. 
(2005) 
Institution (by 
type) 
 
996 Japanese 
manufacturing 
firms between 
1998 and 
2002 
Stakeholder-
Agency 
theory. 
Foreign vs. 
domestic 
owners 
Wage intensity (wages to sales ratio). Equity holder 
heterogeneity associated with firm investments in 
human resources. Domestic owners positively and 
foreign owners negatively associated with wage 
intensity. Domestic owner support for human capital 
higher in low performing firms but foreign owners 
reduce support for human capital in such firms 
  
Gedajlovi
c et al 
(2005) 
Institution (by 
type) and 
insider 
ownership 
 
 
247 Japanese 
manufacturing 
firms between 
1996-1998 
Market-
oriented vs. 
stable 
investors 
Dividend payouts positively associated with foreign 
shareholders and pension funds. Capital 
expenditures positively associated with foreign 
ownership and negatively with insider ownership. 
Stock market beta positively associated with 
investment trusts, and negatively with pension funds 
 
Neubaum 
& Zahra 
(2006) 
Institution (by 
type) 
 
Fortune 500 
firms: 357 in 
1995 and 383 
in 2000 
 
Stakeholder 
salience 
CSP. Long-term institutional investors (pension 
funds) positively associated with CSP. This 
relationship strengthened by investor activism 
Kim et al. 
(2008)  
 
 
Institution (by 
type) 
 
253 Korean R 
& D intensive 
manufacturing 
firms between 
1998 and 
2003 
Agency  Slack and Innovation. Financial slack has inverted-U 
shaped relationship with R & D. Family ownership 
positively moderates the slack and innovation 
association. Domestic institutional investors and 
foreign investors negatively moderate this 
relationship  
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David et 
al. (2010) 
Domestic vs. 
foreign 
owners in 
Japan. 
 
1,180 
Japanese 
firms between 
1990 and 
2004 
Relational 
vs. 
transactional 
governance. 
Diversification (international). For relational 
(Japanese) owners, sales and employment growth is 
the objective of diversification. Transactional 
(foreign) owners more focused on profits 
 
Connelley 
et al. 
(2010) 
Transient and 
dedicated 
institutional 
investors 
(Bushee, 1998 
& 2001). 
 
72 Fortune 
500 firms, 
between 1997 
and 2006, 
comprising 36 
rivalries 
Agency Competitive actions (strategic vs. tactical). Tactical 
actions (e.g. price changes & service improvements) 
positively associated with transient investors. 
Strategic actions (long term actions involving 
significant firm resources) positively associated with 
dedicated investors and negatively associated with 
transient investors 
 
 
 
  Le & 
O'Brien  
  (2010) 
 
 
State 
ownership 
and debt 
1300 Chinese 
firms between 
2003 and 
2005 
Agency  Agency role of debt offsets the negative impact of 
state ownership (principal-principal problem) on 
firm performance 
 
 Bruton et 
al.  
 (2010) 
Ownership 
concentration 
and private 
equity type 
(business 
angels and 
venture 
capitalists)  
 
224 IPO’s in 
the United 
Kingdom and 
France.  
Agency IPO performance. Ownership concentration 
positively associated with IPO performance, 
however this association is negative in U.K. IPO’s 
compared to French IPO’s. Association of price 
premium is negative with venture capital ownership 
and positive with business angel ownership 
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Okhmatov
skiy 
(2010)  
 
Government 
ownership 
(>5%), state 
owned 
enterprise 
(>25%), 
number and 
proportion of 
government 
officials on 
board 
 
Russian 
banks. 450 in 
2001, 640 
banks in 2003 
and 555 banks 
in 2005 
 
 
Political 
embeddedne
ss 
Firm performance (ROA and ROE). Banks with 
board and ownership ties to state owned enterprises 
have higher ROA. Banks with government officials 
on board have lower ROA than “unconnected” 
banks, suggested use of banks by government for 
low interest funding of projects 
Colpan et 
al. (2011) 
 
Domestic vs. 
foreign 
owners in 
Japan. 
 
96 Japanese 
electronics 
firms between 
1992 and 
2002 
Relational 
vs. 
transactional 
governance. 
Domestic corporate owners positively associated 
with product diversification. Firm performance 
positively moderates relationship between foreign 
ownership and changes in capital investment. Even 
domestic owners have heterogeneous goals, with 
domestic financial owners exhibiting characteristics 
between foreign portfolio investors and domestic 
relational owners (2011: 612) 
 
O’Brien & 
David 
(2013) 
Domestic vs. 
foreign 
owners in 
Japan. 
 
 
2,123 
Japanese 
firms between 
1992 and 
2004 
Behavioral 
theory of the 
firm 
Innovation. For performance exceeding expectations 
“communitarian” (Japanese) owners increase R &D 
to greater extent than “contractarian” (foreign) 
owners 
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Julian & 
Ofori-
Dankwa 
(2013)  
 
ROE 41 Ghanaian 
firms between 
2003 and 
2005 that 
were African 
controlled 
Institutional 
difference 
hypothesis 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR measured as 
ratios of firm expenditures on CSR initiatives to 
sales and equity, as well as log of CSR 
expenditures). Greater availability of financial 
resources (ROS, ROE and net profits) associated 
with lower CSR 
 
Inoue et al 
(2013) 
 
 
 
Minority state 
ownership 
367 Brazilian 
firms between 
1995 and 
2009 
Institutional 
voids in 
emerging 
markets 
 
Firm performance and capital investments. Minority 
state ownership positively associated with firm ROA 
as well as capital investments by financial 
constrained firms with growth opportunities 
 
 Liu et al  
 (2014) 
Share 
turnover, 
concentration 
and financial 
leverage 
221 North 
American 
establishment
s 
Strategic 
Human 
Capital 
Share turnover, concentration and financial leverage 
associated with short-term thinking i.e. reduced 
investments in strategic human capital  
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TABLE 3: Debt heterogeneity 
Citation Capital 
Structure  
Measure  
Sample Theoretical 
Lens  
 
Strategic Variables & Implications 
Stearns & 
Mizruchi 
(1993) 
Debt holders on 
board of 
directors. 
22 large U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms between 
1956 and 1983 
Resource 
dependence 
Firm financing. Positive association 
between: money market banker and 
investment banker with short-term 
borrowing. Presence of either money 
market banker or investment banker 
associated with long-term public 
bonds. Insurance company executive 
negatively associated with long-term 
public bonds 
 
Mizruchi & 
Stearns (1994) 
Financial 
representation on 
board of 
directors. 
 
22 large U.S. 
manufacturing 
firms between 
1956 and 1983 
Resource 
dependence 
Firm financing. Firms with CEOs 
from finance background more likely 
to tap debt financing. Representative 
of financial institution on board is 
strong predictor of debt financing. 
Also, family firms more likely to tap 
debt markets than management-
controlled firms 
 
Davis & 
Mizruchi 
(1999) 
Centrality of 
banks in 
corporate 
networks. Shift 
from private 
(bank) debt to 
public (bond) 
50 largest 
commercial bank 
holding 
companies and 
the 500 largest 
industrial firms 
(the Fortune 500), 
Financial 
intermediation 
Director interlocks. Decline in bank 
centrality in corporate networks from 
1980’s onwards. Between 1982-1994 
bank boards shrunk, with fewer 
corporate executives on their boards. 
Firms under threat (low solvency) 
appoint bankers on board 
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debt. 25 largest 
diversified 
financials, 25 
largest retailers, 
and 25 largest 
transportation 
firms in the U.S. 
during each of 
four panel years: 
1982, 1986, 1990, 
and 1994 (1999: 
226) 
 
Uzzi & 
Gillespie 
(2002) 
Banks of small 
and medium sized 
firms. 
Mixed methods, 
ethnography and 
quantitative 
analysis using 
National Survey 
of Small Business 
Finances data 
 
Embeddedness 
& capability 
Firm financing. Embedded ties 
between banks and firm’s lead to 
greater access to bank capital and 
networks. These in turn enhance 
firm’s management of trade credit 
and reduce late payment penalties 
Tihanyi & 
Hegarty 
(2007) 
 
N/A Longitudinal 
multiple case 
studies in Czech 
Republic and 
Hungary  
 
Organizational 
fields 
 
In transition from central planning to 
market economies, both Czech 
Republic and Hungary witnessed co-
evolution of banking as well as 
regulatory institutions 
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David et al. 
(2008) 
Debt 
heterogeneity 
(relational vs. 
transactional). 
1,853 Japanese 
firms between 
1982 and 2002 
TCE Innovation. Debt homogeneity 
assumption false. Debt heterogeneity 
indicates that relational (bank loan) 
debt has features that support 
innovation 
This in spite of hazards of asset 
specificity, uncertainty and 
appropriability 
 
O’Brien & 
David (2010) 
Debt 
heterogeneity 
(relational vs. 
transactional) 
 
2,182 Japanese 
firms between 
1992 and 2002 
Agency and 
rules vs. 
discretion 
Firm growth. Transactional debt 
similar to a rules regime while 
relational debt similar to a 
discretionary regime. Transactional 
debt effective in curtailing wasteful 
growth 
 
Wang & 
Thornhill 
(2010) 
Debt 
heterogeneity 
(relational vs. 
transactional). 
Also incorporates 
financing 
instruments (i.e. 
common & 
convertible 
securities). 
 
39 U.S. 
petroleum firms 
between 1976 and 
2005 
TCE Innovation. Innovation has an 
inverted U-shaped effect on 
financing through relational debt.  
O’Brien et al. 
(2013) 
Debt 
heterogeneity 
(relational vs. 
transactional). 
1,986 Japanese 
firms between 
1991 and 2001 
Agency, RBV 
& TCE. 
Diversification. Relational debt 
mirrors hierarchies and transactional 
debt mirrors markets. Related 
diversification improves 
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 performance. Debt (especially 
transactional debt) negatively affects 
magnitude of these performance 
gains 
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TABLE 4: The market-hierarchy dichotomy 
 
 Market Hierarchy 
Forbearance No 
 
High/Negotiable 
Ownership Concentration Low/Dispersed 
 
High 
Regime (Kydland & 
Prescott, 1977)  
Rules Discretion 
Cultural Orientation 
(O'Brien & David, 2014) 
 
Contractarian Communitarian 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: Capital structure through a transaction cost lens 
  
 Market Hierarchy 
Time Horizon Short 
 
Long 
Risk Tolerance Low 
 
High 
Forbearance No 
 
High/Negotiable 
Ownership Concentration Low/Dispersed 
 
High 
Regime (Kydland & 
Prescott, 1977)  
Rules Discretion 
Capital Structure as 
Governance Structure 
(Williamson, 1988) 
Debt Equity  
Cultural Orientation 
(O'Brien & David, 2014) 
 
Contractarian Communitarian 
Capital Structure:  
Debt (Boot, 2000) Transactional 
 
Relational 
Equity (Bushee, 1998) Transient Dedicated 
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TABLE 6: Governance attributes of capital structure 
 
Attributes of Governance 
Structure 
Market (transactional 
debt & transient equity)  
Hierarchy (relational debt 
& dedicated equity) 
1. Resource ownership Autonomous. 
 
Joint. 
2. Incentive intensity High-powered incentives.  Flat or low-powered 
incentives.  
3. Primary control 
mechanisms 
Contracts, covenants, 
ratings and pricing signals. 
Administrative (e.g. Board 
of Directors).  
4. Adaptation  Autonomous (usually price 
driven). 
Cooperation. 
5. Regime (Kydland & 
Prescott, 1977) 
Rules regime. Discretionary regime. 
6. Contract Law 
(Williamson, 1991) 
Classical (arbitration and 
litigation). 
Neoclassical (excuse 
doctrine and forbearance). 
7. Type of Opportunism 
most likely (Alchian & 
Woodward, 1988; 
Hennart, 1993; Oxley, 
1997) 
Holdup due to specificity 
and 
Appropriability hazard due 
to weak property rights. 
Moral Hazard due to 
plasticity/discretion. 
8. Alignment mechanism 
(mediators) 
Executive compensation. Board of Directors. 
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TABLE 7: Risk tolerance & time horizon 
 
  
Risk Tolerance 
 
Low Risk  
 
High Risk  
Ti
m
e 
H
or
iz
on
 
 
 
 
Short 
Time 
Horizon 
 
  Transactional debt 
  Transient equity  
 
 
  Impatient Capital 
           
   Activist Debt & Equity 
 
 
 
Long 
Time 
Horizon 
 
  Owner-managed & 
  Family firms  
 
 
     
    Dedicated equity 
    Relational debt  
 
    Patient Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
 
3 
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FIGURE 1: Capital Structure and Diversification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transactional Debt H1a (+) 
 
CEO Stock Options 
H7*(+) & H8* (-) 
 
Unrelated 
Diversification 
Transient Equity H1b (+) 
* Mediation hypotheses 7, 8 & 9. H1a established in literature. 
Dedicated Equity 
Related  
Diversification 
H2b (+)  
BOD: Director 
Incentives  
H9*(+) 
Relational Debt 
H2a (+
)  
  
H1c (-) 
H2c (
-)  
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FIGURE 2: Capital Structure and Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transactional Debt H4a (+) 
 
CEO Stock Options 
H7*(+) & H8*(-) 
 
External 
Innovation 
Transient Equity H4b (+) 
* Mediation hypotheses 7, 8 & 9. H 5a & 5b established in literature. 
Dedicated Equity 
Internal 
Innovation 
H5b (+)  
BOD: Director 
Incentives  
H9*(+) 
Relational Debt 
H5a (+
)  
  
H5c 
(-) 
H4c (-)  
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TABLE 8a: Descriptive statistics of unstandardized Diversification data 
Descriptive Statistics Diversification Sample 
 Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 Dedicated 4,593 8.56 7.74 0.01 36.81 
Transient 4,936 17.19 13.28 0.01 61.97 
Relational 3,248 0.0004 0.002 0.00 0.05 
Transactional 3,248 1.00 0.002 0.95 1.00 
Unrelated 
Diversification 4,307 1.06 1.20 0.00 5.25 
Related 
Diversification 4,982 0.86 1.18 0.00 5.07 
R and D Intensity 2,499 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.74 
CEO Stock 
Options 1,990 2,206,870 3,955,621 0.00 23,469,756 
Director Options 1,157 5,656.24 5,657.53 500 30,000 
Assets 5,025 12,302,517,864 36,943,648,349 8,423,280 288,760,000,000 
Cash_NearCash 5,024 1,031,027,228 3,384,527,552 86,460 25,885,000,000 
Market-To-Book 4,990 2.83 2.75 0.37 17.83 
Free Cash Flow 4,966 444,230,863 1,607,459,357 -1,675,859,250 11,635,000,000 
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TABLE 8b: Descriptive statistics of unstandardized M & A data 
 
Descriptive Statistics M & A Sample 
 Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 Dedicated 2,773 9.84 7.14 0.09 32.23 
Transient 2,790 22.41 13.35 2.46 67.41 
Relational Debt 2,478 0.26 0.21 0.00 0.86 
Transactional 
Debt 2,478 0.74 0.21 0.14 1.00 
Unrelated 
Diversification 2,739 0.99 0.77 0.00 3.63 
Related 
Diversification 2,713 0.36 0.67 0.00 3.19 
R & D Intensity 2,207 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.52 
MA/Assets 2,659 2.33 6.04 0.00 173.78 
CEO options 1,704 2,818,215 4,880,283 0 30,551,340 
Director options 1,145 6,454.74 6,059.14 500 31,140 
Assets 2,790 10,478,216,654 52,936,388,784 34,472,000 1,120,650,000,000 
Cash_NearCash 2,790 989,482,690 6,475,831,634 0 225,037,000,000 
Free Cash Flow 2,769 501,503,424 1,410,087,852 -451,430,840 10,043,260,000 
Market-to-Book 2,790 3.42 2.89 0.13 17.57 
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TABLE 8c: Descriptive statistics of unstandardized R & D data 
 
Descriptive Statistics R & D Sample 
 Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
 Dedicated 10,866 8.99 7.65 0.01 33.85 
Transient 11,772 20.78 15.20 0.01 66.68 
Relational 6,935 0.001 0.01 0.00 0.32 
Transactional 6,935 1.00 0.01 0.68 1.00 
R & D Intensity 12,161 0.38 1.45 0.001 11.98 
CEO Stock 
Options 3,708 2,844,196 5,033,139 0.00 31,620,977 
Director 
Options 2,759 8,064.53 7,623.23 527.84 40,000 
Assets 12,161 4,614,167,293 14,595,616,280 3,613,200 108,400,000,000 
Cash_NearCash 12,161 550,005,784 1,623,595,279 143,000 11,487,758,800 
Market-To-
Book 12,052 4.28 5.22 0.40 36.90 
Free Cash Flow 12,065 319,883,106 1,172,022,142 -317,113,440 8,720,000,000 
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TABLE 9: List of Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Capital Structure   
1. Relational debt Proportion of bank debt held by firm. 
Denominator is sum of book value of equity 
(BKLVPS X CSHO) and long-term debt 
(DLTT) 
Bank loan data available 
from Osiris dataset. 
Proportion calculated as 
standard in literature 
(Wang & Thornhill, 
2010). 
2. Transactional debt Debt not classified as relational. 
Denominator is sum of book value of equity 
(BKLVPS X CSHO) and long-term debt 
(DLTT) 
(Wang & Thornhill, 
2010). 
3. Transient equity Proportion of shares outstanding 
(Compustat variable CSHO) held by short-
term investors with highly diversified 
portfolios 
Online public data 
(Bushee, 2013) merged 
with Thompson-Reuters 
13f data. (Bushee, 
2001). 
4. Dedicated equity Proportion of shares outstanding held by 
long-term investors with less diversified 
portfolios. 
 
Same as above. 
Mediators   
1. CEO Stock 
Options 
Product of CEO stock option grants 
awarded during firm’s fiscal year and the 
Black-Scholes option value at that fiscal 
year end. Variable directly available via 
ExecuComp. 
ExecuComp. (Lim & 
McCann, 2013). 
2. Outside Director 
stock options 
Outside director stock options. This variable 
is average of stock option grants to outside 
directors. Same calculation as CEO stock 
options. 
 
ExecuComp. 
Diversification   
Entropy measure Unrelated diversification is the weighted 
average of all firm industry group shares  
Related diversification is the weighted 
average of firm segment-to-group shares 
across segments within all firm groups. 
  
Compustat Business 
Segments dataset. 
(Davis & Duhaime, 
1989; Palepu, 1985) 
Innovation   
1. Innovation R & D intensity (XRD/ SALE) Compustat Annual 
Financials 
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2. External 
Innovation 
Acquisitions. Measured as M & A 
completed value/ Assets (Compustat 
variable AT). 
 
 
 
SDC Platinum M & A 
dataset. (Puranam & 
Srikanth, 2007) 
Controls   
1. Assets Firm assets.(AT) Compustat Annual 
Financials. 
2. Cash & Near Cash Firm holdings of cash or near cash market 
instruments 
Same as above. 
3. Free Cash Flow Operating Cash flow – capital expenditures 
(OANCF – CAPX) 
Same as above. 
4. Firm Performance Market-to-Book (Market value of equity/ 
Book value of equity) calculated using 
Compustat fiscal year closing stock price 
(PRCC_F)  
Compustat Annual 
Financials. (Patel & 
Cooper, 2014) 
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TABLE 10a: Correlations for Diversification Sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Dedicated             
2. Transient 0.15***            
3. Relational Debt 0.06** -0.03           
4. Transactional 
Debt -0.06** 0.03 -1.0***          
5. Unrelated 
Diversification 0.05** -0.09*** 0.05** -0.05**         
6. Related 
Diversification 0.00 -0.07*** -0.02 0.02 0.10***        
7. R & D Intensity -0.06** 0.07*** -0.04 0.04 -0.10*** -0.06**       
8. CEO Stock 
Options 0.02 0.02 -0.08** 0.08** 0.01 0.09*** 0.23***      
9. Director Options 0.02 0.15*** -0.05 0.05 -0.08* -0.09** 0.42*** 0.24***     
10. Assets -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.05** 0.05** 0.12*** 0.24*** -0.06** 0.24*** 0.00    
11. Cash_NearCash -0.07*** -0.11*** -0.05** 0.05** 0.08*** 0.19*** 0.04* 0.22*** 0.08** 0.81***   
12. Market-To-Book -0.03 0.04** 0.03 -0.03 -0.04* 0.00 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.10*** -0.03 0.02  
13. Free Cash Flow -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.05* 0.05* 0.14*** 0.19*** -0.02 0.22*** 0.03 0.60*** 0.63*** 0.09*** 
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TABLE 10b: Correlations for M & A Sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Dedicated              
2. Transient 0.05**             
3. Relational 
Debt 0.09*** -0.01            
4. Transactional 
Debt -0.09*** 0.01 -1.00***           
5. Unrelated  
Diversification -0.07*** -0.16*** 0.01 -0.01          
6. Related  
Diversification -0.06** -0.22*** 0.01 -0.01 0.62***         
7. R & D 
Intensity 0.02 0.24*** -0.17*** 0.17*** -0.19*** -0.17***        
8. MA/Assets -0.05* 0.16*** -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.13*** -0.11*** 0.14***       
9. CEO options -0.05* -0.02 -0.10*** 0.10*** 0.03 0.06** 0.28*** -0.10***      
10. Director 
options 0.06 0.25*** -0.16*** 0.16*** -0.09** -0.15*** 0.44*** 0.07* 0.25***     
11. Assets -0.06*** -0.14*** -0.12*** 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.16*** -0.06** -0.07*** 0.12*** 0.06    
12. Cash_NearCas
h -0.06** -0.09*** -0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.06** -0.05** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.73***   
13. Free Cash 
Flow -0.10*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.01 -0.12*** 0.28*** 0.06 0.62*** 0.47***  
14. Market-to-
Book 0.00 -0.01 0.05* -0.05* -0.11*** -0.04* 0.12*** 0.04 0.27*** 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.15*** 
 
 
 
 
159 
TABLE 10c: Correlations for R & D Sample 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Dedicated             
2. Transient 0.11***            
3. Relational 0.00 -0.03**           
4. Transactional 0.00 0.03** -1.00***          
5.  Unrelated Diversification -0.01 -0.11*** 0.01 -0.01         
6. Related Diversification 0.01 -0.10*** -0.01 0.01 0.40***        
7. R & D Intensity 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.07*** -0.07***       
8. CEO Stock Options 0.00 -0.01 -0.05* 0.05* 0.00 0.06** 0.02      
9. Director Options -0.02 0.15*** -0.04 0.04 -0.15*** -0.13*** 0.15*** 0.25***     
10. Assets -0.10*** -0.19*** -0.02 0.02 0.40*** 0.38*** -0.07*** 0.23*** -0.05*    
11. Cash_NearCash -0.10*** -0.16*** -0.02 0.02 0.27*** 0.24*** -0.05*** 0.29*** 0.12*** 0.82***   
12. Market-To-Book -0.01 0.05*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.09*** -0.03*** 0.00  
13. Free Cash Flow -0.10*** -0.17*** -0.02 0.02 0.28*** 0.30*** -0.06*** 0.22*** 0.01 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.02* 
 160 
TABLE 11: GMM Results for Unrelated Diversification 
GMM Results for Unrelated Diversification (Diversification sample) 
 Unrelated Diversification CEO options 
 Model 1 
Model 
2 Model 3 Model 4 
Assets  0.29**  0.09  0.40***  0.18** 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.06) 
Market-To-Book -0.05 -0.08 -0.08  0.41* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17) 
Cash_NearCash -0.35*** -0.10 
-
0.47***  0.00 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07) 
Free Cash Flow  0.31***  0.14  0.18°  0.12 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) 
Transactional Debt -0.11   0.01  0.08 
 (0.09)  (0.12) (0.31) 
Transactional Debt t-1 -0.04  -0.20 -0.03 
 (0.33)  (0.35) (0.19) 
Transient -0.05  -0.20° -0.27° 
 (0.09)  (0.11) (0.16) 
Transient t-1 -0.03  -0.04  0.25° 
 (0.08)  (0.11) (0.14) 
Dedicated  0.00   0.02  
 (0.08)  (0.10)  
Dedicated t-1  0.12   0.10  
 (0.09)  (0.10)  
CEO options  -0.03 -0.04  
  (0.10) (0.09)  
CEO options t-1    0.05  0.10  
  (0.05) (0.06)  
Num. obs. used 2047 1621 1182 1301 
Sargan Test: Χ2 285.81 176.53 149.83 145.69 
Wald Test Coefficients: Χ2 35.23*** 3.83 40.04*** 59.84*** 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
(1)  2.31
* 1.57 -0.05 -2.05* 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
(2) -0.62 -1.24 -0.38  1.00 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, °p < 0.1 
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TABLE 12: GMM Results for Related Diversification 
GMM Results for Related Diversification (Diversification sample) 
 Related Diversification Director  Options 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Assets  0.33  0.17  0.13 -0.11 
 (0.20) (0.16) (0.20) (0.07) 
Market-To-Book -0.14*  0.07 -0.00  0.08 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) 
Cash_NearCash -0.13 -0.09 -0.16  0.18* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.08) 
Free Cash Flow  0.11  0.21°  0.19  0.11 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) 
Relational -0.02  -0.10 -0.07 
 (0.12)  (0.19) (0.15) 
Relational t-1 -0.29*  -1.00° -0.23° 
 (0.12)  (0.57) (0.13) 
Dedicated -0.03   0.28** -0.13 
 (0.06)  (0.10) (0.15) 
Dedicated t-1  0.12°  -0.14  0.02 
 (0.06)  (0.10) (0.10) 
Transient -0.12  -0.09  
 (0.08)  (0.10)  
Transient t-1 -0.08  -0.35**  
 (0.05)  (0.12)  
Director options    0.13  0.02  
  (0.19) (0.11)  
Director options t-1  -0.49* -0.35*  
  (0.22) (0.17)  
Num. obs. used 2597 1077 673 754 
Sargan Test: Χ2 338.39 130.08 106.01 119.53 
Wald Test Coefficients: Χ2 31.98*** 18.96*** 26.92** 15.91** 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
(1)  1.39 -0.7 -0.1 -0.84 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
(2) -0.44 -0.92 -0.17 -1.05 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, °p < 0.1 
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TABLE 13: GMM Results for Mergers & Acquisitions 
GMM Results for Mergers & Acquisitions ( M & A Sample) 
 
M & A CEO options 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 Model 4 
Assets  0.03  0.04  0.01 0.06 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) 
Market-to-Book -0.02 -0.06° -0.04  0.30*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) 
Cash_NearCash -0.03 -0.29** -0.10  0.57 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.08) (0.68) 
Free Cash Flow -0.11** -0.01 -0.03 -0.18 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.24) 
Transactional Debt  0.13*   0.07  0.15° 
 (0.06)  (0.06) (0.09) 
Transactional Debt t-1 -0.06   0.03 -0.01 
 (0.06)  (0.05) (0.07) 
Transient  0.12*   0.19** -0.27* 
 (0.05)  (0.07) (0.11) 
Transient t-1 -0.03  -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.04)  (0.05) (0.09) 
Dedicated -0.11*  -0.06°  
 (0.06)  (0.03)  
Dedicated t-1  0.12   0.04  
 (0.08)  (0.05)  
CEO options  -0.04* -0.06**  
  (0.02) (0.02)  
CEO options t-1  -0.05* -0.06**  
  (0.02) (0.02)  
     
Num. obs. used 1837 1080 980 1169 
Sargan Test: Χ2 211.18 152.32 148.35 160.43 
Wald Test Coefficients: Χ2 54.96*** 33.30*** 81.66*** 312.85*** 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
(1) -2.66
** -2.48* -2.34* -2.1* 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
(2) -0.36 -0.01 -0.01 -1.25 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, °p < 0.1 
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TABLE 14: GMM Results for Research & Development 
GMM Results for R & D (R & D Sample) 
 R & D Director options 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Assets -0.05* -0.09** -0.02 -0.55*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) 
Market-To-Book  0.03 -0.05° -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) 
Cash_NearCash  0.03 -0.00 -0.04  0.42* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) 
Free Cash Flow -0.05  0.01 -0.01 0.09 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) 
Relational -0.02   0.21 -0.64° 
 (0.02)  (0.25) (0.35) 
Relational t-1 -0.02***   0.22 -1.14 
 (0.01)  (0.25) (0.85) 
Dedicated  0.05   0.13 -0.18° 
 (0.06)  (0.10) (0.10) 
Dedicated t-1 -0.01  -0.04  0.03 
 (0.04)  (0.04) (0.07) 
Transient  0.12  -0.01  
 (0.09)  (0.03)  
Transient t-1 -0.03  -0.02  
 (0.06)  (0.03)  
Director options  -0.02  0.07  
  (0.02) (0.06)  
Director options t-1  -0.04 -0.02  
  (0.03) (0.04)  
Num. obs. used 6869 3544 2034 2213 
Sargan Test: Χ2 452.68 263.54 235.16 203.48 
Wald Test Coefficients: Χ2 48.93*** 42.43*** 28.46** 15.21* 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
(1) -2.66
* -0.19 -0.90 -2.02* 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test (2) -0.88 -0.99 -1.66 -0.74 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, °p < 0.1 
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TABLE 15: Summary of Significant Results 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Result 
 
Unrelated Diversification (Table 11) 
 
H1b (Model 3) Transient Equity  Sign opposite of hypothesis, negative 
association. Significant at 0.1 level. 
 
Related Diversification (Table 12) 
 
H1c (Model 3) Transient Equity As hypothesized, negative association. 
H 2a (Model 1 
& 3) 
Relational debt Sign opposite of hypothesis, negative 
association with Related diversification.  
H 2b (Model 3) Dedicated Equity As hypothesized, positive association. 
H 9 (Model 2 & 
3) 
Director options Sign opposite of hypothesis. Director options 
are negatively associated with related 
diversification. 
 
M & A (Table 13) 
 
H 4 b (Model 1 
& 3) 
Transient Equity As hypothesized, positive association. 
H 5 c (Model 1 
& 3) 
Dedicated Equity  As hypothesized, negative association. 
H 4 a (Model 1) Transactional Debt  As hypothesized, positive association.  
H 7 & 8 
Mediation 
(Model 3 & 4) 
Transactional Debt, 
Transient Equity & 
CEO options 
Transient equity positively associated with M & 
A (model 3) and negatively associated with 
CEO options (model 4). CEO options 
negatively associated with M & A supporting 
H8. 
 
R & D (Table 14) 
 
H 5 a (Model 1) Relational debt Sign opposite of hypothesis, negative 
association. 
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TABLE 16: Post-hoc Analysis of Firm Diversification, R & D and Performance 
 Market-to-Book  ROA   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Assets -0.14** -0.06 -0.09° -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.17*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Cash_NearCash  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.14**  0.12**  0.06*  0.12**  0.01 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Free Cash Flow  0.10*  0.08*  0.07*  0.05° 0.19***  0.17***  0.20***  0.25*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Unrelated Diversification  0.11     0.11    
 (0.17)    (0.09)    
Unrelated Diversification t-1 -0.25    -0.12    
 (0.18)    (0.11)    
Related Diversification  -0.00    -0.06   
  (0.09)    (0.07)   
Related Diversification t-1  -0.05     0.06   
  (0.10)    (0.07)   
Diversification Total   -0.20     0.15  
   (0.13)    (0.11)  
Diversification Total t-1   -0.06    -0.05  
   (0.08)    (0.06)  
Diversification Total2   0.07*    -0.02  
   (0.03)    (0.03)  
R and D Intensity    -0.04    -0.09 
    (0.06)    (0.20) 
R and D Intensity     0.06    -0.51*** 
    (0.05)    (0.07) 
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Num. obs. used 3906 4937 3834 14633 2979 3914 2926 10256 
Sargan Test: Χ2 284.37 303.49* 321.73 585.09** 246.85 242.07 264.43 355.15** 
Wald Test Coefficients: Χ2 12.75* 8.05 15.88* 33.18** 41.96*** 35.53*** 49.76*** 225.34*** 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test (1) -2.80** -3.00** -2.49* -3.44** -3.54** -4.12*** -3.41** -6.97*** 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test (2)  0.59  0.19  0.39 -3.08** -2.18* -2.34** -2.11* -3.20** 
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APPENDIX 
 
 R CODE FOR DATA REPLICATION  
 
 
 
(# Precede comments, rest is R code) 
#Adding e1996 files (Bushee + 13f) 
 
e2010<-read.csv("e2010.csv", header = TRUE) 
 
#Data check using GE as example, all OK 
 
GE2010<-subset(e2010,e2010$ticker=="GE") 
 
#Getting last known holdings for each ticker by mgrno (Manager Number in 
Bushee and 13f filings) to avoid double counting of shareholdings 
 
e1996$date<-as.Date(as.character(e1996$rdate),"%Y%m%d")  
 
e1996$sharesoutstanding<-(e1996$shrout1*1000000) 
 
library(dplyr) 
 
laste1996<-e1996 %>% group_by(ticker,mgrno) 
%>%filter(date==max(date))  
 
#Separate Calculation of proportion of shares held by Transient,  
Dedicated and Quasi-indexer using R package dplyr  
 
library(dplyr) 
 
laste1996q <-laste1996 %>% group_by(ticker) %>%  
             filter(permclass=="QIX")%>% 
             mutate(QIXshares=sum(shares)) 
 
laste1996t <-laste1996 %>% group_by(ticker) %>%  
       filter(permclass=="TRA")%>% 
             mutate(TRAshares=sum(shares))  
 
laste1996d <-laste1996 %>% group_by(ticker) %>%  
             filter(permclass=="DED")%>% 
             mutate(DEDshares=sum(shares)) 
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e1996temp<-merge(laste1996q, laste1996t, by=c("ticker"), all=TRUE) 
 
e1996holdings <-merge(e1996temp, laste1996d, by=c("ticker"), all=TRUE)   
 
e1996holdings<-unique(e1996full [ , 1:3]) 
 
 
#Combined Bushee classification data with Thompson-Reuters 13F filings and then with 
WRDS Compustat fiscal year data, firm-years =35,705 Original in file, add 
ewrdsfullYEAR files and holdingYEAR files to merge  
 
ewrdsfull1996<-read.csv("ewrdsfull1996.csv", header = TRUE) 
 
holdings1996<-read.csv("eholdings1996.csv", header = TRUE) 
 
eh1996<-merge(ewrdsfull1996, holdings1996, by=c("tic"), all.x=TRUE) 
 
 
#Diversification calculation, calculate DU, DR & DT, remove duplicates 
 
d1996<-read.csv("d1996.csv", header = TRUE) 
 
library(pylr) 
 
d1996 <-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey), transform, totalsales = sum(sales)) 
 
d1996 <-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey,SICS1), transform, segmentsales = sum(sales)) 
 
d1996 <-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey,SICS1_2), transform, groupsales = sum(sales)) 
 
 
dr1996 <-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey),  
      summarize,    
      DR = sum((segmentsales/groupsales)*log(groupsales/segmentsales)))  
 
du1996<-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey),  
      summarize,    
      DU = sum((groupsales/totalsales)*log(totalsales/groupsales))) 
 
D1996<-merge(du1996, dr1996, by='gvkey',all=T) 
 
D1996$DT<-D1996$DR + D1996$DU 
 
head(D1996,25) #data check 
 
 
#adding Diversification file D1996  to eh1996 without loss of primary data and 
removing duplicate observations 
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ehd1996<-merge(eh1996, D1996, by=c("gvkey"), all.x=TRUE)  
 
ehd1996<-ehd1996[!duplicated(ehd1996$gvkey),] 
 
 
#Stacking yearly files (ehdYEAR) to create panel 
 
ehd1997_2010<-rbind(ehd1997,ehd1998,ehd1999,ehd2000,ehd2001,ehd2002, 
ehd2003,ehd2004,ehd2005,ehd2006,ehd2007,ehd2008, ehd2009,ehd2010) 
 
cols<-intersect(colnames(ehd1997_2010), colnames(ehd1996)) 
 
ehd1996_2010<-rbind(ehd1997_2010[,cols], ehd1996[,cols])  
 
 
#Adding relational debt from Osiris, using CIK numbers to get GVKEYS from WRDS, 
then merging with main data. 
 
bankloanO1<-read.csv("bankloanO1.csv", header=TRUE) 
 
Changing Osiris data from factor to numeric before calculating full variable and 
downloading gvkeys from WRDS 
 
bankloanO1$BankLoanOsiris<-as.numeric(as.character(bankloanO1$DATA21070)) 
 
bankloanO1$AllLoansOsiris<-as.numeric(as.character(bankloanO1$DATA21010)) 
 
osiristic<-read.csv("osiristic.csv",header=TRUE) 
 
osiriscik<-read.csv("osiriscik.csv", header=TRUE) 
 
bankloan03<-merge(bankloan02, osiristic, by=c("tic","fyear"), all.x=TRUE) 
 
bankloan04<-merge(bankloan03, osiriscik, by=c("CIK","fyear"), all.x=TRUE) 
 
bankloan04$fyear.x<-as.Date(as.character(bankloan04$fyear), "%Y") 
 
bankloan05<-subset(bankloan04, fyear.x > "1995-12-31") 
 
bankloan06<-subset(bankloan05, fyear.x < "2010-12-31") 
 
#Most common identifier available is still ticker, so used for merging after renaming 
columns. 
 
ehdb<-merge(ehd1996_2010, bankloan06, 
by.x=c("tic","fyear.x"),by.y=c("tic.x","fyear"), all.x=TRUE) 
 
#Removing duplicate observations created by full merge 
 
ehdb2<-ehdb[!duplicated(ehdb[c("tic","fyear.x")]),] 
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#cleaned ehdb (EquityHolderDiversificationBankloan) file version #3 used for further 
combinations. 
 
#Combining with ExecuComp data : ceoanncomp, CoDirectorFull using GVKEY (no 
missing values in ExecuComp data) and YEAR 
 
ceoanncomp<-read.csv("ceoanncomp.csv", header=TRUE) 
 
CoDirectorFull<-read.csv("CoDirectorFull.csv", header=TRUE) 
 
 
ehdbceo<-merge(ehdb3, ceoanncomp, by=c("GVKEY","YEAR"), all.x=TRUE) 
 
ehdbceodir<-merge(ehdbceo, CoDirectorFull, by=c("GVKEY","YEAR"), all.x=TRUE) 
 
#ehdbceodir has dimensions 34,546 by 259; but most firm years have missing data due 
to full merge used. Check data again using GE as example 
 
GEfull<-subset(ehdbceodir,tic=="GE")  #all OK 
 
#subsetting ehdbceodir to get variables for setting up final panel. 
 
panelsetup<-subset(ehdbceodir, select=c(GVKEY, YEAR, tic, DEDholdings, 
TRAholdings, csho, BankLoanOsiris, at,che, dltt, bkvlps, DU, DR, DT, revt,sale, prcc_f, 
re, wcap, xrd, xsga, dlc, ebit, emp, intan, ni, capx, oancf, 
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE, OPTION_AWARDS_RPT_VALUE, TDC1, 
ANNDIRRET, NUMMTGS, DIRSTK, DIROPT, SALECHG, NICHG, EPSEXCHG, 
ROEAVG, ROA,MKTVAL, SHRSOUT,sich,naicsh))  
 
panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding<-panelsetup$csho*1000000 
 
panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding2<-panelsetup$SHRSOUT*1000000 
 
#Institution holdings converted to percentage ownership. 
  
panelsetup$Dedicated<-(panelsetup$DEDshares/panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding)*100 
 
panelsetup$Transient<-(panelsetup$TRAshares /panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding)*100 
 
panelsetup$LongTermDebt<-panelsetup$dltt*1000000 
 
panelsetup$BookValueofEquity<-panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding*panelsetup$bkvlps 
 
panelsetup$Relational<-panelsetup$BankLoanOsiris/(panelsetup$LongTermDebt+ 
panelsetup$BookValueofEquity) 
 
panelsetup$Transactional<-(1-panelsetup$Relational) 
 
panelsetup$CEOStockOptionsBS<- 
panelsetup$OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE*1000 
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panelsetup$Assets<-panelsetup$at*1000000 
 
panelsetup$Cash_NearCash<-panelsetup$che*1000000 
 
panelsetup$MarketToBook<-
(panelsetup$prcc_f*panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding)/panelsetup$BookValueofEquity 
 
panelsetup$OperatingCashFlow<-panelsetup$oancf*1000000 
 
panelsetup$CapitalExpenditures<-panelsetup$capx*1000000 
 
panelsetup$FreeCashFlow<-(panelsetup$OperatingCashFlow - 
panelsetup$CapitalExpenditures) 
 
panelsetup$RandDIntensity<-(panelsetup$xrd/panelsetup$sale) 
 
 
For any queries, please contact me: chetanchawla@gmail.com  
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